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Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
In the recent worldwide expansion and exponential growth of National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs) one can, in a way, notice the sense of the human rights regime 
finally coming full circle.   
In fact, human rights began as an essentially localized phenomenon whereby local 
communities were the lead actors in promoting ethical codes of conduct for the 
recognition and protection of the dignity of their members. With the start of the 20
th
 
century, the field of human rights  gradually underwent a process of 
internationalization, with the introduction of a series of international treaties  directed at 
the protection of religious and ethnic minorities. Following World War I, these efforts 
were included within the first international framework of human rights protection 
championed by the League of Nations. With the realization that this approach did not 
prevent the barbarities of World War II, the focus soon shifted from group rights to 
individual rights and a strong commitment from the international community was 
devoted to the universalization of human rights guarantees. The ratification of both the 
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was followed by a 
proliferation of human rights conferences, treaties and declarations which paved the 
way for the current international human rights standards regime. Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s new actors started to play leading roles in the standard-setting agenda, with 
international and intergovernmental bodies effectively holding the reigns of such 
developments. Human rights enforcement efforts were, at this historical stage, above all 
concentrated on the establishment of a truly universal mechanism, somehow relegating 
local efforts at human rights protection to a lesser role.  Bearing in mind that states have 
always been regarded as bearing the primary onus of human rights protection, there 
seemed to be a substantial gap between the international and the local. 
The sense of renewed urgency for human rights promotion and protection at the local 
level that soon started to surface amongst human rights advocates and governments 
alike led to the introduction of NHRIs on a global scale, whose numbers quickly spread 
throughout the 1980s. In 1991 the Paris Principles were adopted, consisting of a set of 
guidelines regulating the establishment and functioning of NHRIs. Shortly thereafter 
came the official endorsement from the international community, when the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration
1
 explicitly “encourage[ed] the establishment and strengthening of national 
[human rights] institutions”.2  The United Nations efforts in favor of the “NHRI 
project” culminated in the creation of a NHRI-specific post, the Special Adviser on 
National Institutions, Regional Arrangements and Preventive Strategies, which 
obviously allowed for greater recognition of NHRI activism the world over. The final 
                                                          
1
 The authoritative document adopted by the 1993 United Nations Vienna World Conference on Human 
Rights. 
2
 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Delaration, pt.I, ch. III. 
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development, which pushed NHRI activism and institutionalization even further, was 
the establishment of the International Coordinating Committee of National Human 
Rights Institutions (ICC) in 1994, the purpose of which was to coordinate the activities 
of NHRIs internationally, acting as connector between NHRIs and the international 
human rights law regime . The ICC soon began registering members based on their 
compliance with the Paris Principles, without which no NHRI would be considered a 
reliable partner by the international community as a whole. 
To a superficial observer these recent developments might represent a closing of the 
previously mentioned circle: national human rights are finally brought back to the fore 
of institutionalization processes and the gap that was dividing “the international” from 
“the local” has finally been bridged. I would contend differently, adding a layer of 
criticism to a system I otherwise consider absolutely necessary for the current human 
rights regime. By focusing on one specific category of NHRI, the Iberoamerican 
Defensor del Pueblo, I will depict those local realities that have so far been overly 
disregarded in the institutionalization processes that NHRIs have recently benefited 
from.  At the international level, no official NHRI evaluation has ever been made by 
seeking to identify the critical human rights issues in the country to then determine how 
the NHRI has addressed them. The different local circumstances which the NHRI is 
bound to be characterized by have never been taken into consideration in processes of 
evaluation, and it is self-evident that NHRIs do not exist in a vacuum. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the institutionalization process of NHRIs 
through a critical lens, cognizant of the fact that the mere existence of a NHRI in any 
one country does not necessarily mean an improvement for local human rights. There is 
an inherent problem with the current NHRI project and that is the substantial disregard 
for the local context within the assessment of these institutions’ effectiveness. An 
overly confident reliance on international standards for evaluation, embodied in the 
Paris Principles adoption and the worldwide recognition of their value as sole means of 
institutional promotion or criticism, is at the root of the tainted success that these 
institutions have had in the last thirty years. 
Consequently, the thesis sets out to answer the following question: 
Are the Paris Principles a sufficient mechanism to evaluate NHRIs effectiveness in the 
light of the local context’s influence? 
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1.2 Method and Sources 
This research project is a combined descriptive and analytical effort, carried out through a 
combination of primary and secondary sources. 
For the initial description of the NHRI concept, both scholarly articles and practitioners’ 
reports were used. The fair conception of NHRIs that results from the analysis is due to a 
balanced choice between laudatory and critical writings, UN-documents, NGO and 
independent experts reports, an essential approach for transmitting an unbiased account of the 
subject matter.  
As far as the regional focus section of the thesis, of invaluable help has been the three-month 
internship period spent at the Office of the Defensor del Pueblo de Ecuador (May – August 
2013). During my placement, apart from learning the workings and technicalities of a NHRI 
from within, I drafted a capacity assessment worksheet divided into five different areas of 
concern (Internal Procedures, Human Resources, Leadership, Accountability and Technical 
Resources). Each of these areas is itself divided into three parts. 
The first part presents a number of indicators/guide statements (36 in total) to be rated 
following a set rating system (out of 5). This represents the only quantative data analysis of 
the capacity assessment, the rest of which is all qualitative. Within this first part, explicatory 
evidence is also asked to be given in support for each graded indicator in order to be able to 
review objective facts rather than simple personal opinions; the second part consists of a 
SWOT analysis table, where each member of staff is asked to list his/her perceptions on the 
Dirección’s Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats on that particular area of 
concern; the third and final part is a space left for general recommendations, obviously 
directed only at the relevant area of concern. 
The worksheets were handed out to each member of staff of the Dirección and a working 
week was left for its completion. Once all the worksheets had been handed in, both 
quantitative and qualitative data was analyzed. The analysis’ purpose was to reflect back to 
the staff of the Dirección their own understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, challenges 
and overall effectiveness of their work. From such analysis a list of final recommendations 
was proposed with a view to increase the Dirección’s effectiveness for its future. Furthermore, 
the capacity assessment worksheet was given out to staff members of four Provincial 
Delegations (Orellana, Sucumbios, Guayas and Azuay) during my visits to these external 
offices. The data collected was then processed separately, in order to discern the different 
realities present in the country.  
This whole activity is supposed to be a pilot scheme, which will hopefully become an 
integrating part of the self-assessment mechanism of the Defensoría in the future. The 
objective of such assessment is in fact to understand the existing strengths and weaknesses of 
the Dirección in order to develop future capacity development strategies. It is for this reason 
that I would see such Capacity Assessment as a complementary feature to the regular Strategy 
4 
 
Plan processes.  This project goes hand in hand with the purpose of the thesis, as a practical 
example of alternative means of assessment mechanisms which directly relate to the local 
context. A copy of my work at the office of the Defensor del Pueblo of Ecuador is attached in 
Annex II. 
During my stay in Ecuador, I also benefited from the possibility of accessing the extensive 
collection of specialist publications found in the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 
Sociales (FLACSO - Sede Ecuador). It is in FLACSO’s library that I managed to conclude the 
short comparative analysis of the various Iberoamerican Defensor del Pueblo offices’ 
mandates. 
On my return from Ecuador, I had the chance to attend the second International Conference 
of the Programa Regional de Apoyo a las Defensorías del Pueblo en Iberoamerica 
(PRADPI). The three day event (25 – 27 September 2013), attended by the majority of 
Iberoamerican Defensores del Pueblo, was a fantastic opportunity to discuss and share points 
of view on the strengths and weaknesses of the global NHRI system of governance. 
Notwithstanding the fact that I have not regarded these extremely instructive discussions as 
outright interviews, they highly influenced the considerations found throughout my thesis as 
well as my conclusions.  
As far as the third part of the thesis is concerned, and more specifically regarding the critique 
of the current NHRI project, I based my research on both scholarly articles, official UN-
documentation and ICC instruments. Due to my current six month internship at the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (January – July 2014), I have had access to the 
UNOG Library as well as to a wide variety of human rights practitioners in the field of 
NHRIs, a list of which I have set in the bibliography. It has obviously been of great help in 
my research to be able to count on this sort of opportunity. 
1.3 Outline 
The present paper can be divided into three parts. Part I (chapters 1-6) serves to introduce the 
figure of the ombudsman from an historical, theoretical and technical perspective.  A gradual 
outline of the figure of the ombudsman is given, starting from an historical perspective of the 
means through which the power of the state has been limited for the benefit of the population 
(Chapter 2). The analysis continues with the result of a legal history-based research of the 
various bodies that have preceded that of the first ombudsman body (Chapter 3), the Swedish 
Justitieombudsmannen (which is the main subject of Chapter 4).  Part I continues with a 
theoretical explanation of how the ombudsman, nowadays a particular category of the wider 
class of institutions called National Human Rights Institutions,  has expanded on such a global 
scale (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 concludes Part I of the paper with the necessary analysis of the 
technical characteristics that shape NHRIs and their role in the international community. 
Part II (chapters 7-9) presents the case study of the paper. It focuses on the peculiarly 
Iberoamerican category of NHRI, namely the Defensor del Pueblo. It is for this reason that the 
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Latin American social and cultural background is analyzed in Chapter 7, starting from its 
multicultural heritage and its colonial history and concluding with the XX century dictatorial 
regimes and current political trends. This analysis is presented with a constant focus on how 
these uniquely Latin American traits have molded the conception of the state, both formally 
and in the eyes of the population. Particular attention is given to the dysfunctions of the 
democratic state in the region and its effects on the state administration. In Chapter 8, the 
institution of the Defensor del Pueblo is explained within the previously mentioned Latin 
American context. Its common features are outlined and a comparative analysis of the various 
mandates is presented in order to give a broad overview of the Defensor’s functions. The 
focus at this point of the paper is given to the peculiar characteristics that these mandates 
figure vis-à-vis other kinds of NHRIs, with Chapter 9 dedicated to such discussion. 
Part III (Chapters 10 and 11) features a critique of the current NHRI project (framed in Part I 
of the paper) considering the essential local context (analyzed in Part II). The relatively quick 
world-wide expansion of NHRIs have without a doubt brought the human rights system of 
promotion and protection “closer to home” and filled a gap that burdened the system as the 
only means of bridging the international with the national was left to civil society efforts. 
Through a critique of both the Paris Principles and the international systems’ approach to 
NHRI development, supplemented by real-case examples from NHRIs in two different 
continents, the paper concludes that NHRIs cannot anymore be evaluated without specific 
reference to the local and a tentative solution is presented. 
In conclusion, overreliance on whether or not the Paris Principles have been fully respected 
suggests that criteria for evaluation are based on essentially external factors with respect to 
the national variables of any one country. We have reached a moment in time when the 
international system of NHRI evaluation cannot stop at structural precepts and mandate-based 
considerations. An increased attention to the impact that these fundamental institutions 
actually make on the ground is now a necessary step if we want to avoid that NHRIs lose not 
only in performance levels but also in legitimacy. The particular traits that each region, let 
alone each state, is characterized by are too crucially different from one another to be left out 
of assessment mechanisms. 
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PART I 
2 Limitation of State Power by the Rule of Law 
The contemporary democratic state is characterized by a number of constant dysfunctions, 
many of which can be linked to the same antithesis between liberalism and democracy, which 
is on the one hand the distribution of power and on the other the necessity to control it. 
Corruption, burocracy
3
, abuse of power (be it by the Executive or whoever else exercises 
power in the name of the people) and maladministration are just some of the most important 
of such dysfunctions, and from each of them stem a multitude of potential human rights 
violations by the hands of the State towards its citizens. If we follow Bertrand Russell’s 
analysis of the State
4
 as being an abstract entity, the interests of which cannot, in the end, be 
other than the interests of those who guide it, we manage to easily view the dangerous picture: 
the functioning of governmental institutions are bound to be shaped by the will and the ideas 
of the people working in them, from the Minister all the way down to the ordinary civil 
servant and functionary. And it is an unfortunate, albeit questionable, truth that the individual 
has an innate tendency to prefer its own convenience to the one of the others, a truth which 
seen in the light of Russell’s point of view, is one of the fundamental and probably unsolvable 
problems of democratic institutions. If it is true that democracy is something else apart from 
the mere right to periodically elect one’s representatives, than such inclinations have to be 
civically controlled. The separation of powers as we know it today, firstly theorized by 
Montesquieu in his L’Exprit des Loix (1748), may be presumed to have been announced with 
the above preoccupation in mind. However, that was definitely not the first time that it had 
been discussed, especially so if we are to consider the separation of powers as a means to 
control the State. 
We can go back all the way to Egyptian times, and more specifically to the Teachings of 
Merikare (2050 B.C.), to find proof of the existence of a certain type of control on the ruler. 
The teachings were written from the Pharaoh to his son in order to let the future ruler know 
that his behaviour would eventually be judged by the divine tribunal.
5
 It is with the ancient 
Greek and ancient Roman philosophers and orators that the discussion on the limitation of 
power was taken to a less transcendental level. The issue was framed in the philosophical 
discussion on which form of government is to be preferred between one of laws and one of 
men. Plato, in the fourth book of his Laws, stated the following: “when I call the rulers 
servants or ministers of the law, I give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because 
I certainly believe that upon such service or ministry depends the well- or ill-being of the 
state. For that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the 
highway to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are 
the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can confer”.6 
                                                          
3
 In this sense, the word “burocracy” has to be given its negative value of the word. 
4
 Bertrand Russel, Authority and the Individual, Routledge (1949). 
5
 Etienne Drioton and Jaques Vandier, Histoire du Egypt, 2nd Ed. Eudeba (1994) in Carlos R. Constenla, 
Teoria y Practica del Defensor del Pueblo, Editorial Reus (2010) at p. 18. 
6
 Plato, The Laws, Book IV available at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws.html (accessed 1st Sept 2013) 
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Respect towards the law is the safeguard against the likely risk of the ruler’s biased behavior 
towards his own personal interests. The subordination of power to law left its slightly 
mythological background and entered the realm of pure political policy with the first Roman 
law theoretical treaties. Cicero’s pro Cluentio in fact contains one of the very first and most 
extraordinary theorizations of the idea of law as the necessary element for a truly free people, 
in that it serves as a safeguard against the discretionary power of rulers or, as Cicero himself 
succinctly stated, “in order to be free, we have to be servants of the law”.7 As will be 
discussed in the following chapter in detail, it is within the Roman intricate system of checks 
and balances during its Republican period that the first sign of what will eventually become 
the modern day ombudsman institution can be traced back to. The introduction of the Tribune 
of the People as an official whose task was to safeguard the rights of plebeians from the 
oppression of the patrician magistrates is only one of the many novelties of that era, the 
collegial form of government and the annual duration of the posts being other examples. Even 
in later periods of Roman history, notwithstanding the drift away from fully republican 
principles, the ruler would not be called Rex again, but rather Princeps (in Latin, “first” 
amongst citizens).  
Evidence of the constant search for a limitation of power in favour of the citizenry continues 
relentlessly in history. One of the most reproduced quotes on the matter dates back to the XIII 
century, to be found in Henry Bracton’s De Legibus Consuetudinibus Angliae which states 
that “[…]The King must not be under man but under God and under the Law, because law 
makes the king, for there is no rex where will rules rather than lex”.8 In this field of political 
analysis, transcendental arguments finally disappear with Marsilio da Padova who, in line 
with the biblical “give back to Caeser what is Caeser’s” principle, can be said to be the 
precursor of what has been labeled civic humanism. From his works the new role of the 
legislator vis-à-vis the ruler is introduced, a role that sees the former able to control the latter 
in an unprecedented way, even to the point of being able to depose him if the law is not being 
respected. One of the most extraordinarily contemporary thinkers of the Renaissance, Nicolo 
Macchiavelli, considered that one of the fundamental tenets of a republic is the citizens’ right 
to freedom, which is at high risk of being limited when the powerful (be them the rich, the 
rulers or, as it often is, both at the same time) make the laws following their own interests. To 
this problem, which is neither more nor less what we now call state corruption, Macchiavelli 
found the solution in the regularization and distribution of power: “[the people] are easily 
satisfied by creating institutions and laws which, together with [the Prince’s] power, gives 
realization to the general security of the people. And when a Prince does this, and the people 
see that no one breaks such laws by accident, they will begin in a very short time to live in 
security and contentment”.9 This represents an early constitutionalist perspective which once 
                                                          
7
 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Cluentio, n. LIII, translated in Spanish by Juan Bautista Calvo, Libreria de 
Hernando y Compañia (1898) in Carlos R. Constentla, cit. At p. 23. 
8
 Henry Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, translated in English by S.E. Thorne, II Ed. 
Harvard University Press (1968) at p. 33. 
9
 Niccolò Macchiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Book I, XVI available at 
http://www.latinamericanhistory.net/discorsi1.html (accessed on 1st September 2013). 
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again shows the importance given to the reining in of power in order to avoid 
maladministration and corruption by the hands of the rulers.  
The superiority of the law above the ruler’s decision-making power is the key principle of the 
English tenet of the Rule of Law which, ever since the signing of the Bill of Rights, product of 
the so called Glorious Revolution, is the guiding principle of English constitutionalism. The 
Rule of Law is, rather easily put, the superiority of the law over the sovereign, a formal means 
of power control. A further fundamental step in identifying the relationship between the 
individual and power was brought forward by John Locke at the end of the XVII century.
10
 
The individual, in this perspective, does away with a part of its innate absolute liberty and 
delegates it to a public authority, keeping for itself those natural liberties which result being 
what we today call fundamental rights, which the State has the duty to respect and uphold. 
This limited role of the state has been a tenet of both the French (see Russeau’s Social 
Contract
11
) and American Revolutions, notwithstanding their ideological differences. And 
continues today to fuel those aspirations towards a state which is not dominated by arbitrary 
political choices but is impersonally fixed to principles of legality and justice, that is a state 
which is subject to the rule of law. A negative power of control is thus necessary for such 
aspirations to become closer to reality. Russeau is very clear in theorizing this alternative and 
necessary form of power whilst introducing the institution of the Tribunate: “When an exact 
proportion cannot be established between the constituent parts of the State, or when causes 
that cannot be removed continually alter the relation of one part to another, recourse is had to 
the institution of a peculiar magistracy that enters into no corporate unity with the rest. This 
restores to each term its right relation to the others, and provides a link or middle term 
between either prince and people, or prince and Sovereign, or, if necessary, both at once. This 
body, which I shall call the tribunate, is the preserver of the laws and of the legislative power. 
It serves sometimes to protect the Sovereign against the government, as the tribunes of the 
people did in Rome; sometimes to uphold the government against the people, as the Council 
of Ten now does at Venice; and sometimes to maintain the balance between the two, as the 
Ephors did in Sparta”.12 
Russeau’s analysis inspired many democratic thinkers of the time, both in Europe and on the 
other side of the Atlantic as well, all pushing for a more balanced power between the state and 
the citizenry. Italy, for example, had a number of political philosophers during the start of the 
XIX century, just before its Unity, that specifically mentioned and proposed novel bodies, the 
purpose of which was to protect the solidity of the pact between the citizenry and the state.  In 
Saggio sulle Leggi Fondamentali dell’Italia Libera13, republican politician Giuseppe 
Abamonti introduced to the Italian political scene two new bodies that according to him 
                                                          
10
 John Locke, Two Treaties of Government – Essay concerning the True, Original Extent and End of 
Civil Government, Book II, II available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/locke/loc-202.htm (accessed 
on 1st September 2013). 
11
 Jean Jaques Rousseau, Du Conrat Social ou Principes du Droit Politique, Book III, XV, Chez Marc 
Michel Rey (1762). 
12
 Ibid. at p. 278. 
13
 Giuseppe Abamonti, Saggio sulle Leggi Fondamentali dell' Italia Libera, stampatore Luigi Veladini - 
Isernia (1797). 
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should have been included in what was soon to become Italy’s first Constitution, also known 
as Statuto Albertino. The two bodies were the “Conservatori della Legge”, a nine member 
body whose task was to control the bills that passed through the Assembly and that national 
authorities fully complied with the law, and the “Difensori del Popolo”, composed of nine 
members as well, responsible of controlling the personal behavior of state officials and civil 
servants vis a vis the citizen. During the constituent assembly of the Repubblica Romana, a 
very short experience of Italian independence (1849) which predated by a decade the 
unification of the peninsula, the figure of the Tribunato was introduced with firm belief by its 
members, to the point of it being defined as “…the master key of our new political 
mechanism”.14 On the other side of the Atlantic, as an example of an early Latin American 
experience that sees such emancipatory bodies being introduced, the 1811 Proyecto de 
Constitucion Provisoria de Las Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata, in describing the body 
of the Provedorado, says: “in order to safeguard the sacrosanct rights and liberties of the 
people against the usurpation of the governments such body is established […] Its only 
obligation will be to exclusively protect the liberty, security and the sacrosanct rights of the 
people against the usurpation of the government.”15 
As briefly mentioned above, during the whole of the XIX century liberalism is the dominant 
political ideology. With time, after the atrocities of the First World War, those guaranteed 
liberties that the natural laws of the market were supposed to enjoy from the state became 
very thin. The Russian Revolution, with its Marxist socialist ideals, the Mexican Revolution, 
with the nationalization of its natural resources and the formal recognition of workers’ rights 
and the 1919 Weimer Constitution, where social rights were finally put into writing, are clear 
signs of a worldwide change in the conception of the role of the state in its relations with the 
citizen, the so called Welfare State. In a nutshell, the individual and society stopped being 
regarded as two separate entities and the responsibilities and functions of the state increased, 
something which meant an unavoidable strengthening of the administrative sector. To the 
increase in power of the state over its citizens followed the necessity of an increase in its 
control by the hands of the citizenry. And when talking about burocracy, Carlos Constenla, 
President of the Latin American Institute of Ombudsmen, describes it as such: “In reality we 
are dealing with the first and most inexpensive means to mystify and limit the rights of people 
through its own legal (or pseudo-legal) structure which has been in place since the 
introduction of a strict division of powers”.16 
3 Common historical heritage of the Ombudsman 
To fully appreciate the nature of the ombudsman institution (which was officially introduced 
in Sweden in 1809, as will be explained in the next chapter) and to frame it in the ancient and 
borderless mission of protecting justice and the most fragile against the influences of power, 
what follows is an analysis of some of the numerous examples of past institutions that can be 
considered distant relatives of the ombudsman itself. 
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In ancient Greece, both major cities established bodies that had as its main purpose the control 
of the decision makers, be them kings (Sparta) or democratically elected leaders (Athens). As 
far as the former is considered, the body in question was that of the Eforoi, a five-member 
body elected by the Guerusìa, the “council of the elderly”. They had the power to question the 
magistrates, depose them as well as sentence them to death in case their misapplication of the 
codes of conduct was grave enough.  Its influence on the elite was so strong that Polybius 
described Sparta as being governed by its kings “together with the vigilant and paternal 
protection of the eforoi”.17 In Athens, where a collegial body of magistrates ran the city with 
an annual duration, the controlling function was supervised by the public office of the 
Euthynoy. At the expiration of each magistrates’ assignment, this official’s task was to go 
through the population’s complaints and decide whether the magistrate indeed deserved a 
penalty for its misdoings. 
In ancient Rome, and more precisely since the V century BC, the institution that more 
resembled the current ombudsman and which is by many scholars seen as the first real 
ancestor of the latter, is the Tribune of the Plebe. At the start of that century, an uprising took 
place by the hands of the people of Rome against the corruption, excessive power and violent 
behavior of the elite which had been subduing the poorer sections of society over the decades. 
This revolutionary act, known as the “Succession of the Plebe”, brought forward fundamental 
institutional changes for the centuries to come. One such change regarded the establishment 
of a novel body, made up of a team of two magistrates whose only task was that of defending 
the people’s liberty from the injustices and abuses of power of the state.  The defense of the 
people from any sort of abuse was sealed by the powerful right to veto (intersessio) which 
could be expressed both by the request of a citizen (appellatio) and by the tribunes’ own 
initiative. This power of veto could be used against any decision taken by the constitutional 
organs of the Roman republic (consuls, magistrates, senate and assembly members) in order 
to protect the less powerful section of society, the plebe. The controlling power of this 
institution was such that historian Polybius, in his Universal History of the Roman Republic, 
went as far as defining the form of government of the time as a “government of the people”18, 
something which lead even Lenin himself to use it as an example of revolutionary militancy 
in his What is to Be Done, when he described the Roman Tribune as someone “who is able to 
react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter 
what stratum or class of the people it affects”.19 In the words of Giovanni Lobrano, renowned 
Italian professor of Roman Law, the Tribunato was “the defense that the citizens endowed 
themselves with against the government. An extraordinary invention: a judiciary of its own, 
something close to being a counter-judiciary; a power close to being a counter-power. It is the 
institutionalization of social dialectic”.20 
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Fast forwarding in this legal history analysis to the Middle Ages, another body that had 
characteristics similar to the modern day ombudsman’s and that presumably functioned with 
similar functions was that of the missus dominicus (in english “envoy of the ruler”), 
introduced by Charlemagne in order to keep under control the vast empire under his rule. 
They were representatives of the royal authority in the various regions of the Sacred Roman 
Empire (each region was controlled by two missi, one of civil and one of ecclesiastical 
backgrounds) who were called to roam their region making sure that the rich landowners were 
not abusing their power as well as receiving claims of misdoings from the people against their 
lords. The reports would then be passed onto the sovereign who would then decide the actions 
to be taken against these local authorities.  It is with the missi and their controlling functions 
that we can for the first time clearly see the double edged sword pertaining to such “defenders 
of the people”: in fact these representatives, as well as undoubtedly working in favour of the 
less powerful members of society, were also a very fierce tool of political control and 
censorship of local authorities. As later chapters will discuss, it is an issue which has been 
particularly central to the ombudsman institution up until our days.  
Yet another ancestor of our modern day ombudsman is the 13
th
 century Justicia Mayor de 
Aragòn, presumably a direct relative of the current Iberoamerican institution of the Defensor 
del Pueblo.  Similar to the introduction of the Roman Tribune, The Kingdom of Aragon 
introduced the Justicia after an uprising against the sovereign by the hands of the nobility. 
King Jaime I was in fact accused of arbitrary conduct in the running of the Kingdom and as 
such the noblemen demanded the introduction in the mechanisms of power of an authority 
which would limit the sovereign’s exercise of power. With the years, the Justicia grew in 
importance and prestige in the defence of the ‘constitutional’ legal system of the Kingdom of 
Aragòn by successfully defending the personal rights and liberties of its inhabitants. Amongst 
its functions, two are worth mentioning more specifically as we can see similarities with the 
current functions operated by ombudsmen nowadays: the Fueros de Manifestaciòn and the 
Firma de Derecho. 
The Fueros de Manifestaciòn were substantially equivalent to what is known as “habeas 
corpus”.  It is the power to order whichever public or private institution that has authority to 
deprive somebody of their freedom, to physically bring the subject of such deprivation in 
front of the Justicia in order to avoid such penalty to be exercised. Additionally, the order 
could be issued in instances of mistreatment of detainees, a sort of primordial form of an 
institutionalized prohibition of torture.  The Firma, on the other hand, is similar to what in the 
modern Spanish legal system is known as amparo: an order from the Justicia (it would be the 
Defensor del Pueblo nowadays) towards another authority obliging it to terminate a certain 
procedure which was considered contrary to the rights and freedoms of the petitioner, which 
could be the Justicia himself de officio. Fundamentally, the King was also subject to the 
latter’s jurisdiction and there have been recorded instances of royal inhibitions, such as that 
affecting King Peter IV of Aragon in 1386. 
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Historians
21
 say that the figure of the Justicia had not been a brand new introduction in the 
Iberian peninsula by the Kingdom of Aragòn, being inspired by Spanish  Islam. The sultanate 
of Cordoba introduced a body of law called the “judge of injustices” (Sahib al Màdalin), 
whose only role was to resolve the complaints handed in to him by the population against the 
abuses and misdoings of public authorities. 
At this point, in order to give a truly worldwide outlook of the historical expansion of bodies 
that may considered the ancestors of modern day ombudsmen, the analysis turns to ancient 
institutions established in the Latin American continent. The first of such bodies, unveiled by 
history, dates back to the Incan empire. The Tùcuyricoc (which may be translated as “he who 
sees everything”) was an agent nominated by the Inca himself for a determined period of 
time, trained in law, who was secretly sent to external provinces in order to check upon the 
conduct of the administrative bodies. They had no power of issuing penalties however, and 
could only suggest their opinion to the governor. The Incas had in fact a very developed 
system of checks on the administration of the empire, so much so that “whichever judge, 
governor or minister who was found to not have properly safeguarded justice within its 
mandate or to have committed any other illegality, was more severely punished than any other 
layman who was found to have committed the same illegality. And the higher the position in 
the state hierarchy, the more severe was the penalty. This was due to the fact that it was not 
tolerated that someone chosen to safeguard justice behaved unjustly […] as he who was 
chosen was supposed to behave better than all of his subordinates”.22  
In colonial times the Spanish brought a substantial part of its administrative mechanism to its 
colonies, in order to facilitate the management of the vast territories it conquered. Amongst 
the newly introduced bodies was that of the Procurador Sìndico General, directly nominated 
by the governing body of each province (known as cabildo), whose role was to defend the 
collective rights of the citizens against the other administrative bodies. The importance of this 
post can be seen by its longevity even in post-colonial America, to the point that in a few 
Latin American countries the modern day ombudsman is still called Procurador (instead of 
the more classic Defensor del Pueblo).
23
  
After this varied analysis of past institutions one can clearly see the leitmotiv that has been 
recurring in all stages of history, no matter what legal tradition is followed: the necessity in 
state-organized communities for a controlling power over its administration in order to 
safeguard its citizens from abuse and injustice. 
4 The Swedish Ombudsman 
The first sign of a state institution with tasks linked to the overlooking of the state’s good 
governance and protection of the citizenry from the abuses of state administration dates back 
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to early 18
th
 century Sweden, when King Charles XII established the institution of the 
Chancellor of Justice (originally called Högste Ombudsmannen, now named Justitiekanslern) 
in 1713. Even though its task was effectively similar to that of the Ombudsman we know 
nowadays,  monitoring that the civil servants of the time behaved according to the their 
obligations and the law, the interests meant to be safeguarded were not the private citizens’ 
interests, but the Executive’s instead, from which the Chancellor depended and by which it 
was nominated. According to Andrè Legrand, the Chancellor’s role was one of general 
control over the civil service, and more specifically “over the observance of the laws and 
obligations of each state employee”.24 Scholars have suggested that the function of the 
Chancellor of Justice was, in turn, inspired by the Ottoman Empire’s figure of the Kadi25, who 
overlooked that the Islamic precepts were being adhered to by all state officials, from civil 
servants to the sultan himself. In fact, King Charles XII was exiled from Sweden to Turkey 
after his defeat against Russia in 1709. It is thus credible that he came into contact with the 
idea of such an institution during his stay in Istanbul.  
In the 1720 Constitution, which sanctioned the supremacy of Parliament over the Crown, the 
Chancellor of Justice had not only its presence confirmed within the state administration, but 
received the additional task of informing Parliament on its findings. From this moment 
onwards, notwithstanding its continued dependence from the Crown, one can see the start of a 
gradually closer relationship between this body of control and the citizenship itself. An even 
closer connection with Parliament was tied during the last years of the 1760s, when the 
appointment function of the Chancellor turned to the Riksdag of the Estates
26
, the Assembly 
made of representatives from the Nobility, the Clergy, the Burghers, and the Peasants (which 
predated the modern day Swedish Parliament - Sveriges Riksdag). This function swiftly 
returned under royal exclusivity after the coup d’état of 1772. 
The dispute between the Executive and Parliament on this issue was eventually settled with 
the adoption of the new Constitution of 1809. It is in this constitutional document that the 
concept and position of the Ombudsman was officially established for the very first time. It is 
evident that the previous body of control, the Chancellor, was not endowed with a sufficient 
amount of independence from the Crown to be fully credible in the eyes of the citizens
27
. 
According to a specialist in the field, Alfred Bexelius, “it is exactly due to this [lack of 
independence] that the decision was taken to allow public authorities to be controlled by a 
totally independent office”.28 And this independence, engraved in the Constitution, did not 
only mean towards the Crown, but towards the government and Parliament as well.
29
 In this 
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way, and for the first time,  the reins of control were officially taken away from the executive 
and given to an independent body, meant to become “the guardian of the common and 
individual rights of the people”.30 Article 96 of the 1809 Constitution declared that Parliament 
“should elect a person of known legal ability and respected for his dignity and integrity, to act 
as an agent of the Parliament in accordance with the instructions to be decreed. [The 
Ombudsman] had to ensure that the laws were properly observed by judges and civil servants. 
He had to prosecute those who by abuse of power oppressed the people or otherwise 
neglected to fulfill their functions”.31 Since then, this body of control has existed within the 
Swedish state with the name of Parliamentary Ombudsman (Riksdagens Justitieombudsman). 
A boost in the Ombudsman’s importance within the state administration came after the 1865 
Parliamentary Act, which abolished representation by estate and established a bicameral 
parliament. Notwithstanding this constitutional change, Parliament was in fact far from the 
modern day kind, still discerning between a lower Chamber whose members were voted by 
those citizens included within the official census, and a higher Chamber in which only 
landowners were allowed. This conservative drift did not affect the Ombudsman’s office, but 
to the contrary it was with the 1865 Act that its independence was reiterated and the 
requirement of reporting annually to Parliament was established. It was however quite usual 
at the time that Parliament would meet rather irregularly, a fact which increased even more 
the Ombudsman’s importance within the organs of control of the state. After all, lacking in a 
constantly present assembly, it was often the Ombudsman that played the role of the only 
body of control over the executive, something which becomes even more astonishing when 
one realizes that even the judiciary of the time was directly answerable to the King. 
Another fundamental reform that shaped the Parliamentary Ombudsman in those early years 
of its existence came just after the end of the First World War. The wording of Article 96 of 
the Instrument of Government (1915) was edited as such: “… the Riksdag shall appoint two 
citizens of known legal ability and outstanding integrity, the one as Ombudsman for Civil 
Affairs (Justitieombudsman) and the other as Ombudsman for Military Affairs 
(Militieombudsman), to supervise the observance of the laws and statutes in the capacity of 
representatives of the Riksdag, according to instructions issued by the Riksdag… The 
Ombudsman for Civil Affairs should supervise the observance of laws and statutes as apply to 
all other matters (except the Military) by the courts and by public officials and employees”, a 
division of roles that lasted until 1968 when the office of Militeombudsman was officially 
done away with and their functions amalgamated into one single body, which kept the old 
name of Justitieombudsman. The number of ombudsmen necessarily grew from the original 
two to four by 1975, due to a constant increase in workload. Each was given an area of 
expertise, according to his/her personal background. One Ombudsman was put in charge of 
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judicial control as well as detention centres; another was introduced to deal with issues related 
to the Armed Forces, as well as cases regarding health, education/culture and means of 
communication; a third specialized in matters revolving around tax, social security and 
vulnerable groups, whilst one was elected as Chief Ombudsman, responsible for the 
administration of the institution and allowed to take charge of the most important cases, 
whether or not they fall within his own area of expertise. Fundamentally, each one of them is 
given an equal judicial status and each has as its ultimate aim that courts, administrative 
bodies and municipalities respect the rule of law and do not abuse their power at the expense 
of the citizenry.  Its mandate and responsibilities are now laid down in three legislative texts: 
the Constitution (Instrument of Government) and the Riksdag Act contain the general rules, 
whilst the more detailed regulations are to be found in the Instructions for the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman (Lag med Instruction for Riksdagens Ombudsman). This is what the Instrument 
of Government 12:6 currently establishes on the figure of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen:  
“(1) The Parliament shall elect one or more Ombudsmen to supervise under instructions 
laid down by the Parliament the application in public service of laws and other statutes. 
An Ombudsman may initiate legal proceedings in the cases indicated in these 
instructions. 
(2) An Ombudsman may be present at the deliberations of a court or an administrative 
authority and shall have access to the minutes and other documents of any such court or 
authority. Any court or administrative authority and any State or local government 
official shall provide an Ombudsman with such information and reports as he may 
request. A similar obligation shall also be incumbent on any other person coming under 
the supervision of the Ombudsman. A public prosecutor shall assist an Ombudsman on 
request. 
(3) Further provisions concerning the Ombudsmen are set forth in the Riksdag Act”.  
Apart from these regulatory frameworks, the Ombudsman is endowed with a certain amount 
of freedom in terms of internal rules and distribution of work by provisions found within the 
Instructions. This independence is however curtailed by the requirement to consult the 
Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution on matters of high importance.
32
 Hence, even 
though the institution’s mandate is provided for by the law, it is not totally independent from 
governmental control.  Those entities which are included within the Ombudsmen’s 
supervision are nearly all state and municipal authorities, their staff, and  even enterprises 
with strong ties of influence with the state. The Ombudsmen’s main legal responsibility is to 
ensure that the courts and public authorities “obey the constitutional requirements of 
objectivity and impartiality and that the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are not 
encroached upon by these organs”.33 Some organs of the state are however exempted from the 
Ombudsmen’s control, amongst which are the King, members of Parliament, Cabinet 
Ministers and the Chancellor of Justice.
34
 A fundamental characteristic of Swedish 
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constitutional law is in fact the strict separation between the political and administrative role. 
This creates two very distinct blocs within the state: the King, its counselors and its Ministers 
on the one hand, and the State Administration with its Administrative Departments on the 
other. The Ombudsmen thus follow and represent this Swedish dichotomy to its fullest. 
In its supervisory authority the Parliamentary Ombudsmen’s Office can fulfill its mandate 
through a number of functions: it can investigate complaints received by the general public, 
initiate investigations on its own initiative, carry out inspections of State/local authorities and 
make recommendations of amendments to both Government and Parliament as well as give 
advice on the application of the law. However, the function that is not constitutionally 
recognized but figures as the one with the highest efficiency is that “by its mere existence it 
counteracts tendencies to transgressions of authority and abuse of powers”.35 In fact, as ex 
chief Ombudsman Alfred Bexelius eloquently describes, its continuous reminders of the true 
contents of the law, “like the drops that hollow the stones by continuous falling, have had a 
definite influence on the way that civil servants have fulfilled and fulfill their missions”.36  
And to the reasonable question on why this body is necessary when the mechanisms such as 
the right of appeal are fully functional, the Swedish historian Alexanderson explains that “the 
Ombudsman is also an expression of the idea that the private citizen would, with greater 
frankness and confidence, dare to present his legal worries if he could turn to a guardian of 
the rights and liberties of the individual, appointed by the popular representatives and outside 
the bureaucracy, than if he had to go to a high officer appointed by the crown”.37 
For notional clarity’s sake, the recent developments of the Swedish Ombudsman’s office will 
very briefly be discussed, before continuing our discussion on how such body expanded from 
Sweden worldwide. During the 1980s and 1990s Sweden introduced a  number of specialized 
ombudsman institutions inspired by the great advances of its first, revolutionary example of 
ombudsman  in order to cater for an ever growing role of the state in the population’s daily 
lives. In fact, society has been compelled to interfere in a regulating fashion in activities 
which previously were totally unrestricted. These novel institutions are the Equal 
Opportunities Ombudsman (1980), the Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination (1986), 
the Children’s Ombudsman (1993), the Disability Ombudsman (1994), and the Ombudsman 
Against Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation (1999).   
The fundamental importance between these later “discrimination-based” ombudsmen and the 
original Parliamentary Ombudsmen, is the state body they are subordinated to: instead of 
being nominated and having to report back to Parliament, these new Ombudsmen bodies have 
been put directly under the government, not only in terms of nominations but also of annual 
tasks and goals, leaving no scope for formal independence. Since 2009, however, all the 
above ombudsmen (apart from the Children’s Ombudsman) were merged into one single 
office: the Equality Ombudsman. Its task follows what the previous ombudsmen were 
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established for, that is monitoring that those laws prohibiting discrimination are complied 
with at the workplace, in schools, etc.  The reason for this merger of different institutions can 
be traced to the risk that these different ombudsmen were facing: the decrease of their 
authority due to the addition of a new office every time a new set of discrimination laws was 
introduced by the legislature. Additionally, it may be added that in this way not only would 
the new institution be more cost effective, but discrimination itself would lose its hierarchical 
value without the different grounds being dealt with by different offices. Interestingly, the 
Equality Ombudsman is the only Swedish body that applied for accreditation as a NHRI at the 
ICC and since May 2011 it holds a B status for not fully complying with the Paris Principles. 
It took almost 150 years since the Ombudsman’s 1809 introduction for this Swedish political 
innovation to start receiving a much deserved attention from abroad. Its balancing role, on the 
one hand protecting the citizens’ individual rights and on the other maintaining the citizens’ 
control over government, started to be viewed with a marked interest by public law scholars, 
who did not hesitate to define the Justitieombudsman as “[the most important] of all the 
factors contributing to the Swedish citizen’s characteristic confidence and respect for 
government”.38 A common conception, by past and present citizens, of their own state 
administration is in fact to look at the latter as an “enemy” rather than as a “servant”. On the 
situation of 1960s’ United States for example, it was noted that a certain idea had been 
fostered that the US Government “somehow did not belong to the people but instead was its 
enemy. Not corruption, injustice or inequities in representation, but the federal government 
itself, and most particularly the Executive and Judicial branches, was made out to be some 
kind of enemy. The local government may be doing things for you, like paving roads for 
example, but those ‘bureaucrats’ in Washington take things from you”.39 It does not take too 
much historical imagination to conceive these words in a contemporary key. It is due to this 
rather timeless conception of the state that the figure of the Swedish Ombudsman started to 
gain importance, first amongst scholars and then within actual institutional reforms’ 
roundtables. In the eyes of many, the great psychological value of such introduction was, and 
continues to be nowadays, a newly-found knowledge that before the large, impersonal 
administrative machinery of government, the citizen is not helpless and that reparatory actions 
are easily obtainable. 
5 Theoretical Explanation of NHRIs’ Global Expansion 
To understand the mechanisms behind the gradual but constant worldwide expansion of 
national institutions, which took the Swedish Ombudsman as inspiration, one needs to 
approach the issue from an international relations theory perspective, taking us back to issues 
of state sovereignty, national citizenship and the global human rights regime. In discussions 
over the rise and expansion of the international human rights regime, one fundamental 
question revolves around whether national legacies or world influences are worthy of a higher 
degree of importance. In theoretical terms, one finds two distinct frameworks that explain the 
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forces behind the adoption of human rights standards: one that asserts the fundamental 
importance of national realities, such as economic, political and cultural profiles, above  any 
other kind of force (neo-realist theory);  and the other that emphasizes worldwide diffusion 
processes and linkages between structures (world polity theory). Before entering into this 
analysis however, it is better to frame it within a more general discussion on how modern 
conceptions of human rights have evolved from being a relatively “western” idea to the 
universal standard we now strive to achieve. 
Human rights have been strongly connected to the social and political practices of “the West”. 
In the post-Westphalia 17
th
 century the rise of modern markets and the birth of a modern 
conception of the state left the European population to face a whole new range of threats to 
their dignity and interests. By the late 17
th
 century, claims of equality and toleration by the 
emerging bourgeoisie became to be formulated in terms of natural rights and after the violent 
consequences that the religious schism caused by the Reformation spread all over Europe, 
religious tolerance started to emerge as a recognized value.  A growing social and physical 
mobility facilitated the spread of a new load of human rights-based demands, and by the start 
of the 20
th
 century western states were guaranteeing an extensive set of civil and political 
rights to their citizens, shortly followed by economic, social and cultural rights as well. By 
codifying these rights, the introduction of the International Human Rights Bills 
40
 helped 
towards their full recognition, expanding the beneficiaries of human rights to all humanity.  
This extremely simplified historical development of the human rights discourse in “the West” 
can be used as proof of the fact that human rights as we know them today “are not a timeless 
system of essential moral principles but a set of social practices that regulate relations 
between, and help to constitute, citizens and states in ‘modern’ society”.41 They are not innate 
and depend highly on the surrounding environment. 
The special relationship between human rights and the West, that for some is so strong as to 
become one of “proprietorship”42, is however arguably down to a matter of timing.  The 
indignities brought about by modern markets which had to be faced were first encountered by 
the West. Before the great social and political struggles of the last three centuries, the West 
was in fact far from the human rights champion that is depicted as today by many scholars. 
The ideas that “all human rights imagination is estate of the West”43 or that “human rights are 
exclusive heritage of the Western liberal political tradition”44 clash with European and 
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American historical associations with the slave trade, violent colonialism and religious 
persecution. However one can still very frequently find scholarly arguments in favour of 
human rights being a western exclusive. For example Dr. Rhoda Howard argues that non-
western societies “did not and do not have conceptions of human rights”.45 This sense of 
Western ownership puts the global movement at risk
46
, as it leads to believe ideas of human 
rights as “political, invasive of sovereignty, a result of imbalances of power and 
ethnocentric”.47  As Jack Donnelly points out, even though gunpowder was invented in China 
and Arabic numerals were invented in the Muslim Near East, “we do not conclude that they 
are of merely local application or validity”.48 Human rights should be considered in the exact 
same light.  Even though the West played a central role in starting the first human rights 
defence systems and their development, these have been acknowledged and adopted in the 
great majority of states worldwide. Peter Schwab and Adamantia Pollis find that “all societies 
cross-culturally and historically manifest conceptions of human rights”49 and An-Na’im’s 
view is that “while it may not be completely plausible to argue that these rights have existed 
in their precise present formulation within the cultural traditions of most historical 
civilizations [...] the essence of these standards is already present”.50 
It is somehow generally accepted that modern conceptions of human rights are directly related 
to the individual yet universal form found in Roosevelt’s four freedoms51 present in the 1941 
Atlantic Charter, which initially started as a geopolitical strategy “to mobilize support for the 
Allies among non-aligned countries and colonies”.52 However this newly established 
international human rights regime eventually started to play a different role. In fact national 
independence movements, such as the ones in South Africa, India and Mexico for example, 
started to make these rights their own, quickly introducing the right to self-determination 
amongst those new freedoms. 
Western regimes, as well as those regimes indirectly supported by Western powers, started to 
be criticized by the use of “its own” product, whilst invocation of human rights to justify trials 
against perpetrators of “crimes against humanity” became more and more common, leading to 
what has been defined as the Nuremberg paradigm. Human rights have since been treated 
with a rather prosecutorial approach, with the fairly recent introduction of truth commissions 
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as alternative to outright judicial courts. Both systems recognize the primacy given to nation-
states as the legitimate bodies for promoting and protecting human rights, as was strongly 
underlined during the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. National 
governments were thus officially put for the first time at the centre stage of human rights 
protection. At the same time, international authorities together with civil society “increasingly 
emphasized the importance of establishing independent national machinery explicitly devoted 
to the enforcement and improvement of human rights”.53 It is from this dual push that 
National Human Rights Institutions emerged within the international fora and the Swedish 
Ombudsman, with more than 150 years of experience already, resulted in being the best retro-
active pilot scheme available, filling that precise gap in the protection of citizen’s rights that 
was present in the international human rights regime of the time. Since 1809, when the first 
Parliamentary Ombudsman was founded in Sweden, 178 NHRIs have been established in 133 
countries.
54
 Whilst a detailed analysis of the various typologies of NHRIs follows in the 
upcoming chapter, it is now time to consider the reasons behind such a widespread national 
incorporation of NHRIs, by turning to the two above-mentioned theoretical frameworks: neo-
realist theory and world polity theory. 
5.1 Neo-realist theory 
To be academically correct, there are three different versions of neo-realism: Kenneth Waltz’s 
structural realism, offensive/defensive realism and modern realism, represented by the 
scholarly contributions of Joseph Grieco. All three versions however inherit the essential 
realist perspective of the first of the so-called “three Ss”: statism, survival and self-help.55 In 
other words, the classical realist perspective views nation-states as “unconstrained rational 
actors pursuing their own interests in an anarchic world”.56 Neo-liberalism’s innovation rests 
on the increased autonomy assigned to international organizations and regimes, nevertheless 
controlled by powerful nations-states which strive to satisfy their own interests towards an 
advantage in the world arena. These nation-states can summarily be identified with “the 
West”, whose economic and political hegemony may lead other states to follow the standards 
set by them, hence dictating the “rules of the game”.57 The international human rights regime 
may very well be seen as one recently introduced “rule of the game”. The straightforward 
implication is that alignment with the international human rights regime (which, as previously 
discussed, is characterized by a strong Western heritage) will be less demanding in a regime 
in which democracy is a foundational pillar, or in which democracy has recently been 
introduced, and where human rights are already sufficiently recognized. So, on the one hand 
democratic, economically advanced and human rights-friendly countries are more likely to 
adopt NHRIs than poor countries which have a tradition of low levels of democracy and 
human rights protection. On the other hand, there are the so called “cheaters”. Double-
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interests in promoting such human rights-friendly regime can be seen by adopting one specific 
version of neo-liberalism, that is Grieco’s conceptual focus on relative and absolute gains 
within cooperation endeavours (known as modern realism). Grieco claims that “states are 
interested in increasing their power and influence (absolute gains) and, thus, will cooperate 
with other states or actors in the system to increase their capabilities”.58 
Even though realists usually concentrate their attention on security issues, the above notions 
will be read adapting them to the topic of concern, NHRI expansion: if states agree to 
introduce national institutions with the aim of promoting and protecting human rights, all 
those states concerned will be dealing with matters of compliance. Institutions will be 
established to enforce such agreement. Modern realists argue that leaders must be vigilant for 
“cheaters”, as these might adapt to the agreed terms in order to achieve its absolute gains and 
increase its reputation worldwide – with all the beneficial consequences this entails -without 
taking into real consideration the actual human rights situation of its citizens. Either way, 
from a general neo-realist perspective, country profiles are crucial elements in NHRI 
acceptance and adoption, be it for strictly hegemonic purposes or in order to be accepted 
within that “hegemonic” world order, in order to receive the benefits that such a situation 
entails. 
5.2 World Polity Institutionalism Theory 
This perspective does away with the centrality of nation-states, emphasizing “the extent to 
which nation-states are embedded in a wider world and influenced by world models of 
‘proper’ nation-state identity”59, creating a sort of isomorphism amongst chosen paths taken 
by states themselves. These models are spread through carriers such as international 
organizations and conferences, whose role is absolutely fundamental within the international 
order, especially in terms of human rights’ worldwide acceptance. Practically speaking, with 
more attention given to human rights by international organizations (and in our case, attention 
to NHRI’s role in safeguarding and promoting such rights), the more likely it is that states 
accept to follow a human rights model (in our case, NHRI establishment). What comes out of 
these organizations are standards that reach levels of constraint similar to those of official 
legal regimes, to which states feel obliged to adhere by peer-pressure, be it regionally or 
globally. This sort of diffusion process has been defined as “norm cascade” or “normative 
bandwagon”60, with an increased importance given to what other countries do and a 
consequential decrease in “normative isolationism” typical of realist perspectives. By 
adhering to such theoretical approach, NHRI diffusion is seen as a direct consequence of the 
world order being saturated by NHRI-based discourse delivered by an ever growing amount 
of human rights organizations.  Once this discourse has been settled theoretically, the 
establishment of NHRIs in some countries throughout the world will automatically influence 
other countries in following the latters’ lead, creating the above-mentioned “norm cascade”. 
International standards and legitimacy are put at the peak of influential factors in the decision-
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making processes of nation-states. Obviously, the above are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive since states may be subject to multiple concurrent sources of establishment.  
Another possible categorization of establishment behaviour which still treads along the same 
lines of the already mentioned theoretical approaches is the one set up by Sonia Cardenas in 
one of her latest scholarly papers on NHRI and state compliance.
61
 She divides the driving 
forces that states are subject to into two different commitments: strategic calculations (which 
somehow retraces what has already been said about the neo-realist perspective) and normative 
commitments (similar to world polity institutionalism). 
5.3 Strategic calculation 
According to this point of view, state actors’ behaviour is deeply moulded by material 
incentives such as enforcement and inducement mechanisms. Often these incentives reach the 
level of coercion, such as when states behave in a certain manner because they fear the 
consequences of violating international norms.
62
 Complying with said norms usually purveys 
in the eyes of the rational state-actor possibilities of benefits and the avoidance of potential 
penalties on their behalf. Arguably, a wide range of states have followed a strategic 
calculation when deciding to establish a NHRI, especially those states that are at the centre of 
international criticism for their poor human rights records. As a matter of fact “human rights 
pressures present states with a problem for which NHRIs can provide a solution”63 and as 
such states view NHRI establishment as a relatively “low cost” solution, especially if the 
NHRI is given moderate to low power vis-à-vis the executive. However, NHRIs have been 
introduced in an extremely wide range of states (in democratic, economically developed 
countries as much as in nondemocratic poor countries). This leads the NHRI researcher to 
view NHRI establishment as being driven by yet another kind of force, one which is more 
normative-driven. 
5.4 Normative commitment 
Instead of basing state-actors’ behaviour on cost-benefit analyses, decisions may be “socially 
constructed and historically contingent”.64 From this perspective, socialization and normative 
commitment are the two main driving forces of state actions and, in our case, 
institutionalization. More precisely, it is through socialization that widespread normative 
commitment takes place, with regularized international networks, forums and dialogue with 
civil society organizations being the main channels for exchange of ideas and the transmission 
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of common practices. In a very “world polity institutionalist” perspective, it is those 
worldwide accepted policies that are more easily introduced by the rest of the community of 
states within their own national systems. This mechanism is wider in reach, and probably 
more complicated, than the strategic approach mentioned in the above section and as such, 
mere financial incentives are not sufficient. Prolonged technical assistance is thus needed, 
through the continuous support of international organizations on the one hand and 
transnational advocacy networks on the other, which leads to the conclusion that, from this 
perspective, what lies as the backdrop of institutionalization mechanisms is international 
standards and support. Norm implementation can in fact be an easy matter for some states, but 
as far the majority of states is concerned, external capacity building and assistance is 
absolutely essential.  As proof of the fact that normative commitment is indeed a functional 
account of compliance, one has to take into consideration the regional pattern of convergence 
that NHRI establishment has regularly followed since its inception. It is in fact through 
regional networks that NHRIs have been created, a phenomenon which can be viewed for 
example  by the initial Scandinavian sprint in NHRI establishment, the 1970s boom of NHRIs 
in the Commonwealth states and the 1990s period in Latin America, during which the 
majority of NHRIs started to operate in the south American continent. 
In conclusion, both neo-realist/strategic calculation and world polity institutionalist/normative 
commitment perspectives have some truth in them, and being theoretical approaches one can 
freely choose to adopt one or the other in order to justify NHRIs’ global expansion. However, 
a recent statistical study conducted by Stanford University
65
 brings some light to the matter. 
The study estimates the influence of variables motivated by both theories (GDP per capita, 
Autocracy/Democracy Scores, Human Rights Practices for neo-realism; International 
Organizations/Conferences, International Human Rights Instruments and World/Regional 
Adoption Densities for institutionalism) using the so-called “event-history analysis” method. 
The conclusion that resulted from the study is quite clear: “the political culture of the world is 
the only variable that consistently and positively affects adoption rates”66, thus openly 
favouring a world-polity institutionalist perspective over its realist counterpart. Not 
everything realist is to disregard however. In fact, it is the nation-state that is asked to manage 
such worldwide identity, its national sovereignty being very much intact throughout this 
whole process. Furthermore, the activity of transnational advocacy networks show somehow 
mixed compliance mechanisms at work simultaneously: through their lobbying activity they 
lead powerful actors to apply pressure on states (igniting strategic calculations) whilst at the 
same time directly helping states through the exchange of best practices and capacity building 
(committing these states to common normative standards). 
6 National Human Rights Institutions: Characteristics and Identification 
To someone who has no prior knowledge of National Human Rights Institutions the most 
elementary of explanations would be to depict them as “a bridge between international norms 
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and local implementation […] designed to ensure the state’s compliance with its international 
legal obligations”67, obviously with international human rights law as the overarching field of 
practice. A more precise definition is however that given by the United Nations Centre for 
Human Rights which defines a NHRI as “a body which is established by a Government under 
the Constitution or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically defined in terms 
of the promotion and protection of human rights”.68 In an arena which has historically had 
non-state actors as its main characters, fighting against states for the protection of the citizens’ 
human rights, the introduction of these state bodies is an absolutely crucial step for any state 
towards a satisfactory promotion and protection of national human rights.  
The NHRI terminology is a relatively new one as it officially dates back to the 1990s, strictly 
referring to a restricted set of institutions whose task is to bring forward policies of protection 
and promotion of human rights in any one country where such institutions are found. This 
attempt at a restricted notion is done so as to differentiate these essentially “state” bodies from 
other organizations which have similar aims but lack the official standing NHRIs have within 
the state, such as NGOs, syndicates, the media and religious associations.   
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), in trying to enunciate the 
common characteristics that define the various typologies of NHRIs, has listed the following: 
“They are institutions of an administrative character, thus neither judicial nor legislative 
bodies; 
Whose competence revolves around counseling in human rights-related matters, both 
nationally and internationally; 
Their function is based on the issuance of opinions and recommendations only, with the 
possibility of examining petitions directed at them by the citizenry; 
Of a constitutional nature, or at least regulated by national laws and/or decrees; 
independent from the Executive.” 69  
This latter characteristic is however the most difficult to be adhered to and many NHRIs are 
indeed directly or indirectly linked to the government of the day.  As will be analyzed below, 
NHRI independence is a very controversial matter. As of now, it is sufficient to say from 
which elements is a NHRI independence judged by, and that is through its composition and 
overall functioning. 
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6.1 Evolution of the NHRI Concept 
Even though the NHRI concept as we know it today was born in the first years of the 1990s, it 
has been since the earliest years of UN’s history that “the idea of national bodies, that would 
contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights, surfaced in international 
discussions”.70  
The first official mention of local human rights committees, at this stage with no requirement 
of independence from the government and with the main purpose of stabilizing said 
institutions in the country rather than actually implementing a human rights protection 
programme, dates back to 1945 when UNESCO’s Constitution was signed. In its Article VII 
there is in fact an explicit mention of national commissions that would liaise with the parent-
organization in advising the government and relevant national bodies towards a full 
implementation of UNESCO guidelines and recommendations nationally.
71
 The second 
official sign of this novel institutional movement comes the following year, more precisely in 
an Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) resolution of 1946. This document invited 
party members to “[…] consider the desirability of establishing information groups or local 
human rights committees within their respective countries to collaborate with them in 
furthering the work of the Commission of Human Rights”72, which by the wording itself 
seems more of an invite to merely consider the possibility of such establishment rather than to 
actually set it up.  Nonetheless it was the first real step that the international community 
formalized towards NHRIs institutionalization. 
The response by the member states to these two initial proposals was a mix of enthusiasm and 
indifference. Whilst the UNESCO example can be said to have mildly succeeded in practice 
from the start, ECOSOC did not have an equivalently positive result. When the Commission 
on Human Rights’ Secretariat brought to the attention of its 1951 plenary session the issue of 
establishing national institutions, the response was idle. The reason behind this standstill is 
probably due to the relevant youth of the international human rights regime, at this point of 
time more adamant to proceed with the global standard-setting agenda than to already deal 
with localizing human rights protection mechanisms. Another factor that might have 
influenced this standstill was the fact that many colonial powers still held many of its 
territories under their jurisdiction, with the well known discriminatory practices that followed. 
A decade later, more precisely in 1962, the Commission made an important step forwards: the 
potentially fundamental function that national institutions could have in the promotion and 
protection of human rights at a national level was finally recognized.
73
 Instead of an invite to 
“stimulate” this institutional process, states were now encouraged to “favour” the formation of 
national institutions. A clear-cut agenda was formulated and a supporting role to the UN 
                                                          
70
 Pohjolainen Anna, The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions – the Role of the United 
Nations, Danish Institute for Human Rights (2006) at p. 30. 
71
 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, London 16
th
 
November 1945, Art. VII (1-3). 
72
 ECOSOC Res. 2/9 of 21 June 1946 on Commission of Human Rights, section 5 “Information Groups”. 
73
 CHR Res. 9 (XXXVI) of March 1962, endorsed by ECOSOC Res. 888 F (XXXIV) of 24 July 1962. 
26 
 
system of human rights protection was awarded to these nascent institutions, a “blueprint for 
NHRIs [in terms of their] purposes of human rights monitoring, advice and education had 
now truly started to take shape”.74 
The idea reached a worldwide audience for the very first time 1963, when it was finally 
included within the General Assembly’s agenda.75 This had the clear effect of sharing the 
potentially positive role of NHRIs with the highest number of member states thus far (112 
governments represented in the General Assembly of the time, in contrast to the 21 
governments taking part in the Commission of Human Rights), including all those states that 
had finally settled their independence struggles and were busy with their domestic 
institutional processes. However, no serious commitments were made at UN level, due to 
what has already been said about the human rights regime still being too young to take into 
consideration anything else apart from creating a body of international human rights law 
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One has to bear in mind that the 
International Bills of Human Rights were ratified in 1966 and entered into force only in 1976. 
The first international seminar on National Institutions took place in Geneva exactly two years 
after the Bills became law, in 1978, organized by the UN Programme for Human Rights under 
the official auspices of Human Rights Commission.
76
 What resulted from the seminar was an 
outline of recommendations on functions, status and composition. As far as functions are 
concerned, the guidelines mentioned the provision of information to the government and 
public, the education of public opinion, the analysis and review of the status of legislation, 
decisions and administrative arrangements and an advisory role for the state on human rights 
questions, amongst other things. It furthermore set out for the first time in UN history the 
requirement of autonomy, impartiality and statutory status of NHRIs, fundamental tenets 
which states are still struggling with nowadays.  
With 1978 the first crucial stage of NHRI evolution sees an end, an historical stage of 
introduction and development of the NHRI idea. The following period, which lasts until 1990, 
has been defined as that of the “popularization of the concept”.77 Together with a constant 
increase in the number of National Institutions being established on a worldwide scale, this 
second stage saw a definitely more determined attitude by UN bodies to establish a solid 
normative background and support programmes for those states interested in NHRI 
institutionalization. A series of General Assembly Resolutions
78
 during the 1980s actually 
invited Member States to set up NHRIs or strengthen those already in place as well as 
encouraging a constant exchange of experiences regarding their establishment. NGOs’ 
participation in this process was also underlined and the requirements of NHRI integrity and 
autonomy were once again brought to the attention of participating governments.  
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By this time, already five international human rights law conventions were in place together 
with their own monitoring systems
79, the Commission’s role was definitely strengthened and 
the operational status of the human rights law regime was finally in full flow. This allowed 
the UN to undergo a review of its approach to human rights protection, which eventually lead 
to a fundamental change of attitude in terms of the Member States’ role, something which 
increased the NHRIs’ role rather substantially. Rather than focusing on mere negative 
obligations for governments to abide by, a growing recognition surfaced on the international 
fora that states should have a more direct role in human rights’ promotion and protection. The 
need for a set of positive obligations became more and more evident, especially following 
what the “third wave” democratization process lead to in many parts of the developing world. 
What the UN had done up to then was seen as simply highlighting the problems, rather than 
facing them directly. Technical assistance projects thus started to be established in many parts 
of the world, with the UN assisting countries in need of capacity development and training. In 
this panorama, the NHRI movement benefited greatly and a proof of this, National Institutions 
were included as potential beneficiaries of such technical assistance programmes by the 
Secretary-General himself who, in his outline presented to the Commission in 1988,  
introduced NHRIs as a specific target group.
80
 During this period, in line with the 
“popularization” trend that characterized it, the UN stopped being the only international body 
involved in the development and strengthening of NHRIs, with regional organizations such as 
the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth States and the Organization of African Unity 
actively supporting the expansion of this institutional revolution.  
With the turn of the 1990s the third period of NHRI evolution’s history starts, the so-called 
“diffusion stage”, more specifically following the First International Workshop on National 
Human Rights Institutions, organized in Paris in October 1991. The latter is considered a 
milestone in NHRI narrative, the contribution of which is of incomparable value if viewed in 
the light of previous UN efforts in this field. The meeting was attended by delegates from 
national institutions, States, the UN (represented by its differently specialized bodies), 
intergovernmental institutions and NGOs, with experts and rapporteurs playing a very 
influential role therein. A group of four human rights commissions (namely Australia, 
Canada, Mexico and the Philippines) represented the leading group of proposal makers, with 
the Federal Human Rights Commissioner of Australia considered to be of central importance 
in the drafting of the recommendations which resulted from the Workshop. It is interesting to 
highlight at this point of the discussion the peculiar situation that came about from this 
selected core group of NHRI representatives: all four of the above mentioned national 
institutions were, and still are, characterized by the same kind of archetype, that is the Human 
Rights Commission model.
81
 The fact that it was mainly focusing on this model’s experiences 
that the recommendations were drafted does lead to the conclusion that already since this 
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stage in NHRI history the international community showed some preference towards one 
particular model of NHRI.
82
 It is from this moment onwards that a certain predominance of a 
worldwide approach to NHRI establishment can be noticed, with local realities put in the 
background or, at least, not taken too much into consideration. 
Discussions varied from legal status-related matters to more practical issues over mandate and 
powers. It was a huge step forwards from the previous milestone represented by the 1978 
guidelines (which were characterized by a very open approach to membership, according to 
which all public bodies specialized in human rights could be considered national institutions). 
At the Paris meeting in fact a rather more narrow definition of NHRI was drafted, one which 
focused on their necessary independent status and with a more strict approach to the 
possibility of varied mandates and structures. Before getting into an analysis of how the Paris 
recommendations were officialized within the international community, it is also important to 
note what by many has been considered to be a great drawback from what had previously 
been discussed in 1978. Due to strong lobbying by a substantial number of participating 
states, the complaints-handling function that once was a stronghold of national institutions 
was introduced as a mere optional task in the 1991 recommendations, a drawback for 
definitional purposes which lasts until our days.  
The recommendations that resulted from the Paris Workshop have since then been known as 
the Paris Principles
83
, the alma mater of modern day NHRIs and their minimum 
internationally recognized standards. The Principles are divided into four main areas: 
- The scope and function of NHRIs in relation with their founding legislation as well as their 
main tasks; 
- The composition of NHRIs and the guarantees of independence and pluralism, with a list of 
criteria on the appointment process founded on a pluralist representation and financial 
autonomy; 
- The actual methods of NHRI activity, which include the different powers for tackling issues 
within their mandate as well as cooperative issues with civil society; 
- As previously stated, a last section is dedicated to those institutions with a quasi-judicial 
function and the minimum standards that such institutions have to attain to.  
The six main criteria for NHRIs present in the Paris Principles are: 
- Mandate and competence, to be as broad as possible and based on universal human rights 
norms and standards; 
- Autonomy from Government; 
- Independence guaranteed either by statute or, preferably, the Constitution; 
- Pluralism; 
- Adequate resources; and 
- Adequate powers of investigation. 
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Since the Paris Workshop published its Principles, it took three years for them to receive a 
definite role as universal objective for all countries to adopt. It first  passed the Commission 
on Human Rights’ assessment in 1992, although with a rather cautious attitude. Unanimity 
was reached but the wording of the final resolution that, in accepting the idea of NHRI 
establishment, merely “welcomed the guidance” provided by the new standards.84  
What really opened the door of universal acceptance to NHRIs as the key national body with 
competence to promote and protect human rights was the World Conference on Human 
Rights, which took place in Vienna in June 1993. The Final Declaration and Programme of 
Action, also known as the Vienna Declaration, once again affirmed  “the important and 
constructive role of national institutions in particular in their advisory capacity to the 
competent authorities, their role in remedying human rights violations, in the dissemination of 
human rights information and in education in human rights”.85 More specifically regarding the 
Paris Principles, they were recognized as a benchmark for national institutions and as such 
governments were encouraged to establish and strengthen already existing NHRIs “having 
regard to the ‘Principles’ relating to the status of national institutions – also acknowledging – 
“the right of each State to choose the framework which is best suited to its particular needs at 
the national level”.86  Criticism around the Vienna Declaration as a whole centered on the fact 
that no novelties were introduced by it to the UN Human Rights Programme
87
, something 
which can be seen by its approach towards the Paris Principles themselves. However, 
notwithstanding merely supporting their final version without carrying any real innovations to 
NHRI development, what the Vienna meeting did was to mark “a breakthrough in the 
evolution of the international status of these institutions”.88 As Pohjolainen states, the Vienna 
Declaration had a twofold effect on NHRIs’ overall value: it officially placed national 
institutions within the UN Human Rights Programme, thereby ensuring a more “domestic-
level” human rights work for the future; and it affirmed that national institutions “constitute 
an important part of the domestic structures of any state committed to human rights”89 with 
the Paris Principles being the minimum standards to be followed when building and fortifying 
them. The Principles were finally approved by the UN General Assembly in December 
1993.
90
 
NHRI expansion received a further boost with a number of international meetings (1993-
1995) and the publication of the UN Handbook on National Institutions
91
 shortly thereafter. 
The meetings referred to are the Second and Third International Workshops of National 
Institutions in Tunis (1993) and in Manila (1995) and the series of meetings held during this 
short period of time by the Coordinating Committee of National Institutions. In these 
occasions the role of NHRIs was not only promoted and more deeply analyzed, but by having 
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a substantial amount of different states’ representatives present around the same table meant a 
true exchange of experiences, which obviously strengthened the NHRI movement all-round. 
Very importantly, at the 1993 Tunis International Conference, NHRIs established the 
International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs (ICC), with the aim to coordinate the 
activities of the NHRI network.
92
 As far as the UN Handbook is concerned, its importance is 
fundamental due to the fact that until its publication (late 1995) the Paris Principles were yet 
to have an official “commentary” nor any technical instructions for states to follow on how to 
apply the recommendations present within the Principles. Even though a clear-cut solution to 
many problems which had arisen from the Paris Principles was still not resolved, it was 
definitely another important evolution in NHRI normative establishment.  
The UN approach until now was, as always, strictly burocratized and developments in the 
sphere of NHRIs followed the usual routine as any other field dwelled upon by the UN 
Human Rights Programme. This was considered standard procedure until 1995, when the 
Centre for Human Rights created the post of Special Adviser on National Institutions, with the 
intention to turn the UN’s approach into a more flexible mechanism for the various States to 
benefit from. As holder of this prestigious post it was decided to appoint the then Human 
Rights Commissioner of Australia Brian Burdekin, whose successful engagement lasted until 
2003. In fact the Special Adviser’s post was directly accountable to the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and, as such, independent from any sort of party-related biased attitude. 
This direct link facilitated easier access to advice from States, rendering the whole process 
easier and less formal. This obviously brought an increased number of States to become 
interested in the establishment of their own NHRI, something which is objectified by the 
fivefold rise in the number of NHRIs since the introduction of the Special Adviser’s post.93 
The Centre for Human Rights in this period changed structure and in 1997 changed name, 
becoming the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In this 
structural change, a special body was established within the Office, the National Institutions 
Team, as a support group for the Adviser especially in terms of UN coordination activities. Of 
undoubtedly precious value, their support was even more positive if read in conjunction with 
the Programme of Action for Technical Assistance to National Institutions, the overarching 
UN framework on the implementation of the Paris Principles worldwide. As the general 
technical assistance approach was being quite broadly criticized as being too opaque in its 
mission statements, the choice of technically assisting the establishment of independent 
national institutions perfectly fitted the need for innovation, apart from creating a “human 
rights space” in those countries with poor human rights commitment records “while avoiding 
the risk of being criticized for supporting abusive government agencies or for wasting 
resources”.94 At this point, great support by the hands of agencies such as the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) has to be acknowledged, thanks to which these technical 
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assistance mechanisms managed to operate functionally, together with the continuous  flow of 
voluntary funding that has characterized NHRI establishment’s history. A common criticism 
to the UN’s approach during this latter stage deals with the lack of a sound “accountability” 
test for nascent NHRIs, with all the attention given to the set up and not to the actual working 
of any given national institution, shielding many of them from constructive assessment even 
in countries whose human rights agenda was poor or practically absent.  To this issue we will 
return in the conclusive chapters of the paper, but it is an aspect to take into consideration 
throughout any NHRI-related discussion as it is one of the foundational problems inherent in 
UN technical assistance projects related to NHRI establishment.  
Following their constant rise in importance and legitimacy within the international 
community, NHRIs were for the first time permitted to address the Commission as themselves 
in 1996, albeit from the seat of their government’s delegation. In 1998 however, a separate 
section within the Commission was especially set up for “National Institutions”95, and since 
then they have had their own say in Council assemblies. 
In the early 2000s a steady growth of NHRIs worldwide was coupled by a rather substantial 
number of both General Assembly and Human Rights Council Resolutions on the role of the 
Ombudsman and NHRIs in general in the promotion and protection of human rights
96
, 
something which kept the NHRI movement always at the forefront of any international human 
rights discourse taking place both universally and within national borders.  
One fundamental characteristic of this latter stage of NHRI history is its promotional aspect. 
Systemic evaluation and actual institutional analysis has been somewhat undermined vis-à-vis 
the project of expanding the number, resources and access to NHRIs, without taking into 
consideration the local realities of each and every NHRI. A clarificatory example is that of 
leadership: more often than not problems related to poor levels of leadership have been 
treated by the international NHRI community as mere internal capacity issues, to be dealt with 
by increased external, unconditional funding and training rather than considering national 
political circumstances which might have had an impact on the work of the institutions. 
National realities, be them political, social and/or cultural have to be taken into consideration 
when establishing and evaluating the proprieties and faults of national institutions.  
One way to understand this international attitude is to acknowledge the fact that during a first 
period of institutional introduction, whatever the kind of institution being introduced, 
promotion has to play a bigger role than critical evaluation, which is followed by what Peter 
Rosenblum aptly defines as “ratcheting up compliance”.97 Efforts from the OHCHR, the ICC, 
regional mechanisms and local pressures amongst others have in the recent past created the 
conditions for an effective normative distribution whilst setting a low bar for access by 
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demanding modest initial commitments. This phase is usually followed by a steady increase 
in efforts to “ratchet up” compliance and induce acculturation, mainly through coercion and 
persuasion. The reasoning by which “promotion raises the stature of the enterprise, which, in 
turn creates a disincentive for withdrawing, if and when more stringent conditions are 
demanded”98 does in fact follow a rational line of thought but sometimes can hide potentially 
dangerous outcomes. Some countries might, and in fact have  tried to obtain benefits from this 
situation with no intention to follow the normative commitments which full compliance 
would entail.   
This tension between the promotional impetus and the local effectiveness is going to be at the 
centre of the discussion in the second half of this paper, where the importance of 
local/regional realities will be highlighted and a dose of skepticism will be injected into a 
project which is undoubtedly positive for the international human rights law system, but 
which could increase its effectiveness by veering towards a less universalistic approach. 
6.2 Categorization of NHRIs 
Having described the recent development of NHRIs from an historical-institutional 
perspective, what follows is the categorization of the different kinds of national institutions 
that have been established around the world. There is some truth in the often repeated saying 
that “there are as many NHRIs as there are states” (133 is the current total amount on national 
institutions, including those not fully complying with the Paris Principles), however one can 
find at least two different categorizations available to the NHRI analyst:  
          6.2.1 Origin and name99: 
Legislative/Parliamentary Ombudsmen: responsible to Parliament, their legitimacy is directly 
related to parliamentary decisions; 
Executive Ombudsmen: with an absolutely lower level of independence, they have the 
dangerous potential to depend from whom they have been nominated within the government 
(usually the head of government). 
6.2.2 Formal characteristics
100
:  
Human Rights Commissions: this kind of NHRI is the one most strictly adherent to the Paris 
Principles, present above all in the Commonwealth countries and in the Asia-Pacific region, 
arguably due to the above mentioned normative commitment process. In some literature in 
fact it s referred to as “the Commonwealth model”. As their name suggests, they are collegiate 
bodies composed by a number of “experts”, each with its own technical field of 
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specialization. Their mandate varies in scope from one Commission to the other but generally 
speaking their functions range from investigation and conciliation of cases brought to them or 
suo motu, monitoring of the state’s compliance with its international obligations, training of 
civil servants in matters related to human rights and human rights awareness campaigns. 
Advisory Committees: also known as “the French model” after the first institution of the kind 
was established in France in 1984 (the National Consultative Commission of Human Rights), 
it later spread to most of Francophone Africa. Unlike the Human Rights Commissions, they 
do not hold the power to receive complaints nor to investigate cases. Their mandate mainly 
revolves around advising the government as well as undergoing human rights-related 
research. They are usually composed by a higher number of functionaries than the 
Commissions, which increases the chance of having a truly pluralistic  representation but, on 
the other hand, are subject to a higher degree of dependence from the Executive. 
Human Rights Ombudsmen: they represent a mélange between the classic “Scandinavian” 
Ombudsman, with its priority focused on the control of the public administrative sector, and 
the Human Rights Commission model, reason for which the literature also refers to them as 
“hybrid offices”.101 The first established institutions of the kind appeared in Spain and 
Portugal in the 1970s, after the fall of both countries’ dictatorial regimes of the time, and 
quickly spread to the Latin American continent, where they experienced an introductory boom 
during the late 1980s and 1990s. During this period, after the fall of the URSS, a number of 
Central and Eastern European states also decided to install such kind of body in their newly 
established states. In contrast with the classic Scandinavian model with its exclusive power 
over the Administration, the Human Rights Ombudsman is also endowed with the promotion 
and protection of the human rights of the citizenry in front of the public sector. This latter 
characteristic is usually strictly adhered to and is one of the most discussed faults of this 
particular type of NHRI. Nowadays the private sector is more and more involved in our daily 
lives, running many kinds of services that once were subject to the control of the public 
sector. Not being able to cater for such potentially dangerous situations is indeed a problem. 
But luckily it is not an overwhelming majority that are limited in such a way. Just like the 
Human Rights Commissions, complaints handling, state monitoring and the issuing of 
recommendations are the essential tasks the Human Rights Ombudsmen undergo in their 
respective countries. And just like the classic Ombudsman, it is a single-person body with its 
own staff but with a very distinct feature: its nearly exclusive focus on human rights. In this 
regard, the Human Rights Ombudsman may also offer training and human rights-related 
education to the public sector as part of the fundamental role it holds in human rights 
promotion, something which Human Rights Commissions usually cannot offer. One 
additional characteristic that may confuse the boundaries between this human rights-specific 
Ombudsman and the classic Ombudsman is the fact that many Human Rights Ombudsmen are 
participating institutions of both the International Ombudsman Institute (IOI) and the 
International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions (ICC).
102
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Human Rights Institutes: this category is set aside from all the rest of the above even though it 
is only one body that may be included within it, that is the Danish Centre for Human Rights.  
This particular kind of NHRI is unique in the sense that it only deals with matters related to 
human rights information, divulgation and research both within Denmark and abroad. It does 
not have the power to receive complaints nor to undergo any kind of control over the state’s 
policies. 
To the above four categories, which have been used to differentiate between NHRIs in many 
scholarly instances since they were outlined by a researcher of the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights in 2006, the International Council on Human Rights Policy
103
 adds three distinct ones 
which arguably complete the vast array of NHRIs present as of today: 
National Commissions Against Discrimination: these bodies are very similar to what has 
already been said about Human Rights Commissions with one fundamental difference: they 
focus only on discrimination and the human rights violations that flow from it.  
Classic Ombudsmen: this is what has up to now been referred to as the Classic Ombudsman, 
or Scandinavian model Ombudsman. Words have been spent on this category in the above 
chapter on the Swedish Justitieombudsman, so no further analysis will be given. Suffice here 
to say that it is a one-person institution focused on one specific aspect such as 
maladministration and discrimination. 
The Defensores del Pueblo: generally viewed as a variance of the Classic Ombudsman, it 
clearly traces its composition outline but as far as the mandate is concerned, the Defensores 
del Pueblo include within its own “jurisdiction” all the various mandates dealt by singularly 
by the different Ombudsmen. As the name might suggest, these bodies are to be found in 
Spain, Portugal and in practically all states of Central and South America, sometimes under a 
different title (such as Procuradoria, Comision Nacional or Defensoría). Part II of the thesis 
will be dealing with the analysis of this particular kind of institution. 
One last remaining category of NHRIs is what can be defined as Sub-National NHRIs. In 
countries with a decentralized system of governance, legislative competence is shared and 
sometimes even divided between national and sub-national levels. In Spain, for example, the 
national Defensor del Pueblo does not deal with every case of human rights breach as many 
autonomous communities have their own ombudsman institutions. These bodies are often 
disregarded from official accreditation processes as problems related to institutional 
representation might endanger the full implementation of their mandates. Undoubtedly these 
institutions play a vital role in those states of a federal nature where sub-national governments 
have exclusive jurisdiction over certain fields of human rights, but cannot be considered to 
replace a fully functional national NHRI. 
After this broad description of the many different classifications of existing NHRIs, one 
specification is needed in order to understand the real value of such analysis. As already 
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mentioned, it is internationally understood that only national-level bodies are considered to be 
NHRIs. However, for many international organizations, only human rights commissions and 
human rights ombudsman institutions are deemed worthy of NHRI status. The ICC-
accreditation process based on the Paris Principles has been openly preferring these two 
categories by awarding them with A-status in a vast number of cases. This leads many 
elements of the UN human rights system, as well as their regional counterparts, to follow suit 
in this institutional preference.  
Slightly complicating the definitional argumentation is the fact that within the UN itself there 
are some discrepancies. The UN General Assembly has, for instance, included the Classic 
Ombudsmen within its definition of NHRI, whilst the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
actively “promotes the establishment and strengthening of thematic NHRIs for children as 
part of CRC state parties’ treaty obligations”. 104 These differences however are not without a 
purpose. As Linda Reif points out, these definitional specificities are imposed for a 
multiplicity of political and pragmatic reasons: they function as institutional “gatekeepers”, in 
order to limit the number of NHRIs allowed to participate in the international human rights 
machinery, and they act as quality control mechanisms, pressurizing faulty NHRIs to improve 
their institutions in order to benefit from the membership status. In this regard it is interesting 
to note that the European region has been less strict in approaching this definitional control, 
allowing for both national and sub-national institutions, classic ombudsmen and thematic 
institutions within their definition of NHRI.
105
 This peculiarity comes from the fact that 
European Ombudsmen benefit from a long history of respectable activity, thus lowering the 
need for a strong “gatekeeper” within the region. 
Now that the concept, functions and typologies of NHRIs have been outlined, it is time to turn 
to their engagement with the international human rights system. 
6.3 International and Regional Mechanisms of NHRI Coordination 
One of the most evident proofs of the recent global-scale development of NHRIs is the 
proliferation of networks and platforms created and strengthened  in the last couple of decades 
with the aim to facilitate the coordination between the different levels of NHRI engagement 
(international, regional and sub-regional). As far as the international level is concerned, there 
are two bodies worth of mention: the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs (ICC) 
and the International Ombudsman Institute (IOI). 
6.3.1 The International Coordinating Committee (ICC) 
The International Coordinating Committee is a representative body established with the 
purpose of creating and strengthening Paris Principles-compliant national human rights 
institutions. It was founded in 1993 at the Tunis International Conference under the official 
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auspices of the UN Human Rights Commission and its legal entity has been granted to it in 
2008, when it was registered under the Swiss Civil Code. The main functions of the 
Committee are the following: 
- To coordinate the activities of Paris Principles-compliant NHRIs internationally; 
- To act as a bridge between NHRIs and the OHCHR or whatever other international 
organization is interested in collaborative efforts with NHRIs; 
- To support from the start the establishment of new NHRIs in those countries which yet have 
to establish one; 
- To support the NHRI-capacity strengthening in those countries already endowed with one. 
- A last, fundamental task of the Committee is that of NHRI Accreditation: in fact it is 
through its Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) that newly established and existing 
National Institutions receive their NHRI status, with the OHCHR serving as permanent 
observer and secretariat of both the ICC and the SCA. Through this process, NHRIs are 
periodically reviewed on a 5 year basis according to the normative outlines found in the 
Paris Principles, with the possibility of appeal by reviewed NHRIs in case of negative 
results in their institutional examination.  
 
There are currently three levels of accreditation: 
 
- “A” Voting Member: the NHRI fully complies with the Paris Principles, which allows it to 
participate as voting members in the international meetings held within the ICC agenda as 
well as to participate with no restrictions in the HRC sessions. 
- “B” Observer Member: the national institution does not fully comply the Paris Principles or 
has been faulty in document-submission for the determination to be made. The institution 
may participate in ICC meetings but may not vote on matters discussed during such 
meetings, as they do not hold the “NHRI badge”. 
“C” Non-Member: the national institution does not comply with the Paris Principles, 
and as such has no right under neither the ICC nor the UN forums.
106
 
 
6.3.2 The International Ombudsman Institute 
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The IOI is an international organization representing ombudsmen bodies of whatever 
designation, as long as its mandate derives from legislative sources. It is the oldest of its kind, 
having been established in 1978, and is endowed with legal personality under Canadian 
legislation. Its main tasks
107
 are that of institutional promotion of the Ombudsman institution 
and of regional participation of the Institute’s activities, so as to decentralize its activities. It 
also functions as a centre for research and exchange of information relevant to Ombudsmen 
bodies. 
6.3.3 Regional Coordinative Bodies 
At the regional and sub-regional level, there is an ever-increasing array of coordinative 
bodies, which occupy the institutional space between the above-mentioned international 
networks and NHRIs themselves. Amongst the most important ones we may find: 
- The European Group of NHRIs; 
- The Asia Pacific Forum (APF); 
- The Federacion Iberoamericana de Ombudsman (FIO); 
- The Network of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of 
the American Continent; 
- The Network of African National Human Rights Institutions (NANHRI); 
- The Commonwealth Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (CFNHRI); 
- The Association of Mediterranean Ombudsmen. 
 
Within Latin America, a region which has been characterized by a very dynamic institutional reality 
ever since the fall of the many dictatorial governments which polluted its recent history, we can find 
at least three sub-regional coordinative NHRI networks: the Consejo Andino de Defensores del 
Pueblo, the Consejo Centroamericano de Procuradores de Derechos Humanos and the Asociacion 
de Ombudsman del Caribe. 
 
Due to this paper’s case study, and for purely practical matters,  only FIO will be analyzed more 
closely in order to give an idea of how these regional bodies function. 
 
The Federación Iberoamerican de Ombudsman (FIO) is a network of human rights ombudsmen 
established in 1995 in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia. It runs following its Statute, firstly approved 
in 1995 and later reformed in several other reformatory meetings, the last of which was in 2006 in 
Nueva Vallarta, Mexico. Apart from its Statute, its governing apparatus is made up of Resolutions 
adopted by both its General Assembly and its Directive Committee. Its primary objective is to be a 
forum of cooperation, exchange of experiences and the promotion diffusion and strengthening of 
the Ombudsman institution in the geographical region under its jurisdiction, independently on what 
name the national/regional/provincial body has been given (in Latin America, Ombudsmen 
institutions vary in names, such as Defensores del Pueblo, Procuradores, Razonadores, etc).
108
  The 
General Assembly is FIO’s maximum authority, which comprises one delegate from each 
participating country, each with a right to speak and vote. Other two FIO organs are the Directive 
Committee, made up of the heads of the participating national bodies together with three 
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representatives of civil society organization; and the “Rector” Council, the body that deals with the 
day-to-day matters brought to the FIO’s attention. It is made up of representatives selected, every 
two years, from the various regions that are included within FIO’s sphere of influence (Europe, 
North America, Central America, Andean Region and South Cone). A last important body 
guaranteed by the Statute is the Technical Secreteriat, which deals with the administrative 
development of FIO. As of 2012, countries that are part of the FIO network are Andorra, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Spain, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico and Venezuela.After the above overview of those 
“in-house” coordinating bodies, in the sense that they are made up of and deal with national 
institutions as per mandate, it is time to take into consideration the engagement between NHRIs and 
the international human rights system. 
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6.4 NHRI and the International Human Rights System 
By know it should be understood that as a “bridge” between international human rights 
standards and their implementation at national level, NHRIs are deeply involved with both 
treaty monitoring bodies and the UN more generally. The Paris Principles themselves 
envisage a clear role for NHRIs as contributors of states’ reporting obligations, although 
without that clarity which would be necessary due to the Principles’ nature of most 
authoritative international statement on such institutions. What now follows is a tentative 
clarification of the kind of relationship national institutions have with the various organs 
within the international human rights law regime, as well as the core functions that NHRIs 
serve within said regime. 
As an introduction, one recognized fault of the Principles and current literature is the fact that 
NHRI classification stops at a structure and function-level, categorizing institutions following 
such institutional characteristics only. We have seen, for example, how commissions are 
different from ombudsman institutions as much as quasi-judicial bodies are more highly 
regarded than those without such function. However, NHRI analysis should not stop there. 
When discussing on NHRIs’ role in the international human rights system, and more precisely 
on their role in implementing international standards domestically, one should take into 
consideration a bigger picture. 
Starting from a merely theoretical point of view, it would be understandable to presume that 
depending on whether a state automatically incorporates international standards in its 
domestic legal order or whether it has to follow a legislative approach, NHRIs’ activity would 
be more or less facilitated. In other words, one has to at least consider whether the basic 
international law difference between monist and dualist states affects the practice of national 
institutions in any one state where these bodies have been introduced.  In fact, from countries 
with a monist approach it is expectable to either assign NHRI mandates with references to 
treaties rather than domestic human rights instruments or to actually not have any explicit 
treaty mandate due to the automatic nature of treaty incorporation into the domestic system. 
From dualist states, on the other hand, what would be expected is the presence of precise 
provisions relating to their mandate’s international scope as ratified treaties always need 
incorporative legislation. 
By using a recent and very detailed mandate-related research published by Richard Carver
109
, 
in consultancy with the International Council on Human Rights Policy (Switzerland), we 
evince that the monist-dualist theoretical divide is not strictly reflected in NHRIs’ mandates 
vis-à-vis the international human rights law system. In Carver’s paper he assembles a 
database of 69 different NHRIs’ founding legislation, purposefully covering all geopolitical 
regions and with an establishment date ranging from 1981 (Spain) to 2007 (France). He 
groups the statutes in three different categories: pre-1992, 1992-1999 and 2000-2007 whereby 
1992 is when the Paris Principles were firstly introduced and 1999/2000 is “the halfway point 
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to test the hypothesis that more recent laws would be more likely to contain an explicit 
international law mandate”.110 
What can be seen from his analysis is the following: fifty-seven per cent of pre 1992 NHRI 
founding legislation explicitly refer to international treaties; in the 1992-1999 period, whilst 
thirty per-cent refer to international treaties and thirteen per-cent to domestic only, it is 
significant that the remaining fifty-six per cent do not specify; most strikingly, amongst the 
latest NHRI mandates, seventy per-cent mention treaties as the legislation to follow, with five 
per-cent restricting their scope to national laws and twenty-five not specifying. These 
percentages span a variety of countries that go from “ultra-monist” Netherlands (with the 
Dutch Equal Treatment Commission) to dualist South Africa (South African Human Rights 
Commission). The fact that both latter examples are Commissions is purely casual, as Latin 
American Defensores del Pueblo are included in the survey, as well as Advisory Committees 
and the like. What this leads to is the realization that different theoretical approaches to 
domesticizing international norms do not influence NHRI legislation. To the contrary, what is 
actually influencing mandates, apart from obvious political traditions, is the global trend. The 
more NHRIs become accepted and well regarded within the international human rights system 
of human rights promotion and protection, the more directly linked their founding legislation 
appear to be to such a system.  
As proof of the latter conclusion, one is invited to consider the growing tendency to increase 
NHRIs role in treaty monitoring and implementation. Whilst General Comment 10 of the 
CESCR
111
 explicitly calls States Parties to include Economic and Social Rights within their 
existing NHRIs’ mandates in order to facilitate the monitoring of the Treaty’s fulfillment 
nationally, General Comment 2 of the CRC goes even further. The role of NHRIs found in 
this instrument’s wording is probably one of the most fully developed when it says that “the 
establishment of such bodies… falls within the commitment made by States parties upon 
ratification to ensure the implementation of the Convention”.112 What really acts as proof of 
this growing trend however is the role that NHRIs have been formally given under both 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT) and Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), two of the latest international human rights conventions 
to be drafted. What these two treaties actually require from ratifying states is that national 
institutions “be given the necessary powers to carry out the various functions specified in the 
treaty itself”.113 It is not a mere invitation to act, but a straightforward requirement, the lack of 
which is considered to be a grave misapplication of treaty regulations.  More specifically, 
OPCAT introduces within State Parties a distinct body, a National Preventive Mechanism 
(NPM), which has to be set up within one year from ratification and, key to our discussion, 
NPMs have been in most cases considered to be equivalent to NHRIs, with explicit reference 
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to the Paris Principles. In other words, NHRIs have often been regarded as the one national 
body which should take NPM within its structure. As far as the CRPD is concerned, Art 33(2) 
also requires the establishment of “independent mechanisms” to follow up on national 
adherence to the Convention and, as with the OPCAT, reference is made to the Paris 
Principles for guidance.  
NHRIs mandates thus cut across strict theoretical boundaries and have been introduced in 
treaty monitoring mechanisms on a constantly more radical manner. We may even go as far as 
saying that NHRIs have somehow reached a stage whereby their identity has attained a 
separate level in international law, a statement which can be better understood if read in light 
of the UN Secretary General’s 2005 Report on the effectiveness of NHRIs114. In this 
fundamental document, NHRIs are seen as “the answer to the old question of the 
implementation gap – the inconsistency between formal treaty obligations and actual respect 
for human rights on the ground”115, a clear indication of the rise of NHRIs’ importance in the 
international human rights regime. From the previously-understood role that NHRIs were 
considered to have (monitoring state adherence to state obligations), they now clearly 
represent an integral part of the implementation of human rights treaties.
116
 
NHRI international engagement can be said to be of mutual advantage. In fact it is not only 
NHRIs that need an international dimension for their activity to function successfully. Within 
the intricate canvas that lies at the basis for the international human rights regime there are 
quite clear indications that NHRIs are actually a necessity for the regime to aptly work. 
NHRIs without international engagement would be some kind of a voiceless creature, which 
would be a disaster in terms of effectiveness if we add to this the commonly known 
characteristic of NHRIs being “toothless” bodies in terms of enforcement mechanisms. 
NHRIs need such international dimension for several reasons: state’s international 
accountability for its human rights performance would not be put to the test as much as it is 
vis-à-vis the international community, the latter probably being the most effective way of 
pressurizing governments into human rights-friendly behavior; it would not be able to fulfill 
that fundamental function that is comparing domestic traditional standards  to international 
ones, reinforcing the principle of the universality of human rights; common problematic 
issues within any one region would not be tackled with the contribution of other members of 
said region, which is the only way to forward a successful strategy of human rights promotion 
and protection, sharing best practices and approaches; it would furthermore be much more 
difficult to actually set the international human rights agenda, as national institutions need an 
international outlook in order to make their voice be heard. 
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However, it is not only NHRIs that need the international system. The strong endorsement 
received from the international community ever since the 1993 Vienna Conference is 
probably the best evidence to show that national institutions are an extremely convenient 
introduction to an effective global system of human right protection. These bodies offer what 
had been lacking in terms of independent, objective information on national human rights 
situations: whilst state reports have often been regarded as “inevitably self-serving”117, 
NGOs’ accounts have also been seen as partly biased and politically motivated. A level of 
independent honesty is expected by national institutions when reporting in international 
forums, as well as a level of authoritativeness which derives from their legal (and sometimes 
even constitutional) obligation to investigate on the domestic situation of their nation. 
Furthermore, the level of knowledge “on the field” that NHRIs are endowed of is unparalleled 
if one takes into consideration the daily activities that such institutions undertake.  
This two-way relationship is however not without its obstacles. States themselves often try to 
tackle national institutions which shed negative light on them in international forums, 
something which increases the image of independence that NHRIs strive for, but which can 
also be a radical way of diminishing their effectiveness. This leads to yet another obstacle in 
the way of NHRIs, with issues relating to financial and personnel realities. International 
engagement obviously involves a high degree of expenditure and if the budget, which is 
directly flowing from the state, is curtailed for whatever reason, it will deeply influence the 
possibility of the national institutions’ contribution to the international human rights regime. 
There are alternative means of access to funding and training, such as OHCHR-run programs, 
regional networks of NHRIs and academic institutions such as the Swedish Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute, but without the state’s acknowledgement and backing, national institutions cannot 
develop their full capacity. It is for this reason that engagement in international forums should 
be seen as a positive appendix to their domestic activity, both with reference to a supportive 
role and as a boost to its effectiveness. 
Having seen both the negative and positive elements that make up NHRIs’ engagement with 
the international system, let us now turn to a more detailed analysis of which international 
bodies are dealt with through this interaction. 
6.4.1 Treaty Monitoring Committees  
Once a treaty is ratified by a state, its compliance is monitored by bodies of independent 
experts elected by the states themselves. These monitoring bodies have a purely legal 
function, not linked to any political end due to the fact that it is not state officials that staff 
them. There is no tie to any one state and discussions only reflect the legal implications of 
matters taken into consideration during meetings, the authority for which flows from a 
commonly agreed text. 
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The reason to analyze this arena of international engagement first is not casual. These 
committees in fact have seen “national institutions far more engaged than with other parts of 
the international human rights system and there are many opportunities for them to increase 
and improve their engagement”.118 On this regard, both the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as 
the more recently established Committee on the Rights of the Child have adopted General 
Comments in which the role of NHRIs were explained and fostered.
119
 The reason behind this 
higher level of commitment is arguably linked to that superior level of independence from 
state-politics mentioned at the start of this sub-chapter. The role that national institutions are 
expected to play during committee sessions and in their preparatory stages vary from lobbying 
states into ratification to monitoring compliance. One of the most debated functions that 
NHRIs are allowed to carry out is that of aid to state-parties in the preparation of their reports 
to any of the treaty monitoring committees. Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of the Principles state 
that national institutions should provide  “opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports 
on any matter concerning the promotion and protection of human rights” as well as “promote 
the harmonization of national legislation regulations and practices with the international 
human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective implementation”.  
6.4.2 Universal Periodic Review  
When the Human Rights Commission was dismantled in 2006, paving way for the 
establishment of the Human Rights Council, a new mechanism was set in place which took 
the domestic human rights review method to a higher level of  consistency and coverage. It 
adopted a four year cycle for each of the 192 member states, and in negotiations processes the 
possibility of having non-state actors involved in the review was extensively debated. What 
resulted was a very ambiguous opening to this possibility, with a referral to “relevant national 
stakeholders” who should be consulted in the drafting of each state report. The HRC 
resolution went further by specifying that such stakeholders were to provide “additional, 
credible and reliable information” by having the opportunity “to make general comments 
before the adoption of the outcome of the plenary”.120 It is clear that such indications were 
included in order to accommodate bodies such as NHRIs. As a matter of fact, national 
institutions have ever since been deeply engaged in the UPR, with high percentages of 
participation shown in all stages of the review process.
121
 
The National Institutions’ role has recently increased in importance after the 2nd Cycle of the 
UPR started in 2012, up until then the only role NHRIs played being the pre-national report 
stage, suggesting and recommending issues that they think should be included in the review. 
After the working group session, the HRC meets in a plenary session to consider and adopt 
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the outcome of the UPR; a one-hour meeting is devoted to each State under Review. At the 
HRC plenary session, the SuR, Member States, Observers including UN entities, as well as 
stakeholders, including A-status NHRIs and NGOs with ECOSOC status, have the 
opportunity to make interventions. A-status NHRIs can take the floor after the country’s 
delegation. It is a very important chance for NHRIs to make their voice known in 
international forums as the recommendations have often been accepted by states and made 
their own during the dialogue which takes place at the presentation of any given states’ 
review. NHRIs have thus been placed in a privileged position within the plenary discussion, a 
role which has been focusing on their respective countries only but which has nonetheless 
been of invaluable importance for the UPR system as a whole. 
6.4.3 Special Procedures  
Praised as “the jewel in the crown of the international human rights system”122, they may have 
a thematic focus (such as arbitrary detention or torture), have a country as specific subject 
matter of their mandate or take up individual cases. Within the Special Procedures’ 
investigation and reporting, NHRIs may contribute in various ways, especially when Country 
Visits take place.  Mandates more often than not include the obligation to undertake such 
visits, after which a report is prepared and presented at the Human Rights Council. In such 
instances, a national institution has potential for maneuver in many ways: it can actually 
initiate a Country Visit by inviting the mandate holder to include its country in the assessment 
or it may lobby the government itself to issue an invitation; it may submit relevant reports to 
the mandate holder, facilitating his task by organizing interviews with relevant stakeholders 
and pointing out the most critical of cases; it can help in the dissemination, domestically and 
abroad, of the final report and its recommendations, in this way raising awareness of the 
issues touched upon by the visit. It cannot be forgotten, in fact, that NHRIs have a crucial role 
not only in the protection of human rights, but in their promotion as well.  However even 
when Country Visits are not in the agenda, NHRIs may contribute by providing general 
briefings on any matter relevant to the mandate holder’s job. In this way they can positively 
mould the approach given from a vantage point, as no official institution has the capability of 
addressing domestic human rights-related matters as they have, let alone an external UN 
official and his team. Additionally, NHRIs may refer cases to Special Procedures, may assist 
in the follow up of individual cases before, during and after the UN’s mission as well as 
helping victims of human rights abuses bring a case to Special Procedure’s attention.  
Unfortunately, according to a OHCHR survey
123
, only thirty-five per cent of respondent 
NHRIs have been interacting with Special Procedures, which signals that the obstacles to 
international engagement are indeed a matter for serious consideration. 
6.4.4 Human Right Council   
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NHRIs’ involvement with the HRC has increased considerably during the last couple of 
decades. Whilst it was only from their respective governments’ seats that national institutions 
were allowed to address the Commission during the 1990s, a mild opening arrived in 1997 
when they were allowed to speak in their own name, although with very restricted scope of 
action. In 2005 Paris Principles-compliant NHRIs were finally granted full participation 
through Resolution 2005/74, a sort of coming of age for institutions which up until then had 
not succeeded in receiving the amount of participatory space they had been striving for. As 
the Commission’s era came to an end, and the Human Rights Council started its activity, 
NHRIs continued in this growing trend, now benefiting from their own separate area within 
the Council and full participation in both resolution-consultation and lobbying. It has so far 
been a rather disappointing contribution to the dialogue however, often focusing on their own 
domestic work rather than advocating for any serious human rights questions. Nonetheless, it 
is too early to draw conclusions. On the positive side, the ICC has placed a permanent 
representative in Geneva, whose role is to act as representative of these institutions within the 
HRC in terms of policy-advocacy both collectively and in the name of particular NHRIs. 
Another interesting fact worth of notice is the often concomitant dates of the ICC’s annual 
meeting with an ordinary HRC session, both taking place in Geneva, an occasion for the 
various visiting NHRI delegations to attend the two meetings without having to stretch budget 
allocations excessively, the latter being one of the most serious problems facing national 
institutions’ international engagement. Another difficulty for NHRIs in making the most of 
the space offered to them is linked to the well known politicization of the HRC, where a 
substantial amount of attention is given to states’ reputation vis-à-vis the rest of member 
states rather than taking strong, objective stances against human rights violations worldwide. 
It is desirable that in the near future national institutions will be able to push discussions 
taking place at the Council towards a more honest and frank level than it has been so far, 
especially after their recent rise in importance and esteem.  
6.4.5 Standard Setting 
Last but not least, NHRIs have lately been increasingly involved in international instruments’ 
negotiations. In fact, their extensive practical knowledge of particular human rights issues  
from “the field” makes them perfect candidates for standard setting mechanisms. Both the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, at their negotiation stages, have abundantly made use of NHRI staff’s 
expertise and guidance. Noteworthy is the fact that both instruments are amongst the youngest 
in terms of publication (both signed in 2007), yet another symptom of the recent rise in regard 
given to NHRIs by the international community.  
PART II 
7. The Importance of the Social and Cultural Background to NHRIs 
In the span of NHRIs’ relatively short history, one can definitely notice a tendency towards a 
universal approach to their expansion, with local realities not taken into full consideration 
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when assessing their operability and effectiveness.  In assessing national institutions, and 
more importantly in accepting them within the ICC-affiliated NHRIs, little to no attention has 
been given to the governments that created them, to the civil society they should be working 
with and to the general social, political and cultural background that allowed such institutions 
to be introduced. 
In order to show the underlying reasons why these elements must be considered so as to 
inform evaluations and to understand how to tackle the successes and the downfalls  of 
internationally recognized NHRIs, what will follow is a brief outline of some of the unique 
characteristics that mould one particular region of the world, Latin America. The reason 
behind this particular choice is due to my personal experience in the field, interning at the 
office of the Ecuadorian Defensor del Pueblo for a period of three months during the summer 
of 2013. During this internship I was able to learn the day-to-day activities of an A-status 
South American NHRI with all its intrinsic challenges of dealing with such a unique blend of 
societal components, exclusive to a continent which has both benefited and suffered from a 
vast array of uncommon elements to other parts of the world. By living in Ecuador I not only 
came to understand the local state of affairs by being immersed first-hand in the running of 
the Ecuadorian Defensoría. In fact, thanks to the frequent informal interviews with the civil 
servants I had the chance to interact with during these months as well as personal research, I 
managed to get a fairly decent perception of the very complicated, heterogeneous leverages 
that have molded this region’s running of the res publica. It is a very hard task to condense 
this huge amount of information into one single chapter, so I apologize in advance if some 
points seem lacking in precious detail. The aim of this chapter is to expose the necessity for 
an acknowledgement of these elements that go to the roots of society, without which any sort 
of institutionalization process should not take place. This reasoning is obviously applicable to 
other particular regions of the world, and may be inscribed in a somewhat broad relativist 
conception. Whilst the initially global NHRI movement has allowed the widespread 
introduction of these institutions, I argue that after more than twenty years since the Paris 
Principles it is now time for an increased attention towards the local over the universal in 
terms of NHRI analysis.  
7.1 Latin American multicultural heritage  
Ever since the “high civilizations” (Inca, Maya, Aztec) ruled the vast expanses of the Latin 
American continent, these lands have been witnesses to a variety of complex economic and 
cultural networks that proceeded autonomously, in isolation from similar processes taking 
place in other parts of the world. Advanced social organization mechanisms, urban 
development, monumental architecture and sculptures, innovative agricultural methods as 
well as technological and scientific innovations (which lead to, for example, the Aztec 
calendar being more precise than the European one of the time) are all symptomatic of a very 
dynamic, in many aspects unique, multicultural basis on which Latin American society has 
been framed from the very start of civilization. Amongst these varied cultural manifestations, 
two elements are to me fundamental for an understanding of this Latin American 
“uniqueness”. First of all, the importance that nature has played, and still very much does, in 
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its relationship with human beings. The pachamama, which in the Andean world stands for 
the “mother earth”, is a central figure in every relation between man and nature and is 
reckoned to be one of the most respected values in society.   
This cultural heritage is manifested today in many forms, and not from mere academic or 
scientific interest. Many Latin American countries regard cultural preservation as a definite 
cultural policy objective, aimed towards a fundamentally important strengthening of the 
national identity of the country, a sort of substratum of the American identity that cannot get 
lost in time. It may even be argued that such a close attention to pre-Hispanic mores and 
traditions be linked to the search for a symbolic “overcoming of the trauma of the conquest 
and civilization”124 whilst at the same time reinforcing “the discourse of a mestizo nation built 
on the syncretism of its native cultures”.125 And apart from these national efforts of 
preservation, there is of course the vitality of the existing indigenous cultures of the Americas, 
a dynamic reality which continues to play an increasingly important role, even in the running 
of the state, in many contemporary Latin American nations. 
7.2 Colonial Rule  
The Spanish imperial rule, the first of its time and with a duration of more than three 
centuries, started at the beginning of the 16
th
 century. Fundamental to our discussion, it did 
not operate solely on economic and political levels, but also had a strong voluntary impact on 
the culture of the conquered. It seems redundant to say at this point that such impact affected 
the whole of the evolution of the Americas and its millions of people.  
The progressive military invasion was readily followed by the introduction of a highly 
centralized colonial administration which led to undisputed control over most of the continent. 
The steady erosion of the autochthonous populations and “empires” was not only due to the 
slaughter and epidemics brought in by the so-called conquistadores. Once officially settled, 
the Spanish introduced a new economy which had serious ecological repercussions, where 
forced labour and repression were considered the norm, the legal doctrine of “terra nullius” 
justified land dispossession and eventually even forced cultural impositions started to take 
place mainly through evangelization. It is not surprising that the Spanish invasion of the 
Americas is nowadays considered the first genocide of the modern era. The highly 
hierarchical and stratified culture that was consolidated in the Spanish colonies, which turned 
the indigenous peasants into serf labour for the new dominant class, lasted throughout the 
XVI century until the XIX century, when the first sparks of separatist/nationalistic movements 
started to achieve their desired goals. The consequences of this destructive 300 year-old 
heritage is clearly visible in the Latin American culture of today. The above-mentioned 
stratification of society led to a characteristic that continues to negatively affect Latin 
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American society even today, leading to what has been defined as “cultural polarization”. 126 
As a matter of fact, the duality dominator-dominated (with Spanish descendents as the former 
and indigenous ethnic groups, blacks and mestizos as the latter) is still very much present not 
only within national corridors of power but also in the ordinary lives of everyday Latin 
America.  
During the colonial period, it was exclusively the colonizers’ culture that was officially 
supported and played a crucial role in the cultural formation of the continent. It is common 
knowledge that compulsory conversion by the hands of the Catholic Church was one of the 
main means through which autochthonous identities were wiped out from official streams of 
education. However, indigenous cultural resistance managed to tackle this attempt at societal 
decapitation, and notwithstanding a very harsh response by the hands of the colonizing power, 
what eventually resulted (referred to by academics as the “culture of conquest”) was a 
substantially different culture from that of peninsular Spain, intrinsically unique due to the 
numerous indigenous influences it benefited from.  
7.3 A Newly Found Latin American Identity  
After three centuries of suppressive colonization by the hands of the Spanish, and more 
precisely during the late XVIII century, local elites started to reach a political awareness 
different from what had been engrained onto them by the dominant power. The bourgeois 
revolutions that spread across the Old Continent, together with the American Revolution, 
sparked a growing interest in independentist movements, that started to appear and spread 
across the whole of Latin America. Worthy of a specific mention is Simòn Bolivar, one of the 
key actors in the liberation from Spanish rule of many nations during this period. His idea of 
building a united America involved the presence of all sets of society, obviously including 
indigenous communities and descendents of the African slaves brought to the colonies by the 
Spanish. However, within the official nationalist political attitude, none of the above was 
taken into consideration. After the successful emancipation of Latin America, national politics 
was once again in the hands of a minority of elites, with the only difference that now 
conservative ideologies (which still looked at their colonial past with sympathy) were 
contrasted by a liberal elite, more inclined towards those ideals coming from Europe and the 
United States.  Independence movements promised liberation not only from a sovereignty 
point of view, but also in terms of a society finally free from colonizing prejudices and 
obstacles. In a striking contrast between what had been proposed at the outset and what really 
became the reality of Latin American political systems, society continued to be systematically 
stratified and a deep classist system re-appeared with no sign of change from the previous 
colonial reality. What became known as caudillismo, somehow still present in modern-day 
Latin American political culture, was introduced as a means of political and social control 
whilst new genocidal campaigns started to appear by the hands of these new elites, together 
with religious and cultural impositions, all following the ideology that the heterogeneous 
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society that made up the various states of the continent were a danger to nationalistic 
movements.  
A real change in mentality came with the Mexican Revolution first (1910-1917) and the 
Bolivian Revolution shortly after (1952). As Stevenhage’s analysis perfectly explains, these 
popular social movements introduced a new kind of nationalism to Central and South 
America called “revolutionary nationalism”. These revolutions were absolutely innovative in 
two important ways: “On the one hand, the emergence of an active peasant society and their 
agrarian reform movement, an issue that had a profound influence on the political and 
intellectual affairs of many nations of the continent. On the other hand, indigenism, that great 
ideological and cultural current that has left its mark on all Indo-american countries with a 
large indigenous population, both in terms of educational and cultural policies, and of 
intellectual creativity”.127 
Stevenhage continues in his analysis of 20
th
 century Latin American society by describing the 
emergence of a new ethnic group which fed from the cultural syncretism implicit in a society 
made up of different races and cultures, the mestizos. The European, indigenous and African 
characteristics gradually ceased to be exclusive in their nature and grew into becoming a new 
Latin American culture, a symbol of the new nationality. The mestizaje  is thus to be 
considered a unique social process that through the centuries has shaped Latin American 
society and cannot be compared to any previous elements common to the geographical area at 
hand, let alone the rest of the world. Notwithstanding the establishment of this new 
common/unique feature, flowing from a process of ethnic integration, the stratification of 
Latin American society and discriminatory practices continue nowadays as a constant plague 
which is cause of social unrest and uneven distribution of power with the consequent distrust 
towards the state. It is clear that it is these kinds of peculiarities that have previously been 
referred to as “worthy of special attention by local NHRIs”, and according to which NHRIs’ 
effectiveness should be interpreted and judged. 
7.4 The “Lost Decades” 
Ever since the end of the colonial rule in Central and South America, the majority of newly 
established states suffered a dictatorial drift that is of unlikely comparison with the situation 
found in other continents. Without presenting the extremely long list of dictatorial 
governments that succeeded each other during the 1970s until the start of the 1990s (which 
ranged from Chilean Augusto Pinochet, to Argentinean Jorge Videla, to Nicaraguan Anastasio 
Somoza just to name three of the most notorious criminal dictators of the continent), it is 
important to shortly discuss the effects that such extreme cases of authoritarian governments 
had on the population of these countries, as well as its everlasting molding of local culture and 
perception of the state by the citizenry. 
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Up to the start of the new millennium in fact, when XXI century socialism appeared in Latin 
America, the armed forces were the main actors in the golpes that overthrew democratically 
elected presidents, that abolished any existing constitutional  order and established 
dictatorships. What came after usually followed the same kind of pattern: destitution of the 
President (sometimes leading to his execution), closure of the National Congress and finally 
instauration of a military caudillo (who seldom came from civil backgrounds). These 
caudillos, sometimes accompanied in their directive role by a small number of other high 
ranking officials (in this case defined as military juntas), although endowed with enough 
power to run the country single-handedly through presidential decrees, all decided to act 
otherwise. For purposes of popular appearance and legitimacy, they decided to keep the 
Constitution in force, except for those articles that clashed with their political interests. It was 
a successful attempt at judicial legitimacy, with constitutional assemblies and sometimes the 
invocation of referendums that led to the passing of constitutions which mirrored the 
dictatorial intentions of these oppressors. A number of them lasted for extended periods of 
time through piloted reelections, as was the case of Augusto Pinochet’s almost 20 year rule 
with the official backing of a large part of the Chilean population.  
Fraudulent elections (such was the case of Guatemala, for example, which from 1970 to 1982 
was scenario of four different fraudulent elections which put in power military governments 
exclusively), or simply forceful perpetration of the governments’ tenure (such as was the case 
for Paraguay, with Genral Alfredo Storessner in power from 1954 to 1989, or of Nicaragua, 
where three generations of Somozas held “office” from 1933 to 1979) were the norm in XX 
century Latin America. During these dramatic decades, Latin America was profoundly hit by 
massive human rights violations with some governments responsible for vast amounts of 
forced disappearances
128
 and the elimination of those persons whose effort in the field of 
human rights made them direct targets of those military governments they were strongly 
criticizing.
129
 In these states, the rule of law was a non-existent principle, as much as 
independent democratic institutions, with the purpose of enabling the citizenry to present 
claims for the gross violations of their most fundamental human rights, did not exist. These 
events were of dramatic impact to the conception of the State held by society. Some of the 
dictatorships that were governing these Latin American states during the 1970-1990s period 
were simply the third or fourth generation of national rulers, and they single-handedly took 
society to the same level of brutal repression and discrimination that characterized the 
colonial period.  In the region there is also a second group of States (if we do not consider a 
third group made up of Costa Rica only,  which never suffered conflicts nor alterations in the 
democratic order) that although free from direct military oppression, had institutional 
weaknesses that made their democracies very fragile anyway. Brevity of presidential tenure, 
political dependence to US influence, internal conflicts between different factions, and the 
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overarching social stratification which in turn led to social unrest, are only a few of the causes 
of institutional weakness of these otherwise fairly un-militarized States.  
Whatever the reasons behind it, institutional weaknesses became the common characteristic of 
Latin American States, with obvious results in terms of extremely poor human rights 
protection mechanisms and a very low consideration of the State by the population at large. 
7.5 Bolivarian States  
More recently, a current of thought considers that the so-called Bolivarian States
130
 figure as a 
novel, somehow less recognized, form of modern dictatorial regimes. It is a highly 
controversial point of view, subject to strong criticism by a great number of thinkers and 
normal citizens alike, and as such I simply restrain myself to indicate its presence and will not 
indulge in any personal reflections on the matter. Whatever opinion one follows however, its 
uniqueness is indicative of a purely Latin American reality that should definitely be taken into 
consideration when dealing with normative and institutional innovations in such countries.  
This current of thought pictures governments such as the ones run by the late Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez (and current President, as well as Chavez’s apparent heir, Nicolas 
Maduro), the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa , Bolivian President Evo Morales and 
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega as concealed contemporary forms of “soft dictatorships”. 
The term “soft” has been used due to the fact that no illegal presidential depositions have 
taken place nor were Constitutions abolished. On the other hand, once in power following free 
democratic elections, they proceeded to mould the existing constitutional paper with the 
apparent purpose of bettering the situation of the middle and low class, the great majority of 
these nations’ populations. Through fairly docile constitutional assemblies and vast popular 
support, which enabled them to make use of popular referendums as further means of 
legitimization, these Bolivarian leaders  have started to exercise close-to unlimited power over 
the legislative and judicial powers of the State as well as those supervisory organs supposed to 
overlook the various organs of the State itself. It goes without saying that in situations of such 
uncontested power, it is not simply the official branches of the State that are in jeopardy: 
many cases of fundamental human rights violations have taken place in these countries, 
accountability levels decreased considerably and electoral manipulations have played as 
obstacles to political alternations. Large numbers of laws and decrees have passed through 
Parliament which have, according to some, captured national democratic institutions within 
their reach, subordinating them to the President’s party and its executive power. Public 
opinion has been one other main card used in order to reach this level of control, through the 
nationalization of the media. 
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What is intrinsically peculiar about these States not only lies at the heart of their ideological 
background (“Latin American socialism”),  of a nature of its own if we compare it to other 
forms of past and present socialist governments around the world, but also in the way that it 
has been judged by many analysts and by large parts of these States’ citizens as well. What 
has been taken into account is only the face-value survival of democratic institutions on the 
one hand, and the great electoral successes that have brought these populist governments into 
power on the other, “as if the citizens’ votes were sufficient to make up for arbitrariness, to 
legitimize authoritarianism, to convert unconstitutional acts into acts with full constitutional 
value and to qualify as democratic many institutions that in reality are not”.131 What thinkers 
of this line of thought view in the Bolivarian democracies is a very precise paradox: in a time 
when democracy and institutions that follow democratic mechanisms have finally spread in 
basically the whole of the Americas, what now have to be recognized as the main enemies 
towards a fully functional democratic system of governance are not the armed forces and 
military caudillos, but rather civil political leaders and their parties, democratically elected 
into power and with a strong popular support.  
7.6 The Principle of Sumac Kawsay/Buen Vivir 
It is from this background that in South America a novel debate has started to spread, 
originating from social movements, especially of an indigenous nature, as well as from certain 
academic environments, above all in countries of the Andean region. The Buen Vivir (“Good 
Living” if we are to translate it literally) is a critique of the contemporary form of 
development to which it proposes alternatives, nearly always adopting contributions from 
indigenous cultures.  Buen Vivir is a powerful principle which means “life in harmony and 
equilibrium between men and women, between different communities, and, above all, 
between human beings and the natural environment of which they are part.  In practice, this 
concept implies knowing how to live in community with others while achieving the minimum 
conditions for equality.  It means eliminating prejudice and exploitation between people as 
well as respecting nature and preserving its equilibrium”.132  
Apart from criticizing the modern conception of development, its practices and its 
institutionalization, the Buen Vivir also puts into question the current means of understanding 
welfare and “well being”, together with a critique of how natural resources are perceived 
nowadays within the optics of development. This ensemble of theoretical critiques and 
alternatives has flown into a very pragmatic “political platform”133 which, notwithstanding its 
origin coming from a very specific marginal societal group, is a very specific attempt at 
switching perspectives of the whole society of any one state that adopts its principles. 
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The defence of plurality and the appraisement of different forms of knowledge means that the 
Buen Vivir cannot advance specific reforms, in terms of practical proposals to be followed in 
detail such as tax reforms or agricultural reform strategies. What it can do, however, is to 
offer a framework of principles and values with which such reforms can take place, 
determining both the conditions for such specific governmental programmes and the 
restrictions to them. As an example, the Buen Vivir’s focus on the protection of the Rights of 
Nature, the latter recognized as an absolute right-holder for the first time in modern history, 
obliges the state to shape all its programmes of action, practices and indicators around this 
biocentric stand. Of fundamental importance, there is no single typology of Buen Vivir. The 
various kinds of “Buen Vivires” depend on the various historical, cultural and ecological 
terms of each context and as such no universal guideline of the Buen Vivir is either desirable 
or possible. 
Buen Vivir’s influence, even though underlining the majority of the new political leftist 
realities of the continent, has been stronger in the Andean region, due to its origin flowing 
from the indigenous populations present in these countries (Buen Vivir is a fairly 
inappropriate translation into Spanish of the Ecuadorian Kichwa People’s principle of Sumac 
Kawsay, the original concept). Ecuador and Bolivia went as far as including the principles 
pertaining to Buen Vivir in their Constitutions during their latest Constitutional reforms.  
Notwithstanding this novel possibility of change, there are severe limits to its full 
implementation. The increased visibility and more active participation that the Buen Vivir 
guarantees to the indigenous communities of Latin America has often been hindered by the 
governments in power. It is a matter of fact that a very common political feature of 
contemporary Central and South America has been a tendency to a strong presidential 
tradition of government. This implies a low level of influence by the so-called “party politics” 
(sometimes even limited by the president itself) and the reliance on a strong charismatic 
leadership. The necessary institutional and representative balance is thus interfered with, often 
through plebiscitary mechanisms, and the voice of the less represented (in which group, 
amongst others, we find indigenous communities) is usually silenced. It is clear that 
notwithstanding a formal commitment to the ideals underlying the Buen Vivir, many states 
fail to practically accomplish their undertaking.  
The above-mentioned focus of post-dictatorial Latin American states on economic growth and 
the reliance on the export of raw materials means that there is not just an ideological clash 
with their (sometimes) constitutional commitments, but also a very pragmatic contradiction in 
their decision-taking. Whilst for example, the so-called politics of social justice, such as 
economic redistribution through direct conditioned payments to the poorest members of 
society, are catered for by many governments of the region, there is also widespread 
dependence on extraction industries which have severe social and environmental impacts on 
the lands involved.  
All these characteristics are undoubtedly the backbone of Central and South American culture 
and as such should not be left in the background of neither national nor international decision-
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making. More to the point of major concern for our analysis, in the case of institution-
building, all these factors should be taken in consideration when introducing certain elements 
in countries with such strong and ancient traditions. The “copy-paste” approach that can 
arguably be said to apply to the NHRI movement since its formal inception in 1991 may not 
continue to consider these traits as simply “attachments” to the bigger picture. And what has 
been said so far is most definitely not the whole organic peculiarity that distinguishes the 
Latin American continent from the rest of the world. 
7.7 Dysfunctions of the Democratic State in Latin America 
A more detailed analysis of yet another, potentially even more topical feature than any of the 
above characteristics of modern day Latin American democracies, is however necessary. 
Within Hispanic civilization there is an arguably low level of affection towards following the 
law to the letter. Americo Castro, in one of his most influential works on Latin American 
culture, has this to say on the matter, a somewhat exaggerated generalization that does hold 
some truth within its words: “for the Hispanic everything depends from what he/she feels or 
does not feel like doing, and not from what ought and ought not to be done.  If we feel like 
doing it, we would give everything away, even our own lives, for our closest ones; however, 
we would not spontaneously go and apply ourselves so thoroughly for the collective good, 
however small is the effort required from us”.134 In another work of his, Castro explains that 
even if the above was indeed true, Spanish colonies had yet another issue to handle: “In those 
countries where no precious minerals were to be found, or which found themselves far from 
the main commercial routes and thus outside the empire’s influence, it was impossible to 
establish that special systems of rules and hierarchies coming from continental Spain. […] 
Authority, as an internal and conceptual function, is not acknowledged by members of that 
people, who feel the overwhelming tendency to see the State as an emblem of fraud”.135 This 
rather bold comment has to be read within the historical context that justified forced European 
“culturalization” and states the obvious difficulties found by the colonizing powers in 
introducing a particular form of government unknown to the American continent. This had 
obvious repercussions on the manner that the modern state was and has been perceived by the 
population in the last two centuries of independent Latin American history. 
Furthermore, some other historical traits can be viewed as an expressed tendency towards the 
low respect for strict legal rules. In medieval  Spain a very peculiar set of local laws, called 
fueros, was introduced in the various regions that continental Spain was divided into. This 
sort of “legal federalism” may be symptomatic of the judicial spirit that reigned at the time 
and that has survived, albeit in a rather milder and implicit form, up until our days in Spain 
but also in those countries with a colonial history leading back to the Spanish empire. 
According to Grenadian writer Angel Ganivet, “the fueros were holders of the Law’s denial. 
The fuero’ s concept is founded upon the idea of diversifying the law in order to adapt it to 
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small social groups; however, if this difference becomes excessive, as it were in many cases 
of the past, it eventually leads to such an exaggerated legislative atomism that each family 
asks for a separate set of laws so as to accommodate its own interests. During the Middle 
Ages our regions were seeking their own rulers, not to be able to be better governed, but 
rather to overcome royal power; the cities wanted local laws that exempted them from royal 
authority and every social class often requested  new fueros and privileges that applied to 
them personally”.136 Ganivet goes even further by declaring that Imperial Spain ended up very 
close from its judicial ideal: “that every Spanish man would be authorized to do what he feels 
like doing”.137 
Even though some might read the words of Ganivet as a provocative historical generalization, 
there is some truth applicable to modern day Iberoamerican culture in terms of the 
administration of the State. The modern democratic state, in which the ideals of freedom and 
justice are amongst its most foundational values, is subject to a certain numbers of controls 
that ideally should be used only marginally. Constitutions the world over identify within 
themselves a strict adherence to a separation of powers which lies at the roots of any 
functioning democracy. This reasoning is however based on formal legal norms that, 
unfortunately, have little to do with the informal reality of everyday state administration. And 
the latter consideration is especially true of the geographical region we are dealing with, so 
much so that Spanish administrative lawyer Augustin Gordillo defined it as the “Parallel 
Administration”.138 According to Gordillo, these countries seem to have been subject to a 
tendency whereby institutionalized administrative sources of power, flowing from the 
constitution and the various legal rules, are accompanied by different sources of power 
tantamount to a “parallel power” of the state. In other words, as a corollary to the extensive 
official written legal codes and procedures, there exists a set of unwritten rules that society 
has been more and more inclined to regard as the norm. A perfect example of such attitude is 
given by Carlos R. Constenla, former President of the Instituto Latinoamericano del 
Ombudsman, in describing what in Argentinian popular language goes by the name of 
gauchada
139: “those who have been professionally involved with the civil service know that 
whichever acquaintance of his, called to court for an administrative breach, whether or not at 
fault, will visit them before attending their hearing, in order to seek some sort of protection 
from the potential sentence”.140 It is this formally concealed, but informally very obvious, 
parallelism in the system that has brought the administrative system of Latin American states  
in a desperate need for a more strict and thorough mechanism of state control. In fact, “the 
constant comparison between values of generosity, tolerance and magnanimity with those of 
lightness, simplicity and superficiality […] has strengthened the weaknesses of the States’ 
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existing organs of control, to the point of establishing an extensive system of normative 
violation, also known as impunity”.141 
 
7.8 State Administration in Latin America 
This above discussion is even more parenthetic if we set it within one of Latin American’s 
most obvious obstacles to good state administration, and that is the extreme bureaucratization 
of the state apparatus.  The term “bureaucracy” was first used in the XVIII century by Vincent 
de Gournay with the function of outlining the power pertaining to that body of functionaries 
and state employees who were dependent on the Crown. De Gournay was a fervent 
physiocrat, and as such very critical towards absolutism and the centralization of the 
administration of the state. Read in this key, it is clear that the very birth of the term came 
with a strong pejorative connotation.   
What is understood by bureaucracy nowadays is the overgrowth of unnecessary rules and 
regulations, the great waste of resources, the lack of initiative due to an established unofficial 
ritualism that eventually affects the rights of the citizen in a very deep manner. These negative 
traits lead to a certain kind of generalized apathy of the State apparatus, forcing the 
functionary to base all its activities on decisions already taken in the past in similar cases, as 
well as not urging him to take definitive conclusions on whichever case he is asked to deal 
with. Thus, there seems to be a generally diluted responsibility over the whole of the 
administrative system which obviously means the lowest of accountability vis-à-vis the right-
holder/citizen, with its numerous human rights implications. 
To sum up the negative characteristics of the Latin American state’s overly bureaucratic 
system of government, I would like to use a phrase by Erich Fromm which perfectly explains 
the mechanism that such system entails: “(a system) which administers human beings as 
things and administers things in quantitative rather than qualitative terms, in order to simplify 
and cut the costs of the operation and ultimately dominate”.142 What the word bureaucracy 
evokes is a world of paperwork, of lack of responsibility and often even oppression and 
arbitrary acts, the first and cheapest form of cutting off and restricting the rights of a human 
being through the State’s own (pseudo)legal structure. 
Furthermore, the Iberoamerican administrative tradition has been one of “silence, secrecy, 
reserve, not publicity. And it is not the case that the public functionary considers such 
behavior illicit: to the contrary, he regards that as correct, what is supposed to be done, the 
licit and normal; he stands as jealous guardian of all administrative information and is very 
attentive on not sharing with the ones being administered, as it might be jeopardized 
otherwise”.143 Secrecy is one of the most effective mechanisms to isolate the powerful and 
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lead to institutional immunity, as the possibility for accountability disappears and control 
mechanisms over the administration have no material to control. This is an unfortunate 
degeneration of the modern democratic principles that originated in the XIX century, when 
“the following  Kantian axiom became law: actions concerning the rights of other men are 
unjust if their precepts do not permit their sharing”.144 And while the liberal ideology 
according to which ‘the best government is the one which governs the least’ faded away with 
the horrors of the First World War and the introduction of the so-called social rights started 
being introduced both in Europe (Weimar’s Constitution) and in Latin America (after the 
Mexican Revolution), a different approach to democracy appeared. State interventionism 
became the norm for a rising number of policy areas, following the notion that the individual 
and society should not be isolated but, on the other hand, implicitly connected. 
The affirmation of the Welfare State after the Second World War brought new, major 
responsibilities on the part of the State, the obvious consequence of which is the growth and 
strengthening of the administrative sector into something which has been called the “super-
administration of the State”.145 The growth of the executive over the legislative and judicial 
powers had obvious repercussions on the level of control that the latter were supposed to play 
in the relationships amongst the various bodies of the state, with the obfuscation of the 
necessary difference law - politics and legislation - government. All of the above is even more 
noticeable in Latin America, where the major system of republican governments has been of a 
presidential nature. In this region, if the administration of the state is not put under serious 
control, the risk of abuses on the citizenry has lead to the gravest human rights violations, as 
every overflow in the exercise of power is an abuse.  
This increasingly close relationship between national politics and the economic and social 
situation of the population brought about the emergence of a variety of new rights (of an 
economic, social and cultural nature) within the sphere of human rights. In varying degrees, 
the State is increasingly responsible for the guarantee of a new set of basic rights to it citizens 
such as health, education and adequate housing. In Latin America, extreme inequality and the 
exponential increase of the amount of people living below the poverty line reaches dramatic 
proportions. And the reasons behind it all are clearly not due to natural phenomena but rather 
directly related to the political choices  of those who have been in power in Central and South 
American States during the last centuries. 
It is within this fairly broad frame that we have to view the particular importance of NHRIs in 
Latin America. It is a context in which common historical, economic and cultural traits have 
molded society in such a way that a global approach to institutionalization, without 
consideration of all of the above when assessing the quality of NHRI’s activities and 
implementing policies to increase their effectiveness, cannot be the right approach. Whilst the 
international community should indeed “support structures that can mobilize and leverage 
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local institutions in pursuit of the shared values represented by international human rights” 146, 
I believe that NHRI assessment and analysis should take place according to the local context, 
in light of the local human rights situation and developments. It seems to me quite obvious 
that the reality described in the above pages cannot apply to countries in which the state 
administration is regarded by the general population as a guardian of the rights of the 
citizenry, as for example is the case in the Scandinavian region. Nevertheless, the policies and 
regulatory frameworks that NHRIs in both areas of the world have to follow in order to be 
accepted as fully-functioning NHRIs, are the same.  
The particular terms that characterize development in South America are directly related to an 
historical memory which is a warning sign against the inefficiency of previous neoliberal 
reforms and a springboard for a major general role of the State itself. Various nations 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela for example) have cut from 
their recent past and governments pertaining to the “new left” have risen to power. These 
progressive governments, even though heterogeneous in attitudes and stances, have as 
common ground  several development strategies, such as the emphasis on economic growth 
and the reliance on the export of raw materials, whereby a state’s reserve of natural resources 
for example, becomes of fundamental importance for its insertion in the globalized economy.  
Governments in Latin America have benefited from an extraordinary level of 
unaccountability, and as such organs of institutional control of an independent nature need to 
adjust to such a dramatic reality. There are many unique characteristics that exclusively 
pertain to this part of the world, and to not take into consideration these “autochthonous”  
instances of maladministration of the state is, in my opinion, rather absurd.   
8. The Defensor del Pueblo 
8.1 The Defensor del Pueblo within the Latin American Context 
Even though the Ombudsman body makes its first official appearance in the Iberoamerican 
world in 1976, when the Proveedor de Justicia de Portugal was included within the 
Portuguese Constitution
147
, followed suit by the establishment of the Spanish Defensor del 
Pueblo in 1978
148, “the Ombudsman first reaches Iberoamerica as an intellectual 
preoccupation, rather than a constitutional creation”.149 It was mainly through the promotion 
within academic and intellectual environments, and mainly from an Administrative Law point 
of view only, that the idea of an Ombudsman body
150
 was first introduced in Iberoamerica 
during in the 1950s.  Regarding the introduction in the Latin American region of the actual 
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state-run bodies, apart from Guatemala’s Procuraduria de Derechos Humanos which was 
established in 1985, every Ombudsman body was introduced, be it constitutionally or simply 
through specific legislation, from 1990 onwards. This fairly recent tendency is directly linked 
to the social and political events that shaped the whole continent during the last crucial 
decades of the 20
th
 Century, all united by a common democratizing trend that led to the end of 
authoritarianism in both Central and South American states.  
The Defensorías del Pueblo have thus been an integral part of those constitutional reforms 
that were at the basis of each national transitional process, as such an essential mechanism for 
the establishment of democracy and its consolidation in the vast majority of Latin American 
states.  In order to understand the full scope and meaning of the Ombudsman’s introduction in 
the region, it is necessary to include in the analysis, on a very general scale, the Latin 
American social and political context of the last decades, and its significance in terms of 
democracy and human rights. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the period between 1978 and 1990 was characterized by 
an astonishing disrespect of even the most fundamental of human rights by the hands of the 
state. The extreme human rights violations that took place during these years led the 
succeeding policymakers to place institutions with a human rights mandate in the foreground 
of the new constitutional reforms. The necessity to turn page from these horrors implied that 
responsibility be established and perpetrators be punished. In line with this reasoning, the 
majority of states set up what became known as “Truth Commissions”, bodies with the 
specific purpose to investigate on the most grave violations taken place during the 
authoritarian years, bring to justice the guilty and repair the violated.  This period not only 
introduced fair elections and an increased respect for human rights, but also sparked  a trend 
of institutional reforms “aimed at enhancing and strengthening popular participation, the rule 
of law, accountability and other values associated with democratic governance”151, such as 
decentralization, constitutional courts and ombudsmen. Already existing foreign means of 
horizontal accountability (such as human rights commissions and the ombudsman) were used 
as important models to get inspiration from, in a general attempt at rebuilding public 
institutions “with checks to avoid the human rights abuses and bureaucratic ineptitude of the 
prior regimes”.152 Thus, similar drastic changes in a relatively short period of time brought 
about a common necessity for new institutional models, all within the same process of 
“transitional justice”. It is within this contextual framework that the figure of the Defensor del 
Pueblo is introduced. 
In 1986 the Spanish Centre for Constitutional Studies organized the first Spanish-American 
Meeting on “The Ombudsman Project for Latin America”, a chance to promote a body that 
would enhance the democratic revolutions that were taking place at the time. The discussions 
that took place facilitated the expansion of the figure of the Ombudsman within the Latin 
American community of states, with many representatives openly supporting its fast 
                                                          
151
 Uggla Frederik, The Ombudsman in Latin America, Journal of Latin American Studies (2004) 36, p. 
423. 
152
 Reif, Transplantation and Adaptation (note 3), p.276. 
60 
 
integration within their national politics. One intervention is worth reproducing, as it aptly 
expresses the common idea that came out of the international meeting: “I think that the point 
of view according to which our idiosyncrasies, our Latinoamericanidad/being Latin 
American, our underdevelopment and our ‘tropicality’ denies the necessity for an 
Ombudsman institution is an offence to our political intelligence. In fact, these very same 
idiosyncrasies have not prevented us from establishing a monstrous and labyrinthine modern 
State. Our own, same underdeveloped societies have charged the State with responsibilities to 
not only guarantee public order and the right not to be tortured or imprisoned, but also to 
promote development and provide services to the community. If we have been able to create 
such State, how can we say that we are not able to create mechanisms of control and 
protection of the citizen vis-à-vis the State?”153 And while the abovementioned idiosyncrasies 
do not preclude the possibility for the establishment of a national Ombudsman institution, it is 
through their close consideration that the Defensor del Pueblo is endowed with the 
characteristics it holds today. It is a history of adaptation of this originally Nordic institution, 
fitted into the neo-democratic context of post-dictatorial Spain and Portugal, finally suited to 
the necessities of the Latin American continent. What this adaptation into a different reality 
has brought is eloquently summarized by Dr Jorge Luis Maiorano, Argentinian Public 
Defender and Vice-President of the International Ombudsman Institute: “during the 
institution’s transit to countries of southern Europe, and even more so to the Latin American 
region, a new model was born, strictly tied to the constitutional developments of the 
democratic transitions that took place after the collapse of the existing authoritarian regimes. 
This new model adds two new fundamental elements to the classic Ombudsman body: first of 
all an explicit and prioritized function of human rights promotion and protection, without 
setting aside its non-judicial competence over  the control of the state administration; 
secondly, the power to transfer to the prosecution those proceedings worthy of a criminal 
trial”.154 
In this sense, the Latin American Defensor del Pueblo overcame the classic Ombudsman’s 
exclusive responsibility over cases of State maladministration, as the latter was only one of 
the preoccupations of that historical moment. Human rights promotion and protection, be it of 
a constitutional or international character, becomes the Defensor’s main role in societies torn 
by internal wars and dictatorial repression. The difference between this new model and the 
classic Nordic “administrative” organ of control is easily discernible. In its Atlantic crossing, 
the Ombudsman body came across a variety of social, political and cultural issues that 
moulded its function in such a way that led certain scholars to rename it the “Criollo 
Ombudsman, which has to operate within a State whose institutions are weak and inefficient, 
whilst lacking the confidence and credibility of its citizens. In certain cases, the state finds 
itself with unhealed wounds coming from the massive human rights violations, such as 
instances of torture and forced disappearances, perpetrated by those authoritarian regimes 
                                                          
153
 Gueròn Carlos, Internvention in VVAA. El Proyecto de Ombudsman para America Latina, Cuadernos 
de Documentacion, Serie III, Cuestiones Iberoamericanas, No. 1 (Madrid, 1986), p.33-34. 
154
 Maiorano Jorge Luis, El Defensor del Pueblo en America Latina. Necesidad de Fortalecerlo in Iraizoz 
Mari, La Eficacia del Defensor del Pueblo en Iberoamerica – Expansion y caracterizacion como 
Instituciones Nacionales de Derechos Humanos, Dykinson S.L (Madrid, 2012), at p. 61. 
61 
 
whose actions have not been investigated with proper clarity. It has to face complaints over 
the slowness of legal procedures and the rising impunity which is caused by the inadequate 
proficiency of national investigative bodies. In addition to this, it is faced with the cruelest of 
situations: thousands of homeless people, without access to food, to the most basic of health 
services and education and discriminatory practices that affect a great number of children, 
women, the elderly and indigenous people. The Ombudsman is thus spurred to defend not 
only their civil and political rights, but their economic, social and cultural rights as well”.155 
From the above, it should be clear that a certain kind of prioritization is implied in a body 
which finds itself facing at the same time grievances relating to cases of torture and ones 
dealing with administrative delays.  
Furthermore, some less obvious Latin American distinctions still contribute to the particular 
shaping of the classic Ombudsman into its hybrid version of the Defensoría del Pueblo.  
In terms of democratic index, whilst it is a confirmed reality that the vast majority of 
contemporary Central and South American states benefit, officially speaking, of a democratic 
system of government, it cannot be said to be benefiting from a healthy one. In fact, a number 
of instances
156
 during the last two decades have put into question the quality of many 
democracies in the region which, in turn, has brought to a very high level of dissatisfaction 
amongst the population of the political practices and institutions of their respective countries. 
A consequence of Latin America’s steep percentages of inequality and poverty is the 
weakness of a “culture of legality” that directly hinders upon the rule of law. What this region 
is facing is not a crisis of democratic values which, now more than ever, is crystallized into 
society, but rather a crisis of how these values are managed by the State for its people. The 
Defensorías del Pueblo find themselves in the perfect institutional and normative space to be 
able to tentatively master these inequalities and democratic deficits, a function unknown to 
their Classic counterparts in Europe.  
After having overcome the complexities related to the transitional period, the citizens have to 
face the overwhelming presence of the Public Administration. Its intricate system of distinct 
territorial competences, usually divided at least into regional and national offices, has lead to 
a normative and authoritative dispersion that damages the already feeble relationship between 
the general population and the State. Additionally, the increasing privatization that national 
services have been witnessing in the last years is yet another ingredient to the citizenry’s 
perception of helplessness in front of an apparent dissolution of responsibility by the hands of 
the State. It is both the frailty of some Latin American democracies and the degree of social 
exclusion and stratification that all countries of the region are suffering from that boost the 
Defensor’s office importance. The widespread institutional disaffection, which reaches 
structural levels due to the economic, social and cultural differences that co-exist within any 
one state of the continent, could be seen as an opportunity to build upon. The introduction of 
                                                          
155155
 Valladares Lanza Leo, The Challanges Facing the Ombudsman in Latin America in The 
International Ombudsman Yearbook, Vol.2 at p. 161. 
156
 United Nations Development Programme, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens' 
Democracy, available at http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/democracy-undp-publication.htm. 
62 
 
the Defensor del Pueblo, with its independent role as defender of the human rights of citizens, 
has been seen as a necessary evolution of the developing Latin American democratic State.  
 
8.2 Common Features of the various Defensores Del Pueblo 
The various Iberoamerican national institutions are all, on paper, characterized by a set 
number of features which can be summarized as the following: 
8.2.1 Independence  
The fundamental attribute of any functioning Defensoría, and the element which guarantees 
its legitimacy vis-à-vis society, is its independence. The lack of dependence from any other 
state body, especially if part of the executive, is what “most clearly underpins a national 
institutions’ legitimacy and credibility, and hence its effectiveness”.157Most importantly, the 
office of the Defensor del Pueblo is obliged to treat matters of legitimacy with extreme 
seriousness due to its very nature, an institution which lacks coercive powers and bases its 
performance margin on its persuasive power. Independence does not in fact derive from the 
mere declaration of being so (even though it is an essential element for an organic law to 
have), but is acquired through a process of external recognition. The relationship between the 
Defensor del Pueblo, the legislative and the executive powers has to be one of mature 
coexistence, each cognizant of their specifically different roles and legal responsibilities. It is 
for this reason that the figure of the Defensor itself is of extreme importance due to the 
usually complex role, made of complex institutional relationships, with the political sphere. 
Respect, by both the population (whose rights it is defending) and state authorities (over 
which it is playing a controlling role), is essential for the effective fulfilment of its functions. 
As such, independence can be divided in two different categories: independence of the figure 
of the Defensor himself and of the institution as a whole. 
- Independence of the Person 
In the whole of the region, the appointment of a Defensor del Pueblo follows a number of 
requirements which have been introduced with the common interest of shielding the person of 
the Defensor from any concerns of political bias. The appointment procedure is key to its 
legitimacy, even more so due to its unipersonal character. As such all states of Iberoamerica 
(apart from Puerto Rico) elect its Defensor del Pueblo through their legislative power, with 
varying degrees of majority vote.
158
 Notwithstanding the fact that it is the representative of 
popular sovereignty that is taking the ultimate decision, and which provides democratic 
legitimacy to the post, in reality there still is a degree of risk that such procedure allows for a 
political appointment, constraining its independence. The fact that the vast majority of states 
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rely on a 2/3 majority at least shows “the intention of guaranteeing the maximum level of 
neutrality and political independence in the implementation of the Defensor’s function”.159 
The problems start to arise when one analyses the path that the actual candidatures  have to 
undergo before reaching the legislature’s examination. In fact, few legislations regulate the 
nomination procedure, as in the majority of states it is the political parties that bring names to 
the fore in dedicated parliamentary commissions, in which nominations are negotiated behind 
closed doors. However there are some positive examples of the contrary: civil society is 
directly involved in the selection process through public contests, during which the citizenry 
is directly called to choose the candidate. This is the case of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru and Ecuador. The mandate’s duration is also an important facet for the 
position of Defensor. A certain stability is necessary and as such, long and non-renewable 
periods of tenure guarantee a higher degree of independence than short renewable ones. In 
Iberoamerica the time of tenure varies from a minimum of three years to a maximum of seven 
and in most cases the second reelection is not permitted in order to prevent potential double 
interests being involved in the continuation of the tenure. 
A Defensor has, furthermore, to abide by a number of personal qualities which, 
notwithstanding being mostly unwritten, are to demonstrate the apt nature of the candidate. 
Minimum required age (only Spain and Portugal do not set a limit), the necessity of having a 
jurist background, personal distance from any form of party politics and ethical qualities are 
all elements that are taken into consideration before the election of a candidate to the post of 
Defensor.  
- Independence of the institution 
In addition to the above characteristics relating to the person of the Defensor, one can also 
find other which are directly related to the institution itself, in place so as to safeguard its 
independence from the other state bodies and authorities. This kind of independence can be 
divided into three main categories: functional independence, financial independence and 
independence of its internal procedures from external influence. As far as its functional 
independence is concerned, the International Council on Human Rights Policy recommends 
that legislation always be put in place in which it is expressly stated that “the members and 
personnel of the NHRI will not receive instructions by members of government or from other 
functionaries, neither direct nor indirect, and that functionaries should not try to give such 
instructions”.160 This recommendation is partly followed in the region, with six 
constitutions
161
 openly stating independence as one of the necessary facets of their national 
institutions.  
A Defensoría can benefit from as much functional independence as possible, however its 
obvious need for funding is the element that will finally determine its actual limits. What this 
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category of independence ultimately deals with is the capacity of budget negotiation and 
proposal by the hands of the institution and its ability to not fall victim of cuts in the 
following funding intakes. Out of the whole Iberoamerican panorama, only five Constitutions 
make a reference to this kind of independence.
162
 The real issue on the matter is the 
impossibility of finding any official indications on how the budget allocation should function 
or how to determine the allocation of resources in comparison to other institutions or previous 
years. And in circumstances of imprecision, the least powerful body is the one to suffer the 
most. This is a surprising fact, as financial independence is a vital ingredient to the correct 
functioning of such a novel institution. The result of this legal vacuum is that most 
Iberoamerican Defensorías del Pueblo find themselves at the mercy of their respective 
country’s legislators and sometimes even executives, a tremendous obstacle to the human 
rights protection of the citizenry.  
Lastly, the Iberoamerican Defensor del Pueblo should strive for a third kind of independence, 
related to its internal organization. A Defensoría should be able to issue its own regulations on 
organizational matters as well as dealing with its operations. Fortunately, regulations on the 
matter are more evident with the vast majority of Iberoamerican Defensorías enjoying 
autonomy in freely designating its personnel and methods of work.
163 
8.2.3 Sole-membership  
The function of the Defensor is strictly personal and the moral authority can only be 
recognized to one individual and not to a set of people. As previously mentioned, the personal 
reputation of the individual is a fundamental pawn towards the necessary popular legitimacy 
that the office of the Defensor del Pueblo has to hold.  
8.2.4 Complaint-Handling Mechanism 
One of the most characteristic functions of the Defensor is the power to investigate de oficio 
or through a complaints procedure which directly allows the petitioner/citizen to appeal 
against an action of the state which is unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary or discriminatory.  
The complaints procedure is also a form of political participation due to the possibility for 
citizens to influence political decisions through their complaints, both at their preparatory and 
implementation stage. The huge majority of Iberoamerican legislations allow for any 
individual to file a complaint, with the sole requirement of having a personal interest in the 
matter. It is only with the Spanish and Ecuadorian Defensor that the requirement of 
“legitimate interest” comes into play.164 In this way the citizen does not behave as mere 
spectator of governmental decisions and may actively be involved through the legal 
channeling of popular participation of which the Defensor is the main enabler. The Defensor 
may ask any state authority for reports on issues of concern without having to follow 
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hierarchical structures and when individual or group petitions are being dealt with, the 
outcomes can be varied: official requests for information, investigations, inspections amongst 
others.  
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8.2.5 Non-Binding Charachter of its Resolutions 
The Defensor del Pueblo is a ”magistry of conscience” in the sense that it is only through its 
opinions and influence that its recommendations are considered by the authorities under 
scrutiny. These recommendations only have the authority that is granted to them by the 
prestige of the institution and the rightfulness and moderation of its resolutions. It is a 
fundamental characteristic of the Defensor the lack of an ultimately decisive function and as 
such cannot undo or change any administrative decision. Its resolutions cannot be held 
obligatory due to it not being a court of justice and can be interpreted as exhortations, requests 
and advices, with the only obligation on behalf of the receiving institution to consider it, 
whether or not it is in accordance with their findings.  
8.2.6 Informality 
The essence of the function of the Defensor del Pueblo is to guarantee to the population the 
easiest access to its protection and assistance. It is an informal alternative, accessible to all, 
without however replacing any administrative act or jurisdictional decision. As such an 
underlying feature of the institution is its lack of formalisms and the requirement of being as 
accessible as possible, be it in the forms of regional offices or through informal means of 
redress. 
9.  A Mandate Peculiar to the Defensor del Pueblo 
The global normative approach that has characterized the last thirty years of NHRI expansion, 
with the Paris Principles as the main regulatory framework, has placed every national 
institution within the same conceptual space.  Since 1991 the amount of states that established 
a human rights commission or ombudsman rose exponentially, each with the obligation to 
adhere to the general norms found in the Principles for them to be fully accepted within the 
NHRI community, with all the benefits that stem from this membership. Every typology of 
national institution has been included within the Paris Principles’ reach, as much as every 
country has been asked to accept and follow their regulations. Even though with a potential 
for theoretical redundancy, we have already seen how one particular region of the world, due 
to its historical, social and economic traits, has delineated a very unique kind of nation state 
both in terms of the citizens’ approach towards the state as well as the state’s approach 
towards its citizens. Fundamental to our argument, this distinctive approach is mirrored in the 
Latin American Ombudsman’s competence framework which figures a number of 
distinguishing features.  
9.1 An express mandate to promote and protect human rights 
A comparative analysis of the various Iberoamerican Ombudsman bodies shows that the 
majority of national founding legislation grants an express mandate to promote and protect 
human rights.  
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National institutions with a longer tradition of activity, such as the Nordic Ombudsman 
bodies, find themselves basing their activities on a legal framework that implicitly includes 
the respect for human rights within its institutional overview. This is possible due to a longer 
national history and fewer grave human rights violations in their recent past. In these cases, an 
explicit reference to the defense and promotion of human rights within the national 
institutions’ mandate is not as necessary as it is in the case of younger democracies, such as 
Spain, Portugal and the whole community of Latin American states.  Many countries, 
especially those with a relatively short democratic history, lack this intrinsic value that human 
rights benefit from elsewhere. It is also often found that these young democracies, 
notwithstanding a commitment to the various international human rights treaties, have not 
adjourned their national legislation to the required standards. It is fundamental in these cases 
for the NHRI’s mandate to directly allude to the guarantees found in the ratified international 
treaties. It is through the citizens’ complaints over the state’s maladministration that human 
rights are thus safeguarded, following what the American Bar Association defines as the 
Ombudsman’s “basic concept”: “Human rights are not protected simply by constitutions or 
legislation, by guarantees or speeches, by proclamations or declarations, but primarily by the 
availability of remedies. The Ombudsman system is one of the remedies which seeks to 
preserve human rights.”165  
For clarity’s sake, the Iberoamerican countries that either mention “human rights” in their 
national institution’s mandate expressly or indirectly through allusion to “international human 
rights treaties” in their Constitutions are the following: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela.
166
 Spain and Portugal, even 
though not mentioning human rights specifically in their Constitution’s articles through which 
the Defensor is founded, refer to Part I of their respective Constitutions, which indirectly 
count for the protection of human rights. Ecuador, Honduras and Nicaragua on the other hand 
do not mention human rights in their Constitutions and leave every normative clarification 
regarding their Defensor del Pueblo office to national legislation, an issue that has direct 
consequences on both the independence of the institution and on its potential longevity, being 
susceptible to easy reformation by the hands of the government of the day. Costa Rica and 
Peru do not even mention human rights in the founding legislation of their Ombudsman body, 
referring to “constitutional rights” instead. 
Another peculiarity of Iberoamerican Ombudsmen bodies that distances itself from the very 
essence of the Classic Ombudsman revolves around the controlling function over public 
authorities. Whilst the latter function still is an intrinsic part of their mandate, the great 
majority of Latin American states have opted for a mandate with human rights protection as 
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their main point of focus, the supervision of the State administration relegated to a secondary 
function.  Administrative supervision is subordinated to the protection of fundamental rights 
in Argentina and Central American states, as well as Spain, notwithstanding some 
controversies related to differences between the Constitutional mandate and the Defensor’s 
Fundamental Law.
167
 As a matter of example, the Argentinian constitutional mandate 
establishes that “the fundamental objective of this institution is to protect the rights and 
interests of the individuals and the community as a whole vis-à-vis the actions and omissions 
of the national public administration”.168 Similar examples can be seen in the Constitutions of 
Mexico, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. It is particularly 
meaningful to note at this stage that the prioritization of human rights protection is preferred 
by countries which have experienced recent waves of grave violations of human rights and 
which are in a situation of post-conflict re-establishment.  
The furthest from the classic ombudsman model are the mandates of the National Institutions 
of Colombia, Ecuador and Paraguay, which do not even contemplate the administration’s 
supervision
169
. Representative of this latter group of states is Art. 215 of the Ecuadorian 
Constitution, which states as mandate “the protection and safeguard of the rights of the people 
of Ecuador and the defence of the rights of Ecuadorians which find themselves outside of the 
country”. Yet another group of states, comprising Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela have been 
defined by existing literature as holding “parallel mandates”170, in the sense that both human 
rights and the public administration’s supervision are treated in an equal manner. Art. 162 of 
the Constitution of Peru, for example, states that “it is the Defensoría’s role to defend the 
constitutional and fundamental rights of the person and of the community as well as supervise 
the fulfilment of the duties of the public administration and the provision of public services to 
the citizenry”.  
Only Portugal, Costa Rica and Puerto Rico follow the classic tradition. As such their power of 
supervision and control over the Administration represents their principal task within their 
mandate, as can be seen by the words of Art. 23.1 of the Constitution of Portugal: “the 
citizens can present complaints for the actions and omissions of the public authorities”.  
As the brief comparative mandate analysis above has shown, it is typical of National 
Institutions of Ibero-America to have a promisingly broad mandate of human rights 
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protection, mainly due to the atrocities suffered by these states in the not so distant past. What 
will follow is an analysis of the concrete measures put in place by the various institutions so 
as to verify whether such generous mandates are fully complied with or whether they are 
subject to limitations. As a matter of fact, it is the conjuncture of the objectives set out in the 
general mandate together with the available means for their fulfillment that make out the 
overall competence framework. For the majority of cases, the Defensoría’s mandates are 
circumscribed to the activities underwent by the public authorities. It is not however a term of 
a clear-cut nature. Whilst it has been considered that “the supervisory activity should extend 
to the totality of the public Administration in all its forms, be it military, judicial, local, 
national, etc…”171, one can nonetheless find very limiting mandates. A controversial example 
of such limitations is found in Ley Argentina art. 16, which states that “outside the 
competence of the Defensoría del Pueblo [of Argentina] lie the Judicial and Legislative 
power, the Municipality of Buenos Aires and the national organs of defence and security”.  
As a matter of fact it is not an easy task to offer a generalized overview of the scope of Latin 
American NHRIs’ mandates. It is from the terminology itself that one can notice this 
complexity: whilst in Spain, Costa Rica and Argentina what is being overlooked by the 
Defensor is “la Administración”, in Costa Rica it is “el sector publico” and in Mexico it is 
“those acts and omissions of an administrative nature”, just to name a few. In order to be as 
concise as possible, only selected examples of the 17 Iberoamerican Defensorías will be 
given, which will nonetheless give an insight into the mandates’ area of influence and its 
implicit limitations. 
9.2 Mandate over the Judicial Power 
In its original version, the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman plays a fundamental role with 
respects to the judiciary, “overlooking the manner in which judges, government functionaries 
and other civil servants observe the laws and accusing those who act illegally or forget their 
duties”.172 More specifically, while the mandate itself does not cover actual judicial decisions 
and the majority of cases deal with formality issues (such as undue delay or improper 
conduct), nothing impairs the J.O. from expressing his views on any decision taken by the 
judiciary. It is then obviously up to the moral authority that the office beholds for the 
Ombudsman’s point of view to actually be taken into consideration by the relevant 
authorities.  
In Iberoamerica this approach is, apart from few exceptions, adhered to. In this particular 
region it is in fact of absolute importance that the administrative acts of the judicial powers be 
controlled by an independent body, as impunity levels within weak judicial administrative 
entities are usually very high. The right to effective judicial protection is, in the end, an 
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essential service that comes within the Defensor del Pueblo’s scope of an all-round protection 
of the citizens’ fundamental rights. 
From a theoretical point of view, there is an important difference between the concept of 
jurisdictional power and that of jurisdictional function. Whilst the former is a power that 
derives from the sovereignty of the state, deeply rooted within the separation of powers 
principle and which cannot allow for other “jurisdictions” to limit its function, the latter is the 
only concept that the Defensor’s office may act upon. In this way the manner in which the 
jurisdictional power is being administered comes within the scope of the mandate, leaving the 
jurisdictional power and the substance of the judicial decisions intact from any external 
intrusions.  
Whereas a number of legislatures are silent on the matter (Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), the rest specify with a certain amount of clarity what 
role their Defensoría plays when dealing with judiciary-related matters. A very clear and 
express formulation on how a Defensoría is to behave when matters related to the judiciary 
come into question, and which can be used as an example of the role the Defensor has vis-à-
vis the judiciary, can be found in the Peruvian legislation: “when the investigations of the 
Defensor del Pueblo refer to the administration of justice, he may obtain the information 
which is regarded as necessary from the competent bodies and institutions, without its actions 
interfering with the  exercise of the power of the judiciary. In case the results of its 
investigation show an abnormal or irregular functioning of the administration of justice, the 
Defensor is allowed to let the Executive Council of the Judicial Power know as well as the 
Public Ministry. In its annual report to the National Congress, it will have the task to inform 
the members of the Congress on the efforts taken by the Defensor on these issues”.173 
Importantly, cases which deal with issues of due process represent one of the most frequently 
dealt issues of the Peruvian Defensoría del Pueblo, and similar records can be found in most 
offices around Latin America. Similar limitations can be found in the majority of Latin 
American States as well as in Spain and Portugal so much so that on this aspect the 
Defensor’s role has been compared by critics to that of a “post office”174, with the sole 
purpose of forwarding those claims received to the relevant state body. Against this general 
trend is the Venezuelan legislation, which specifically includes the judicial branch of the 
National Public Power within its Defensor’s mandate, whereas both the Argentinean and 
Mexican legislations firmly disallow any sort of competence on behalf of the Defensor’s 
office over matters related to the judiciary.
 175
  
In the end, apart from a few exceptions, one can see that Latin American NHRIs include 
within their mandate non-jurisdictional matters related to the administration of justice, which 
is an important step towards the strengthening of a rule of law sometimes set aside in 
countries of this region of the world. 
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9.3 Mandate over the Military 
The role that the military played in Latin American recent history, often responsible of coup 
d’états in a frame of gross human rights violations, would lead to assume that newborn 
democracies would have taken into serious consideration the possibility of putting the military 
forces under some sort of independent control.  
To the contrary, during those debates that led to the passing of many National Institutions’ 
organic laws, there have been instances of open opposition to this eventuality, such as when 
the accusation was made that “it would reach a level of extremism were we to allow the 
Defensor’s mandate to have a say on any national body”.176 This quote is symptomatic of a 
trend that is rather surprising but that gained the upper hand only in one country of the 
continent, Argentina. In fact, Art. 16 Ley Argentina is presumably the most controversial of 
Latin American organic laws, especially if one takes into consideration the military 
dictatorships that ruled over the country in the 1970s and 1980s. After listing what is to be 
considered under the label of “national public administration”, and thus falling under the 
Defensor’s mandate, it continues with the national bodies that in turn do not fall under its’ 
competence which include, apart from the judicial power, the legislative power and the 
municipality of Buenos Aires, also “those bodies related to national defense and security”. 
On the other hand, Bolivia, Honduras, Spain, Panama, Portugal and Venezuela expressly 
include the armed forces within their own Defensor’s mandate. As an example of such a 
group of mandates, the Statute of the Portuguese Preveedor de Justicia lists the following as 
within the competence: “scope of the activities of the services integrated in the central, 
regional and local public administration, the Armed Forces, the public institutions, the public 
companies or the companies whose capital is mostly public and the concessionaires operating 
public services or exploiting state property”.177 
There is also a third group of states, made up of Mexico, Paraguay and Peru, which do not 
state with clarity their position on the matter. The use of such expressions such as “whichever 
authority or civil servant”178 may, in fact, be interpreted in either way.  
In the end, the inclusion of the armed forces within the Defensor del Pueblo’s mandate is 
surprisingly rather varied, notwithstanding the original Swedish Justitieombudsman had made 
such inclusion a strict requirement.  
9.4 Mandate over Individuals 
A further characteristic peculiar to the Defensorías del Pueblo amongst the broader NHRI 
family, is the role some play vis-à-vis individuals. This is a highly contentious subject-matter, 
as one of the pillars of the ombudsman institution is, quite openly, the role it plays in 
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controlling the proper functioning of the administrations, of the functionaries and of the civil 
servants in general. It is all the more contentious in Latin America, where non-state armed 
groups such as guerrilla groups or paramilitaries have played a central role in shaping the 
geopolitical structure of the continent for decades, with the obvious human rights 
repercussions implied in their violent activities. This is not a merely legal issue, where one 
legal point of view is in contrast with another. It is fundamental for any mandate to be as clear 
as possible on whether an individual’s responsibility can also be included within its sphere of 
influence, allowing the population to understand which claims can and cannot be made. What 
may otherwise happen is “to bring the popular denotation of the concept of human rights to 
the extreme, and as a result negatively affect the efficacy of NHRIs themselves, if these start 
to be perceived as protectors from insurgents”.179 
In total, four states have included individuals within their Defensorías’ mandate, that is 
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Guatemala.  As an example of how individuals’ are 
included in a Defensoría’s mandate, the case of Colombia will be analyzed. It is a great 
example to give due to the situation that Colombians have been facing in terms of internal 
insurgencies and gross violations of human rights by the hands of non-state organized military 
groups. It is probably due to this that the Colombian Constitution, in its Art 282, states that 
the primary function of the Defensor del Pueblo will be that of “guide and instruct the 
citizens, within the national territory and abroad, on the exercise and defence of their rights 
against the competent authorities or antities of a private character”. Furthermore, its organic 
law as one of the Defensor’s tasks that of “presenting recommendations and observations to 
the authorities and to individuals in case of threat against or outright violation of human 
rights”180, with no further explanation as to when an individual can be held responsible for 
human rights violations.  
Mexico, together with a number of other Iberoamerican states,
181
 also extends the competence 
of its NHRI to individuals, however qualifying such extension and rendering the previously 
analyzed, unlimited scope of action, all the more efficient. Individuals are included “when 
committing unlawful acts under the acquiescence or tolerance of any civil servant or 
authority, or when the latter refuse without reason to exercise the tasks that they are legally 
supposed to undergo in relation to such illicit acts, in particular with regards to conduct that 
affects the personal integrity of the person.”182 his latter manner of handling cases of 
individuals’ violations of human rights by the hands of a NHRI is arguably more apt for an 
institution whose main task is that of controlling the state administration. As Gil-Robles 
rightly warns, an exaggerated widening of the scope of competence, instead of being a benefit 
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for the population, could be “a trap set up to paralyze the institution due to an excess of scope 
and an exaggerated burden of work that cannot lead to the institutions’ discredit.”183 
9.5 Limits on NHRI mandates – Separation of Powers and Mandate Universality 
Having undergone a short comparative analysis of some of the main issues relating to 
Iberoamerican NHRI’s mandates, we can see how wide their span of activity can be. So wide 
in fact that it may arouse mixed emotions: on the one hand, the satisfaction towards 
constitutional texts with such a developed human aspiration; on the other the anxiety which 
comes from the fact that such good ambitions usually end up being merely superfluous.  
A problem that flows from interpreting mandates so generously is that Defensorías around the 
continent could fall in a form of activism that eventually would spread to fields which are not 
supposed to be of their competence. When National Institutions are officially given the 
competence to “represent the State in international fora over matters that fall within its field of 
action”184, ideally a task for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to accomplish, one can sense the 
risk of the “universalization” of NHRIs’ role, an issue that in Sweden for example was solved 
by the institution of four different Ombudsman bodies. 
Let it be reminded in fact that “the Ombudsman’s function is not that of replacing any other 
pre-existing authority; to the contrary, it is that of making sure that such authorities function 
correctly through the proper performance of their mandate”.185 There is a clear difference 
between the Defensor del Pueblo and those other institutions which have the protection of 
fundamental rights as their main function (as can be, for example and depending on which 
state, the Constitutional Court).  
A wide interpretation of the mandate, even if stemming from the actual wording found in 
Constitutions and in the founding legislation, is directly linked to the possibility of these 
institutions’ legitimacy to be eroded. Once the mandate is given a somewhat universal value 
by wrongful interpretations, it is the institution’s’ efficiency that is hindered. In other words, 
with an increase in the populations’ expectations from the Defensor’s office, it is rather direct 
that the office’s success decreases. 
9.6 Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural rights by the Defensorías del Pueblo 
Whilst for civil and political rights the traditional systems of judicial control have the upper 
hand in terms of protection, the same cannot be said for economic, social and cultural rights. 
The result of the regulatory frameworks that all human rights have been subject to, be it 
internationally or based on national constitutions, lead to the obligation of the Administration 
to respect them, even though at times such respect is not under judicial constraint. It is within 
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this frame that the Defensor’s role holds a distinguished spot, as the guarantor of all 
fundamental rights of the citizens.  
The topic is particularly relevant for the Latin American region, where economic, social and 
cultural rights are regarded as playing an important political role, with no terms of comparison 
to the more developed countries, where a higher quality of life and supposedly more efficient 
administrations tend to treat “second generation” rights in a more streamlined fashion. As a 
matter of fact, already in 1985 out of the total amount of complaints received by the Spanish 
Defensor del Pueblo, only 5% were related to civil and political rights. The clear meaning 
behind this percentage is clearly described by the then Defensor Ruiz-Jimenez: “at this 
moment in time our juridical system holds a structure that allows for a quick and summary 
solution as well as overall protection towards violations of civil and political rights […] On 
the other hand, economic, social and cultural rights do not benefit from the same judicial 
protection”.186 
A problem with all Iberoamerican national institutions on the matter is, however, the absolute 
lack of clarity. Whereas on one side of the argument we have the Defensor seen in the 
perspective of a panacea-like recipient of claims dealing with all generation of rights 
(including third generation rights such as the right to development and to a healthy 
environment), we have also had very opposite outlooks. In order to “start with the easiest, 
with the most efficient”187 and progressively broaden its mandate in light of its gained 
experience, many legislators and scholars alike have purposefully limited the Defensor’s 
mandate to individual rights only. 
This debate has not been dealt with face first by the various Iberoamerican legislations, and to 
the contrary no indications on which approach to follow has thus far been given to Defensores 
in the region, within whose mandates we often encounter rights of an economic, social and 
cultural nature. According to this approach, the efficiency of the institution is hampered by 
the magnitude of its mandate, with its inability to comply with the decrees the national 
legislature has directed at it, yet another particularity of Iberoamerican national human rights 
institutions.  
PART III 
10. A Critique of the current NHRI Project 
Public legitimacy is essential for the well-functioning of a NHRI, whose underlying function 
is to connect the international effort of human rights promotion and protection with the 
national sphere. Human rights that are internationally accepted as universal need that “local 
embrace” for them to be fully respected and legitimatized, and embedding an institution 
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within the state apparatus is a first step towards this end. Positive aspects that stem from the 
introduction of a NHRI are related to this localization, starting from the obvious unparalleled 
awareness of the socio-cultural context within which human rights promotion and protection 
has to be immersed in. Another great advantage is related to the feeling of proprietorship that 
civil society enjoys over the work of the institution due to its necessary quality of 
independence from other bodies notwithstanding its unique position of proximity from the 
government of the day and national decision-makers in general. It is obvious that a poor 
domestic system of human rights protection is ultimately an issue of accountability for the 
state to assume, but a publicly legitimized national institution has a great role to play in the 
race towards such accountability, be it by documenting the local human rights situation, 
advising the state on its international human rights obligations or by aiding international 
bodies of human rights protection in their examination of the state’s actions.  
The relatively quick world-wide expansion of NHRIs have without a doubt brought the 
human rights system of promotion and protection “closer to home” and filled a gap that 
burdened the system as the only means of bridging the international with the national was left 
to civil society efforts. But the mere existence of NHRIs in any one country does not 
necessarily mean an improvement for local human rights. There is an inherent problem with 
the current NHRI project and that is the substantial disregard for the local context in the 
assessment of these institutions’ effectiveness. An overly confident reliance on international 
standards for evaluation, embodied in the Paris Principles adoption and the worldwide 
recognition of their value as sole means of institutional promotion or criticism, is at the root of 
the tainted success that these institutions have had in the last twenty years.  
Before getting into the analysis of such a questionable approach and the current overreliance 
on the Paris Principles for NHRI effectiveness assessment, an illustrative example will be 
given which demonstrates that even if all of the characteristics for a fully functional human 
rights ombudsman are put in place, it is the local context that, in the end, holds the balance of 
power between a successful and a failed institution. To follow the same geographical trend of 
the paper, a Latin American example has been chosen. However, to prove the global scale of 
the issue, two other examples will later be given from the African continent.  
10.1 The Procuradorìa para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) of El Salvador 
After the 12-year civil war that tore El Salvador apart between 1979 and 1992, peace accords 
were organized in order to settle the countries devastated institutions. The establishment of a 
truth commission was an integral part of these accords as a way to investigate the human 
rights violations committed during the war. During the reporting stage, it was found that “El 
Salvador [had] no system for the administration of justice which met the minimum 
requirements of objectivity and impartiality”.188 This led to a strong movement for judicial 
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reform which comprised the establishment of a new form of ombudsman with a strong human 
rights mandate.  
The first PDDH ombudsman, elected with a large majority by the Assembly, was Carlos 
Molina Fonseca, an important political figure of the time but with no substantial human rights 
experience. Notwithstanding his little familiarity with human rights, his term of office was 
highly regarded both within the state and internationally. During this period, the Human 
Rights Division of the UN Observer Mission (ONUSAL) helped in the running of the office 
and departmental delegations were set up throughout the country, increasing its accessibility 
and thus its effectiveness. 
In 1995 ONUSAL withdrew from the country, which coincided with the elections for a new 
chief ombudsman. It was clear to all that with the withdrawal of the UN mission, the 
Salvadorean Ombudsman was going to need a strong leadership. The Assembly assigned the 
post to a navigated human rights lawyer, Dr. Victoria Velazquez de Avilez, who brilliantly 
spent her three year mandate to strengthen every aspect of the office. She firstly increased the 
use of her investigative powers, reaching an astonishing one thousand complaints per 
month
189
, making sure that the most difficult of cases reached the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. She did not hesitate to confront the government over alleged abuses of 
authority and collaborated with the attorney general’s office to develop a programme to 
“combat impunity in the administration of justice”. The ombudsman’s budget allocated by the 
Assembly was found to be insufficient for the extent of necessary action and thanks to her 
excellent cooperation with international bodies, she managed to secure substantial funding 
from UNDP. It is also by looking at national public opinion polls of the time that we can see 
how successful these first few years were. The 1996 opinion poll commissioned by the 
University of Central America found that whilst 47 per cent of the respondents considered the 
Salvadoran justice system to be corrupt (with 75 per cent declaring that many judges were 
subject to political control), almost 30 per cent considered the job of the ombudsman to be 
effective in defending citizens’ human rights, with De Aviles’ personal evaluation was 
considered good or very good by two thirds of the respondents.
190
 
This intense use of the PDDH authority was not at all appreciated by El Salvador’s governing 
party (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista – ARENA) which even led to a number of death 
threats directed at De Aviles and her closest staff members. Reelection was thus strongly 
opposed to the point that a revision of the ombudsman law was rushed through the Assembly. 
What resulted was the election of Eduardo Penate Polanco, a senior member of the judiciary 
close to ARENA officials, who immediately began a “systematic purge of personnel trained 
for human rights work”. All the previous collaborative efforts with external funding agencies 
were stripped of their success, a process which culminated in Penate excluding the UNDP 
from the PDDH programmes. The Investigation Department was also reduced to a near 
standstill, with 31 cases completed in his first six months of office. Even from an 
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organizational point of view, contracts were offered to new staff members for brief periods of 
time, increasing employee insecurity and thus affecting the ombudsman’s office effectiveness. 
And even though Penate was forced to a premature resignation due to the misuse of Swedish 
funds, his successor continued this trend of administrative miscarriages. As proof of the 
decline in both prestige and success of the institution, a 2001 Gallup Central America poll 
shows that 80 per cent of the respondents did not even know about the ombudsman’s identity 
and nearly 60 per cent could not give a response to the question regarding which Salvadoran 
public body was most likely to be effective in protecting human rights.
191
 
This example of institution building in a transient democratic state demonstrates that politics 
still have a patronizing attitude which is difficult to surmount.  The Salvadoran Ombudsman 
suffered a process of political isolation which led to its quick and dramatic decline. ARENA, 
which had not been defeated in an election from 1989 to 2009, had a dissenting attitude 
towards horizontal accountability which strongly affected its approach towards the human 
rights ombudsman’s office. The Salvadorean Human Rights Ombudsman had surprised 
everyone for its effectiveness in countering the impunity that the executive, the judiciary and 
national administration in general was enjoying in the early years of democratic government. 
It was highly regarded both by the people of El Salvador, which turned to its services in 
growing numbers, and by the international community, leading to significant funds being 
directed to the Ombudsman’s budget. However, the increase in the State’s accountability was 
seen as a menace by a wide number of political powers, which proceeded to crush the agency 
in a matter of years. This dynamic is unfortunately not to be found only in El Salvador, and 
should be viewed as an example of a frequent mechanism of political influence on horizontal 
accountability mechanisms in many countries around the world. In established democracies, 
the cooperative nature of the human rights ombudsman is sufficient for its role of 
administrative watchdog and human rights defender.  However, in states that are in the 
process of consolidating their democratic structure, this rather weak form of accountability 
agency leads to it being at the mercy of those political powers that are supposed to be checked 
upon.  
10.2 African counterparts 
As proof of the global extent of the above considerations, I will use two examples of A status 
NHRIs from the African continent. The first example (Commission Nationale des Droits de 
l’Homme [National Human Rights Commission] of Togo -CNDH) will bring to light the not 
necessarily direct correlation between NHRI presence and advancement in human rights 
protection. The second example (Uganda Human Rights Commission - UHRC) goes one step 
further, and demonstrates that even A status NHRIs can go as far as actually facilitating 
human rights violations by the hands of the state.  The reason for choosing the Commission 
Nationale des Droits de l’Homme (CNDH), apart from it being the first NHRI to be 
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established in Africa in 1987, is due to the two diametrically opposite roles it played within 
Togo during its first twenty years of history. As Peter Rosenblum aptly puts it “the Togolese 
Commission shocked the region with its “heroic” and unanticipated boldness at the outset, but 
was subsequently crushed into embarrassing boosterism for the government”.192 Established 
by President Gnassingbe Eyadema as a form of easing the tension amongst his single party 
rule and the numerous human rights related criticisms he received, its initial years were 
surprisingly dynamic. Notwithstanding the lack of an express permission within its mandate, 
CNDH overcame any prior expectation by undergoing investigations and denouncing many 
cases of human rights violations which up until then were not even mentioned in official 
discussions. The independence of the institution from the executive reached very satisfying 
levels, which brought to the fore politically sensitive issues such as security forces-related 
cases and instances of extra-judicial killings of demonstrators during the rallies which took 
place in the 1990-1991 two-year period. It is fair to say that CNDH played a major role in the 
fight for democracy, the 1991 Constitution and the effective end of the single party rule in the 
Togo. The political situation in the country however did not cease to undermine democratic 
principles. To the contrary, President Eyadema retained power and underwent a gradual but 
systematic repression of independent human rights activism, with the CNDH being one of the 
first victims of this purge. The chief commissioner at the time was forced to find refuge 
abroad, all things considered analogous to outright exile, whilst the new directorate put in 
place featuring people closely connected to the President himself. In 1997 a new law was 
passed with the intention of re-launching an otherwise dormant institution, but to no avail. 
According to a Human Rights Watch report, “the CNDH [continued to] be more concerned 
with defending itself and the national authorities than protecting and promoting human rights 
in Togo”193, with its efforts at human rights promotion have since been viewed by the 
population at large “as largely hollow in the absence of a will to engage in protection as 
well”.194 The CNDH’s defensive attitude towards international human rights investigations in 
the country, paired with its protracted refusal to respond to claims coming from national and 
international NGOs, has brought the Togolese Commission to be a prime example of how 
NHRI establishment may indeed go hand-in-hand with systemic repression of civil society 
and democratic pluralism, demonstrating a great potential, but at the same time the easily 
breakable fragility of national institutions.  
The second example, the Ugandan Human Rights Commission (UHRC), also went through a 
gloriously promising start. Set within the 1995 Constitution, it courageously championed 
human rights protection and promotion efforts in a country which has been single-handedly 
run by President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement since 1986. Its 
powers to subpoena information, order the release of detainees and order compensation for 
abuses has initially gone a long way towards a fair oversight of the human rights situation in 
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Uganda. It has notably been involved in highlighting prison conditions in the country, as well 
as dealing with sensitive topics such as police brutality and arbitrary arrests.
195
 At the outset, 
the task that the UHRC underwent of publicly denouncing the state’s wrongdoings was 
accomplished with great sense of responsibility and an open approach to collaborations with 
civil society organizations. Resistance from government agencies and resource constraints 
considerably limited the work of the Commission throughout its existence, but the level of 
independence was capably achieved, above all thanks to the initial leadership of its first 
director Margaret Sekaggya. However, by assessing the Commission’s work over time, one 
can notice once again the terribly thin line that these institutions tread on, especially in 
countries with political systems that shield the state from human rights-related accountability 
measures. Already by the end of the 1990s observations started to appear regarding “the 
tendency of the commissioners to avoid what appeared to be the most serious human rights 
issues for the country, including multiparty democracy and the death penalty”.196 
Furthermore, the various investigations undergone seemed to be poorly acted on by the 
government, with the total sum of damages owed by the state to torture and detention victims 
amounted to $1,030,000 in 2009, according to UHRC itself.
197
 
In 2005 the constitution was amended in order to eliminate presidential term limits, thus 
leading Uganda to yet another democratic defeat. Instead of taking the reins of the social 
discomfort that started to surface in the country and challenging the abuses of the state 
officials of the time, the UHRC “invested more resources in private disputes, particularly 
mediating child maintenance cases, and reporting on private violations [such as] road 
carnages and school fires”198, remaining silent on some of the most egregious human rights 
abuses taking place at the time. By 2009 President Museveni had appointed five new 
commissioners, overtly loyal to the government, a situation which led an observer to define 
the UHRC situation as one in which “the commission is starting to look like a bystander to a 
decay of rights – maybe even an enabler, by virtue of the strong international cover that it 
provides – rather than a promoter of human rights”.199 
What these examples are to show, and many more could have been given
200
, is that there is no 
reason to correlate NHRIs with human rights improvement. To remain in the same regional 
sphere, the state of Benin has done away with its NHRI per se, deciding to focus on other 
means of state-control functions. A hybrid Constitutional Court was established in the early 
2000s, its functions ranging from human rights complaints’ and relevant individual standing 
rights (as well as the right to initiate proceedings motu proprio), rulings on legislative norms 
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and international norms’ implementation. Notwithstanding these functions, to which one has 
to highlight its pluralistic membership, and the fairly successful record that the Court 
witnessed during its first years of activity, the international community’s response was 
absolutely negative. The hybrid nature of Benin’s particular solution to finding a national 
mechanism that would help in the human rights protection of the country’s citizen is clearly 
not compliant with the NHRI mold. As such, when it was its turn to be examined by the ICC, 
all it received was a mere “C” grade, relegating it to being an uninfluential institution in the 
international fora.  
10.3 The Root of the Problem 
And here is, in my opinion, the potentially foreseeable error that the international community 
has made towards these faulty national systems of human rights protection: the activity of 
NHRIs of the caliber of the CNDH, the UHRC or the PDDH of El Salvador, notwithstanding 
all the worrying issues presented above, has been celebrated in international fora ever since 
these institutions’ inception. Taking the example of the Togolese Commission, despite the 
publication of information on the dangerously close ties between the government and the 
Commission itself
201, it still “continued to enjoy UN support […], its Chair never failed to 
participate in UN meetings and to vaunt the Commission’s compliance with the Paris 
Principles”.202 Even more ironically, on the same year in which the HRW report on African 
NHRIs was published (2001), African NHRIs decided that it was none other than the 
Togolese Commission to host their annual regional meeting, a very explicit endorsement of an 
institution that at that precise moment in time was far from being of an exemplary nature.  
The determining factor has always been the institution’s structure, financing and the overall 
operation of the NHRI itself rather than its actual effect on the human rights situation of the 
country or even issues of state compliance, let alone considerations related to the particular 
geographical region of belonging. No official, internationally approved, NHRI evaluation has 
ever been made by seeking to identify the critical human rights issues in the country to then 
determine how the NHRI has addressed them. The different local circumstances which the 
NHRI is bound to be characterized by have never been taken into consideration in processes 
of evaluation, and it is self-evident that NHRIs do not exist in a vacuum. It could be the case 
that an institution with scarce results but in a human rights-averse state would still be 
considered effective and of use towards human rights protection whereas a fully functional 
NHRI in a fully democratic state could be deemed worthy of ameliorations due to the positive 
environment it is acting in. It could even be the case (see Benin) whereby human rights 
improvements have arrived without any sign of NHRI institutionalization processes. 
Evaluations should be informed by assessing the relationship between an NHRI, the 
government that created it and civil society it should be collaborating with. All these 
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interactions should, on another level, be analyzed taking into consideration the local context 
of time and place, without which we neutralize differences that, as we have seen from the 
pages above, constitute the essential contours which frame any given national human rights 
consideration.  
It is as if international organizations have been focusing more on aspirational elements (how 
an NHRI is set up in order to promote and protect human rights) rather than actual practice. 
And when we deal with NHRIs’ capacity building and development, by international 
organizations one means the OHCHR and ICC. 
As a matter of fact, if it had not been for the persistent activism that the UN underwent in the 
area of standard setting, the NHRI proliferation that we have witnessed in the last two decades 
would not have been of the same scale. As already mentioned in Chapter 6, the first 
engagement that the UN had with the idea of NHRI institutionalization dates back to 1946
203
, 
and since then a gradual increase has taken place in the number of official UN resolutions and 
guidelines on NHRI establishment and support.
204
 International consensus, of an obviously 
political nature, was so strong as to overcome the historical East-West and North-South 
divisions.  
A critical reading key to this unprecedented support follows a three-fold explanation: first of 
all, the ongoing human rights institutionalization machinery did not show any margin for 
ostracism by the hands of states. At best states could hope to control rather than to halt a 
process that was to inevitably rise in magnitude. Secondly, the internalization of at least part 
of the international human rights accountability structure could be used as a shield for state 
sovereignty, the latter being one of the greatest obstacles to the creation of a global system of 
state accountability. Thirdly, “for any state that was subject (or feared being subject) to 
international human rights pressure, national institutions may have offered a way to avoid 
greater international institutionalization”.205 Efforts towards this goal were being used by 
states to divert international attention from the ongoing national human rights problems. For 
instance, the following excerpt is taken from a letter sent in 1962 by a former UN 
Commission on Human Rights US representative to the US Secretary of State Rusk, in a 
period during which the US was under serious pressure from the UN for both its civil rights 
record and its initial opposition to the creation of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights : “Judging from the interest evoked in the Commission by the US report on its national 
advisory committees on human rights (national and state Civil Rights Committees) and the 
comparative lack of government committees on human rights in all other countries… our 
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Government could profitably elucidate this point – especially for the benefit of African and 
Asian states”.206 
In this very statement, one can find the roots of the chore issues that go at the heart of the 
inherent problems to global NHRI establishment (apart from the irony related to the US still 
lacking a NHRI more than half a century later): first of all the fact that national efforts might 
have the potential for providing cover to a broader repression of human rights and; secondly 
a one-size-fits-all approach whereby a single institutional template is used (which, if not 
adhered to, will strike out of the “adults table” any other sort of national institution with a 
cause for human rights protection and promotion, with no particular regard for the actual 
performance of the institution itself). It is this “institutional template”, which has been 
formally outlined by the Paris Principles, that leaves room for doubt.  
10.4 A Critique to the Paris Principles 
The Principles are comprised of a number of sections, each with a particular focus on specific 
characteristics that NHRIs should attain to: competence and responsibility, composition and 
guarantees of independence and pluralism, methods of operation and additional principles 
concerning the status of commissions with quasi-jurisdictional competence.  
In terms of NHRI competence and responsibilities, the Paris Principles do allow leeway to 
adapt to the different legal, political and social circumstances, where flexibility in its mandate 
and structure (as we have already seen, ranging from multi-member commissions to single-
member ombudsman bodies) is guaranteed by Art 2 (Competence and Responsibilities).
207
 
The issues start arising from the ambiguity of the wording, which leaves too much space for 
states to maneuver due to the requirement that the mandate be “as broad […] as possible”. 
States who are not allowing a broad mandate to their NHRI could potentially find themselves 
still within the regulatory structure of the Principles were they to prove some sort of national 
emergency for doing so.
208
 The possibility for states to choose between “a constitutional or 
legislative text” as founding instrument for their national institution is also a matter of 
concern. It is very clear that legislative texts may very easily be modified or repealed by the 
government of the day, something which endangers the fundamental requirement of NHRI 
independence. 
Independence is the main topic of the second section of the Principles (“Composition and 
Guarantees of Independence and Pluralism”), where vagueness is also a problematic issue. As 
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a matter of fact, the wording offers very little guidance on how to achieve this 
independence.
209
 According to the Principles, NHRIs are allowed to establish their 
composition through “a procedure which affords all necessary guarantees”210 but absolutely 
no guidelines are given on what that procedure may be or what level of independence the 
institution has to attain to. The requirement of benefiting from “adequate funding [the purpose 
of which] should be to enable [the NHRI] to have its own staff and premises, in order to be 
independent of the Government and not be subject to financial control which might affect its 
independence”211 is yet another sign of the overriding lack of clarity. For example, funding 
might be made available for staff and premises, but not much can be done when an adequately 
funded national institution suffers from weak leadership, which often flows from a political 
choice rather than problems of capacity.
212
 It is the local political context that matters a lot 
more than compliance to any formal set of internationally accepted principles. 
The weak construction of the Paris Principles can also be seen by the formulation of the last 
of its sections, that relating to the “quasi-jurisdictional competence” that a national institution 
may benefit from.
213
 As such, the power of investigation is considered as an optional function 
for a NHRI to have, without which an institution can be regarded as fully complaint to the 
Principles. It is above all towards this formulation that many criticisms have already been 
directed to
214
: the power to investigate is in fact considered as an essential power for all 
ombudsmen and hybrid human ombudsmen. Without a doubt, it is this conception that 
undermines the perception and application of the Paris Principles in Latin America. 
Commentators have praised the importance of the complaints handling procedure as “the 
backbone which gives real sense to [the Defensor’s] current existence”215, the fundamental 
working tool inherent in the figure of the office. It thus seems that the Paris Principles were 
drafted “with only the classical human rights commission model in mind”216, the original sin 
which most of the Principles’ criticisms have originated from. They are not, in fact, a set of 
guidelines that reflect the human rights issues of each state but rather “were created by 
authorities outside the state who may have different expectations and priorities based on their 
own situation”.217 
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10.5 A Critique to the International Community’s Approach to NHRI Development 
If one takes a look at the evolution of NHRIs, it is not hard to see where the above criticisms 
stem from. The 1990s, a fundamental decade for NHRIs, were characterized by an 
unprecedented amount of human and financial resources being devoted to their establishment 
worldwide, with the OHCHR playing a pivotal role, benefiting from “the monopoly of 
expertise”218 on this particular field. “Technical Cooperation” (the OHCHR mechanism for 
assisting states in fulfilling their human rights obligations, previously known as “technical 
assistance” or “advisory services”) was the logistical framework within which the UN 
supported NHRI establishment, a mechanism which has been per se reason for doubts, having 
been regarded as strongly reliant on governments’ good faith. Ever since the first sign of UN 
technical cooperation (the UN “advisory services” of the 1980s), commentators have noted 
that almost “every country that requested advisory services or technical cooperation received 
it without regard to the genuineness of its commitment”.219 OHCHR assistance to NHRI 
establishment can thus also be included within this criticism. This is not to say that every 
instance of technical cooperation has been flawed by an exaggerated faith in the good will of 
requesting states, of course. The willingness to provide support to any requesting government 
and the absence of significant criteria for evaluating results may, however, have led to a 
weakening of the critical engagement with states that the UN championed in the field of 
human rights. Once again, the global approach to NHRI establishment has been brought 
forward with too little attention to the “local”. There has been a tendency “to take for granted 
the rational for expanding National Institutions as a key area of support, based on positive 
experiences in different transitional situations [see the preliminary stages of the Procuradorìa 
of El Salvador]. However, the weak documentation as regards positive impact renders it quite 
relevant to ask questions about the performance of national institutions in relation to the 
assumptions made about their promotional and protective roles”.220 
A practical example of this approach can be seen by looking at the initial structure of the main 
“gatekeeper” of NHRIs, the ICC, a body composed of NHRIs for the promotion and 
strengthening of NHRIs themselves. The implicit fault in this is the limits it faces vis-à-vis its 
own members, whereby external processes of review seem rather scarce: apart from the 
OHCHR’s role (ICC’s permanent observer, serves as secretariat to the ICC through functions 
such as Needs Assessment Missions) there does not seem to be “any substantive requirement 
that would measure whether the NHRI commitment to human rights or the effectiveness of 
the NHRI within the state is genuine”.221  The ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation has 
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published an important General Obervation on the matter which stresses the NHRI’s 
interaction with “other human rights institutions, including those of the state and civil 
society”222, and that is to signal that steps are being taken to rectify the initial hermetic 
process of accreditation.  However the reform process of the accreditation procedure, initiated 
by the 2008 Sub-Committee Discussion paper
223
 continues with its trend of partiality. In its 
definition of independence, for example, one can find merely two elements for analysis: “a 
clear definition of roles” and “an absence of bias”. Still no sign of external criteria can thus be 
found. Even by taking a closer look at the substantive grounds of NHRI assessment, there is 
little sign that “the Guidelines for Accreditation now consider the effectiveness of NHRIs”.224 
By reading the texts of the Guidelines, the Rules of Procedure or of the General Observations, 
not even an explanation of what “effectiveness” might entail is provided. General Observation 
1.6 is the only instrument that allows the Sub-Committee to review the NHRI’s work through 
cooperation with external independent bodies (NGOs). The perception is that of a top-down 
approach to institutionalization, where even standards for accreditation are focused on the 
structure, financing and overall operation of the NHRI rather than assessing its contribution 
depending on the critical national human rights issues and how the NHRI is tackling them. To 
use a direct example, “if resources are being devoted to child support and road carnage, but 
not suppression of political pluralism, that should be explained”.225 
All the above criticisms may, of course, be considered part and parcel of an unavoidable 
attempt at broadening as much as possible the introduction of National Institutions within the 
state apparatus of the many countries that showed interest in their establishment. In one of 
their excellent works on human rights treaty mechanisms, Goodman and Jinks have termed 
this approach as a strategy “of delayed onset coercion [whereby] a human rights regime might 
also enhance its effectiveness by demanding modest initial commitments and ratcheting up 
obligations over time”.226 
This gradual vetting can be documented by the publication of the abovementioned Guidelines, 
Rules of Procedure and General Observations which, to a critical eye, may be seen as an 
admittance of poor initial clarity in the field. However, if states can still hold within their 
institutional framework A status institutions, whilst at the same time breaching the most 
fundamental of human rights, doubts are bound to arise. By adding to this already 
preoccupying fact the realization that the NHRI accreditation process, even if followed with 
extreme rigour, does not offer a pragmatic solution to these doubts, the puzzle is made even 
more complicated. 
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The evaluative mechanism that NHRIs worldwide are subject to relies too heavily on the idea 
that the shared interests of these bodies are directly proportional to their own well-
functioning. Too much attention has so far been given to the mere implementation of the Paris 
Principles rather than focusing on the local effectiveness standards of NHRIs. The intermesh 
with government departments, judicial bodies, civil society and the general socio-cultural 
situation of any one country is highly affecting NHRIs’ performance and quality. More than 
thirty years have passed since the introduction of the Paris Principles, and half a century since 
the NHRI “establishment boom” spread around the world with great coherence. To the 
contrary, it may be firmly stated that whichever way we look at the current situation, it is no 
longer one characterized by efforts of promotion, but rather one in which NHRI refinement 
and consolidation should be playing the leading role.  
11 Recommendations and conclusions 
I thus propose that different priorities should be given in order to assess whether a NHRI is 
purposefully and efficiently undergoing their commitment towards the promotion and 
protection of national human rights. That is far from saying that the Paris Principles should be 
discarded or to propose reformulations of the latter. The Paris Principles are an essential 
component, whose purpose is that of laying minimum standards for existing and future 
NHRIs. However, if one considers a common definition of “effectiveness” – ability to 
produce desired results – one cannot help but notice the unrelated nature of the Paris 
Principles’ focus on structural elements. It is often overlooked in NHRI discussions that, in 
the end, “the desired ultimate result is not independence qua independence but rather human 
rights promotion”227 as “an NHRI can be highly independent and cooperative whilst still 
being unable to affect much in terms of social and political human rights gains”.228  
The purpose of the latter half of this paper has been to prove that the current reliance on the 
rather broad and overarching minimum standards found in the Paris Principles is too distant 
from considerations of local effectiveness. NHRI establishment seems to have so far been 
considered the magic bullet of contemporary human rights promotion and protection and cost 
of this behavior has the potential for diminishing the fundamental importance that National 
Institutions have in the human rights international system. The privileged position that listed 
NHRIs are given in the international arena make it mandatory for an increased attention on 
their assessment mechanisms as well. It is outside the scope of this paper to offer a unique, 
detailed solution to the concern that has been developed in the above pages. However some 
brief indications will follow of what may be done to at least partially fill the current gap 
between the general method of NHRI assessment (Paris Principles) and the need for a more 
attentive focus on the local human rights situation. 
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First and foremost, the solution would stem from the syllogistic connection that NHRIs have 
with their stakeholders. If measures are to be set up for assessing local NHRI effectiveness, it 
is those with whom they interact that should be consulted. The already existing points of 
contact that NHRIs have with those that use their services (especially those endowed with a 
complaints mechanism) should be the starting point for the establishment of consultation 
procedures
229
, within the institution as much as with all major external stakeholders. These 
consultations would make use of the unparalleled knowledge that NHRIs’ stakeholders have 
of the local human rights situation, whilst opening up to wider participation by the population 
at large, thus increasing the essential ingredients for NHRI effectiveness, accessibility and 
social legitimation. Human rights NGOs and community bodies would be instrumental in 
building a number of indicators located in time and place which would bring to light impacts 
unimaginable to international bodies of assessment such as the ICC. The results would 
obviously not be the sole means of impact-assessment as more formal sets of indicators 
should also be present in the process. However the commixture of a participatory process with 
a more strictly institutional one would allow a much more nationally-sensitive assessment if 
compared to the strictly mandate-based mechanism currently in place. This mechanism is 
definitely going to result in increased length and expense from the consultations which 
currently take place on a one-way trajectory between the ICC and the NHRI itself (as part of 
their re/Accreditation Procedure). I would however consider it a necessary step towards 
improvement: it would increase effectiveness on the ground by identifying local trends, 
problems and charting progress. Once these tailor-made indicators have been collected, they 
have to undergo a phase of interpretation.  The analysis, within which these interpretations 
would need to be considered, heavily relies on the knowledge of the country at hand and its 
particular human rights situation, the relationships that the NHRI has with different national 
and international partners, all framed within the overarching political, social and economic 
backdrop. Independent external bodies of evaluation should play a leading role in this 
interpretative phase, with representative bodies (ICC being one of them) being relegated to a 
secondary role. 
These locally-induced indicators would be used against the backdrop of a set of minimum 
conditions and specific objectives common to all NHRIs, derived from “best practices” in the 
field, dealing with the character of the institution, its mandate and its accountability. The 
connection should be easily discernible: the Paris Principles would then become a set of 
benchmarks against which purely national indicators can be analyzed. In this way, only at this 
second stage would the Paris Principles start being an influential part of the NHRI assessment 
mechanism. This change in approach would diminish the current overreliance on the 
Principles, the main elements for NHRI evaluation today, to being instrumental to a bottom-
up mechanism where the main focus is on the local impact that NHRIs make in the field of 
human rights promotion and protection. 
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This solution would be extraordinarily convenient whilst at the same practical. In fact, 
“reopening the Paris Principles is not an option […] as this could be co-opted by states with 
their political agenda”.230 It would also mean spending an exorbitant amount of time and 
resources on something that is already a miracle of balance between competing political 
interests. Without actually modifying the current NHRI mechanism, and by merely 
introducing an additional official layer of assessment, we would do away with criticism 
relating to the ICC’s “brand protection-approach” to evaluation whilst ensuring a systematic 
examination of whether NHRIs respond to critical local human rights issues. 
In conclusion, if one relies too much on whether or not the Paris Principles have been attained 
to, it is clear that criteria for evaluation are essentially external to the national variables of any 
one country. We have reached a moment in time when the international system of NHRI 
evaluation cannot stop at structural precepts and mandate-based considerations. An increased 
attention to the impact that these fundamental institutions actually make on the ground is now 
a necessary step if we want to avoid that NHRIs lose not only in performance levels but also 
in legitimacy. The particular traits that each region, let alone each state, is characterized by 
are too crucially different from one another to be left out of assessment mechanisms. The 
case-study used for this paper has been that of Latin America and its regionally-specific 
NHRI structure, the Defensoría del Pueblo. However, different regional examples could have 
been used and the above discussion on two African NHRIs stand as proof of the global value 
of our discussion. As the present paper attests, NHRIs cannot anymore be evaluated without 
specific reference to the local.  
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Annex I 
Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles) 
 
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993 
Competence and responsibilities 
1. A national institution shall be vested with competence to promote and protect human rights. 
2. A national institution shall be given as broad a mandate as possible, which shall be clearly set 
forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its composition and its sphere of competence. 
3. A national institution shall, inter alia, have the following responsibilities: 
(a) To submit to the Government, Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis 
either at the request of the authorities concerned or through the exercise of its power to hear a 
matter without higher referral, opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters 
concerning the promotion and protection of human rights; the national institution may decide to 
publicize them; these opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports, as well as any prerogative 
of the national institution, shall relate to the following areas: 
(i) Any legislative or administrative provisions, as well as provisions relating to judicial 
organizations, intended to preserve and extend the protection of human rights; in that connection, 
the national institution shall examine the legislation and administrative provisions in force, as well 
as bills and proposals, and shall make such recommendations as it deems appropriate in order to 
ensure that these provisions conform to the fundamental principles of human rights; it shall, if 
necessary, recommend the adoption of new legislation, the amendment of legislation in force and 
the adoption or amendment of administrative measures; 
(ii) Any situation of violation of human rights which it decides to take up; 
(iii) The preparation of reports on the national situation with regard to human rights in general, and 
on more specific matters; 
(iv) Drawing the attention of the Government to situations in any part of the country where human 
rights are violated and making proposals to it for initiatives to put an end to such situations and, 
where necessary, expressing an opinion on the positions and reactions of the Government; 
(b) To promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with 
the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective 
implementation; 
(c) To encourage ratification of the above-mentioned instruments or accession to those instruments, 
and to ensure their implementation; 
  
(d) To contribute to the reports which States are required to submit to United Nations bodies and 
committees, and to regional institutions, pursuant to their treaty obligations and, where necessary, to 
express an opinion on the subject, with due respect for their independence; 
(e) To cooperate with the United Nations and any other orgnization in the United Nations system, 
the regional institutions and the national institutions of other countries that are competent in the 
areas of the protection and promotion of human rights; 
(f) To assist in the formulation of programmes for the teaching of, and research into, human rights 
and to take part in their execution in schools, universities and professional circles; 
(g) To publicize human rights and efforts to combat all forms of discrimination, in particular racial 
discrimination, by increasing public awareness, especially through information and education and 
by making use of all press organs. 
Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism 
1. The composition of the national institution and the appointment of its members, whether by 
means of an election or otherwise, shall be established in accordance with a procedure which 
affords all necessary guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian 
society) involved in the protection and promotion of human rights, particularly by powers which 
will enable effective cooperation to be established with, or through the presence of, representatives 
of: 
(a) Non-governmental organizations responsible for human rights and efforts to combat racial 
discrimination, trade unions, concerned social and professional organizations, for example, 
associations of lawyers, doctors, journalists and eminent scientists; 
(b) Trends in philosophical or religious thought; 
(c) Universities and qualified experts; 
(d) Parliament; 
(e) Government departments (if these are included, their representatives should participate in the 
deliberations only in an advisory capacity). 
2. The national institution shall have an infrastructure which is suited to the smooth conduct of its 
activities, in particular adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to enable it to have 
its own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the Government and not be subject to 
financial control which might affect its independence. 
3. In order to ensure a stable mandate for the members of the national institution, without which 
there can be no real independence, their appointment shall be effected by an official act which shall 
establish the specific duration of the mandate. This mandate may be renewable, provided that the 
pluralism of the institution's membership is ensured. 
 
  
Methods of operation 
Within the framework of its operation, the national institution shall: 
(a) Freely consider any questions falling within its competence, whether they are submitted by the 
Government or taken up by it without referral to a higher authority, on the proposal of its members 
or of any petitioner, 
(b) Hear any person and obtain any information and any documents necessary for assessing 
situations falling within its competence; 
(c) Address public opinion directly or through any press organ, particularly in order to publicize its 
opinions and recommendations; 
(d) Meet on a regular basis and whenever necessary in the presence of all its members after they 
have been duly concerned; 
(e) Establish working groups from among its members as necessary, and set up local or regional 
sections to assist it in discharging its functions; 
(f) Maintain consultation with the other bodies, whether jurisdictional or otherwise, responsible for 
the promotion and protection of human rights (in particular, ombudsmen, mediators and similar 
institutions); 
(g) In view of the fundamental role played by the non-governmental organizations in expanding the 
work of the national institutions, develop relations with the non-governmental organizations 
devoted to promoting and protecting human rights, to economic and social development, to 
combating racism, to protecting particularly vulnerable groups (especially children, migrant 
workers, refugees, physically and mentally disabled persons) or to specialized areas. 
Additional principles concerning the status of commissions with quasi-jurisdictional 
competence 
A national institution may be authorized to hear and consider complaints and petitions concerning 
individual situations. Cases may be brought before it by individuals, their representatives, third 
parties, non-governmental organizations, associations of trade unions or any other representative 
organizations. In such circumstances, and without prejudice to the principles stated above 
concerning the other powers of the commissions, the functions entrusted to them may be based on 
the following principles: 
(a) Seeking an amicable settlement through conciliation or, within the limits prescribed by the law, 
through binding decisions or, where necessary, on the basis of confidentiality; 
(b) Informing the party who filed the petition of his rights, in particular the remedies available to 
him, and promoting his access to them; 
(c) Hearing any complaints or petitions or transmitting them to any other competent authority 
within the limits prescribed by the law; 
  
(d) Making recommendations to the competent authorities, especially by proposing amendments or 
reforms of the laws, regulations and administrative practices, especially if they have created the 
difficulties encountered by the persons filing the petitions in order to assert their rights. 
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Annex II 
Informe Final 
Autoevaluación, Análisis de la Hoja de Trabajo y 
Recomendaciones 
 
Cumpliendo con el Acuerdo de Cooperación firmado entre la Universidad de  Lund y 
el Instituto de Derechos Humanos y Ley Humanitaria Raul Wallenberg por un lado, y 
la Defensoría del Pueblo del Ecuador por el otro, realicé una pasantía con una 
duración de dos meses y dos semanas (del 20 de mayo al 2 de agosto de 2013), 
durante la cual me fue asignada la tarea de realizar un reporte final que contenga un 
análisis de gestión de peticiones de la Dirección Nacional de Derechos Humanos y de 
la Naturaleza. El objetivo del reporte consiste en la proposición de recomendaciones 
para fortalecer la actividad futura de la Dirección. 
A la luz de esta tarea, he desarrollado una hoja de trabajo de la evaluación de la 
capacidad dividida en 5 áreas de interés: Organización de Trabajo, Talentos 
Humanos, Liderazgo, Responsabilidades y Recursos Técnicos. Cada una de estas 
áreas es a su vez dividida en tres partes: 
1. la primera parte presenta un número de declaraciones de indicadores/guías (36 
en total) a ser calificadas según el sistema de calificación del 1 al 5. Esto 
representa el único análisis cuantitativo de datos de la evaluación de la 
capacidad, el resto del cual es cualitativo. Dentro de esta primera parte, 
también se solicita dar una evidencia explicativa que respalde el indicador 
calificado, con el fin de revisar los hechos objetivos y no las simples opiniones 
personales. Obviamente, los indicadores encontrados en la presente hoja de 
trabajo han sido escogidos por mí mismo y son para futuras referencias 
solamente si son reconocidos como útiles. 
 
2. La segunda parte consiste en un análisis FODA, en el cual se solicita a cada 
miembro del personal hacer una lista de las percepciones sobre las Fortalezas, 
las Oportunidades, las Debilidades y las Amenazas sobre cada área de interés. 
 
3. La tercera y parte final es un espacio destinado a recomendaciones generales, 
obviamente dirigidas hacia el área de interés relevante. 
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Las hojas de trabajo fueron entregadas a cada miembro del personal de la Dirección y 
una semana laborable fue destinada para completarlas. 
Una vez que todas las hojas de trabajo son entregadas, tanto los datos cualitativos 
como los cuantitativos son analizados. El análisis reflejará para el personal de la 
Dirección su propia comprensión de las fortalezas, debilidades, desafíos y efectividad 
en general de su trabajo. Para tal tarea no hay mejor juez que el mismo personal ya 
que es, por mucho, el que mejor conoce sobre tales asuntos internos. A partir de 
dicho análisis se propondrá una lista de recomendaciones finales con miras a 
incrementar la efectividad de la Dirección en el futuro. 
Además, la hoja de trabajo de la evaluación de la capacidad fue entregada a los 
funcionarios de cuatro Delegaciones Provinciales (Orellana, Sucumbíos, Guayas y 
Azuay) durante mis visitas a dichas oficinas externas. Los datos obtenidos van a ser 
procesados por separado con el fin de discernir las distintas realidades presentes en el 
país. 
En mi opinión, para que la evaluación de la capacidad esté completa, debería ser 
llevado a cabo un paso extra, el cual no tendrá lugar en la presente evaluación por 
motivos de falta de tiempo y coordinación, que consiste en realizar entrevistas con las 
actores externos interesados. Dichas partes pueden consistir en instituciones 
gubernamentales, organizaciones internacionales, organizaciones de sociedad civil, la 
academia y los medios. Esto conduciría ya sea a una confirmación de las 
percepciones internas del personal o a la oposición de las mismas; básicamente, a una 
perspectiva externa sobre una evaluación potencialmente subjetiva. 
Toda esta actividad pretende ser un esquema piloto, que se espera que en un futuro se 
convierta en una parte integrante del mecanismo de auto-evaluación de la Defensoría. 
El objetivo de dicha evaluación es el hecho de entender sistemáticamente la 
existencia de fortalezas y debilidades de la Dirección, con el fin de desarrollar 
estrategias futuras de desarrollo de la capacidad. Por esta razón, yo vería a la 
Evaluación de la Capacidad como un rasgo complementario a los procesos regulares 
de Planes Estratégicos. 
Lo que sigue es una visión general de la manera en la que el proceso de evaluación 
fue dividido desde el comienzo:  
Enfoque: 
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 Habilitar a la Dirección para que evalúe sus capacidades, a la luz de sus 
fortalezas y debilidades. 
 Habilitar al personal para que exprese su opinión sobre una variedad de asuntos 
relacionados a su trabajo diario. Esta “ventana abierta” para la discusión es 
esencial no sólo para un incremento de la eficiencia del trabajo en la oficina, ya 
que nadie tiene mayor conocimiento sobre los aspectos positivos y negativos 
de la Dirección que su propio personal, sino que también muestra a los 
funcionarios que sus opiniones son analizadas con atención, incrementando su 
nivel de involucramiento. 
 Identificar las brechas más urgentes de capacidad, para ocuparse de ellas lo 
más pronto posible. 
 Ser capaz de tener una base fortalecida a partir de la cual desarrollar estrategias 
a largo plazo para enfrentar las brechas de capacidad identificadas. 
 
Participantes 
 Personal de la Dirección Nacional de Protección de Derechos Humanos y de la 
Naturaleza. 
 Personal de las Delegaciones Provinciales de la Defensoría del Pueblo de 
Guayas, Orellana, Sucumbíos y Azuay. 
 Idealmente, pero no para esta primera instancia del análisis de la evaluación de 
la capacidad, actores externos clave a los que se les solicita compartir sus ideas 
sobre la base de su involucramiento con el trabajo de la Dirección.  
 
 
Metodología: 
 Discusiones individuales y grupales tanto con el personal de la Dirección como 
con el personal de las Delegaciones Provinciales anteriormente mencionadas. 
 Antecedentes compartidos por la Dirección. 
 Repartición de hojas de trabajo de evaluación de la capacidad, a ser 
completadas y entregadas para su análisis. 
 Idealmente, entrevistas con actores externos. 
 
La Tabla 1 presenta los resultados de la hoja de trabajo de la autoevaluación de la 
Dirección. Cada una de las columnas enumeradas (e.g. Unidad 1) representa el 
número de hojas de trabajo devueltas para su análisis (número de personal 
participante). La primera columna contiene el tema central a ser evaluado, seguido 
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por el promedio de las evaluaciones de cada miembro del personal. Este promedio 
será de ayuda para comprender las fortalezas y debilidades de la Dirección, mientras 
se priorizan ciertos aspectos sobre otros. 
La Tabla 2 sigue el mismo patrón de la Tabla 1, con la diferencia de que 12 
funcionarios fueron tomados de las Delegaciones Provinciales durante las visitas a 
dichas oficinas. Las Provincias que fueron visitadas no constituyen una mayoría entre 
las Provincias Ecuatorianas, pero fueron escogidas para representar tanto a las 
oficinas exitosas como a las problemáticas. Observando la diferencia en promedio 
entre la Dirección Nacional y las Delegaciones, las prioridades relacionadas con 
Planes de Acción futuros pueden ser establecidas, y las fortalezas y debilidades, 
identificadas. 
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Table 1:  
D ec la ra c ión  g u ía
Calificación de Capacidades
G en era l Un id a d  1 Un id a d  2 Un id a d  3 Un id a d  4 Un id a d  5 Un id a d  6 Un id a d  7 Un id a d  8 Un id a d  9 Un id a d  1 0 Un id a d  1 1 Un id a d  1 2
O rg a n iz a c ión  d e Tra b a jo
3.5454545455 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 3 3 4 4
3.6666666667 3 5 1 5 3 5 4 4 4 3 4 3
4.0833333333 3 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 2 4 5 4
3.6363636364 4 4 2 3 4 5 4 4 3 4 3
3.25 4 1 1 4 4 5 2 4 4 2 4 4
3 2 3 3 2 3 5 2 4 2 2 5 3
4.4166666667 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 5 3 4 5 4
3.4166666667 4 2 4 5 2 5 3 4 2 4 5 1
3.9166666667 5 5 4 4 3 1 4 4 4 5 5 3
3.3636363636 5 3 4 4 2 1 3 4 4 4 3
Talentos Humanos
3.3 3 4 3 3 3 5 4 2 3 3
2.75 3 3 1 4 3 5 2 2 2 2 3 3
2.9 4 2 3 4 2 4 2 3 2 3
4 3 5 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 3
3.380952381 4 5 5 3 2 2 4 4 3
3.25 4 2 3 4 3 5 2 4 3 2 4 3
3.8 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 5 5 3
4 4 4 3 5 5 5 3 3
3.3636363636 2 4 1 5 2 5 4 4 4 4 2
3.0833333333 2 3 2 5 3 5 3 2 4 3 3 2
3.9166666667 4 4 4 5 3 5 4 4 3 4 4 3
Liderazgo
4.2 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 3
3.6 4 3 3 5 2 5 3 4 4 3
2.2 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 3 4 2
3.1111111111 3 4 3 3 5 2 2 2 4 3
3.2 3 3 4 4 5 2 2 2 4 3
Responsabilidades
3.1111111111 3 3 4 3 2 2 3 4 4
3.7272727273 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 5 4
3.4285714286 4 5 5 4 1 1 2 4 1 5 5 3
2.625 2 2 2 4 2 3 3 3
2.5454545455 2 2 3 4 2 1 3 2 1 5 3
3.75 4 5 4 5 4 5 2 4 3 1 5 3
Recursos Tecnicos
2.9 3 1 3 4 4 5 2 3 1 3
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad de 
desarrollar planes generales anuales, planes estratégicos y 
unidades estratégicas que coinciden exactamente con las 
funciones y actividades de las unidades de trabajo.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
poner en marcha los mecanismos de coordinación entre las 
unidades y dentro de la Defensoría en su conjunto.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
verificar que el enfoque de género está integrado en todas sus 
políticas.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
implementar sus planes de trabajo anuales, planes estratégicos 
para la Dirección y sus unidades.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
identificar las prioridades financiarías necesarias.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar y mantener una base de datos interna para el personal 
tanto en instrumentos de derechos humanos como en procesos de 
planificación interna.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
recibir y tramitar quejas de cualquier persona, grupo de personas 
u  organizaciones no gubernamentales alegando violaciones de 
los derechos humanos.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar e implementar procesos estándar para llevar a cabo 
investigaciones independientes de violaciones de derechos 
humanos y prácticas discriminatorias.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar recomendaciones apropiadas para reparar las 
violaciones de los derechos humanos.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad de 
promover y supervisar la aplicación de las recomendaciones.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar y poner en marcha el desarrollo de recursos humanos 
a largo plazo para garantizar la adecuada dotación de personal y 
las competencias  del personal.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
poner en marcha un adecuado número de mecanismos de 
medición de rendimiento.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene un número adecuado 
de personal calificado para cumplir su mandato.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
acceder y adaptarse a las políticas internacionales y a las mejores 
prácticas para abordar y responder a violaciones de derechos 
humanos en el país.
El personal de la Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la 
capacidad para distinguir entre las violaciones de derechos 
humanos y las violaciones de otros derechos y sugerir 
reparaciones apropiadas.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
investigar los centros de detención sin impedimentos externos.
El personal de la Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la 
capacidad de participar con los actores adecuados para llevar a 
cabo una investigación.
El personal de la Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene acceso a 
bases de datos sobre los derechos humanos nacionales e 
internacionales.
El personal de la Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la 
capacidad para articular sus ideas y opiniones abiertamente con 
los actores claves externos para llevar a cabo sus 
responsabilidades más efectivamente.
El personal de la Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la 
capacidad para participar con las organizaciones no 
gubernamentales y trabajar activamente con ellos para la 
protección de los derechos humanos.
Capacidad de la Dirección Nacional de Protección de 
coordinación con las oficinas provinciales.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
decidir cómo dirigir, aceptar o rechazar quejas basadas en el 
mandato.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
garantizar la aplicación de mecanismos transparentes y 
procedimientos para recibir y actuar en quejas y medidas 
disciplinarias.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
asegurar que los derechos del personal estén protegidos y 
promocionados a través de un código de conducta.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
garantizar la aplicación de un seguimiento basado en el  mérito y 
los resultados y un marco de evaluación para medir el impacto del 
trabajo de la Dirección.
Capacidad de la Dirección Nacional de Protección para liderar el 
desarrollo de una supervisión y plan de evaluación para medir la 
eficacia de su trabajo.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad de 
realizar un análisis integral de la situación que involucra a todo el 
personal para promover la gestión del cambio y la rendición de 
cuentas institucional.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
llevar a cabo monitoreos regulares y evaluación de las 
actividades de la Dirección.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
hacer público el número de las quejas  y porcentaje de las quejas 
aceptadas.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
participar sin impedimentos externos con todos los interesados en 
el ejecutivo incluyendo las fuerzas armadas, las prisiones y la 
policía.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
participar y colaborar sin problemas con todas las organizaciones 
de la sociedad civil de los derechos humanos y las ONG.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar mecanismos para el procesamiento de los tramites 
defensoriales.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
asegurar auditorías/veedurías ciudadanas  independientes 
regulares.
La Dirección Nacional de Protección tiene la capacidad para 
movilizar y garantizar recursos basados en las prioridades del 
Plan estratégico / otros planes de trabajo.
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Table 2: 
D ec la ra c ión  g u ía
Calificación de Capacidades
G en era l Un id a d  1 Un id a d  2 Un id a d  3 Un id a d  4 Un id a d  5 Un id a d  6 Un id a d  7 Un id a d  8 Un id a d  9
O rg a n iz a c ión  d e Tra b a jo
3.583333 2 3 1 4 5 4 4 4 4
3.583333 2 3 2 4 5 4 4 3 4
3.818182 3 3 3 4 3 5 5 4
3.363636 3 1 2 4 4 3 4 4
2.909091 2 3 1 4 1 4 4 1
3.090909 2 3 2 3 2 3 4 3
3.916667 3 3 2 4 4 3 5 5 5
3.6 2 2 4 4 3 4 4
3.909091 3 3 2 4 4 5 4 4
3.454545 2 3 2 4 2 5 4 1
Talentos Humanos
2 2
2 2
4 4
4 4
4 4
3 3
4 4
4 4
3 3
3 3
4 4
Liderazgo
4.083333 3 3 2 4 5 5 5 2 5
3.8 2 2 2 4 4 5 4
3.636364 2 2 2 3 3 5 5 3
3.272727 2 3 2 2 1 5 5 1
2.666667 2 2 1 2 4 3 4 2 4
Responsabilidades
3.181818 2 3 2 2 3 4 4 4
2.545455 2 2 1 2 2 4 4 4
3.272727 2 2 1 4 5 3 4 3
3.090909 2 3 2 3 3 5 4 1
3.75 3 2 2 3 5 5 4 3 5
3 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 4
3 3 3 2 2 3 5 4 2
Recursos Tecnicos
2.3 2 2 1 3 3 3 3 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 3 4 1
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad de desarrollar 
planes generales anuales, planes estratégicos y unidades 
estratégicas que coinciden exactamente con las funciones y 
actividades de las unidades de trabajo.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para poner en 
marcha los mecanismos de coordinación entre las unidades y 
dentro de la Defensoría en su conjunto.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para verificar que 
el enfoque de género está integrado en todas sus políticas.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para 
implementar sus planes de trabajo anuales, planes 
estratégicos para la Dirección y sus unidades.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para identificar 
las prioridades financiarías necesarias.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para desarrollar 
y mantener una base de datos interna para el personal tanto 
en instrumentos de derechos humanos como en procesos de 
planificación interna.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para recibir y 
tramitar quejas de cualquier persona, grupo de personas u  
organizaciones no gubernamentales alegando violaciones de 
los derechos humanos.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para desarrollar 
e implementar procesos estándar para llevar a cabo 
investigaciones independientes de violaciones de derechos 
humanos y prácticas discriminatorias.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para desarrollar 
recomendaciones apropiadas para reparar las violaciones de 
los derechos humanos.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad de promover y 
supervisar la aplicación de las recomendaciones.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para desarrollar 
y poner en marcha el desarrollo de recursos humanos a largo 
plazo para garantizar la adecuada dotación de personal y las 
competencias  del personal.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para poner en 
marcha un adecuado número de mecanismos de medición de 
rendimiento.
La Delegación Provincial tiene un número adecuado de 
personal calificado para cumplir su mandato.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para acceder y 
adaptarse a las políticas internacionales y a las mejores 
prácticas para abordar y responder a violaciones de derechos 
humanos en el país.
El personal de la Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad 
para distinguir entre las violaciones de derechos humanos y 
las violaciones de otros derechos y sugerir reparaciones 
apropiadas.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para investigar 
los centros de detención sin impedimentos externos.
El personal de la Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad de 
participar con los actores adecuados para llevar a cabo una 
investigación.
El personal de la Delegación Provincial tiene acceso a bases 
de datos sobre los derechos humanos nacionales e 
internacionales.
El personal de la Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad 
para articular sus ideas y opiniones abiertamente con los 
actores claves externos para llevar a cabo sus 
responsabilidades más efectivamente.
El personal de la Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad 
para participar con las organizaciones no gubernamentales y 
trabajar activamente con ellos para la protección de los 
derechos humanos.
Capacidad de la Delegación Provincial de coordinación con 
las oficinas provinciales.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para decidir 
cómo dirigir, aceptar o rechazar quejas basadas en el 
mandato.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para garantizar 
la aplicación de mecanismos transparentes y procedimientos 
para recibir y actuar en quejas y medidas disciplinarias.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para asegurar 
que los derechos del personal estén protegidos y 
promocionados a través de un código de conducta.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para garantizar 
la aplicación de un seguimiento basado en el  mérito y los 
resultados y un marco de evaluación para medir el impacto 
del trabajo de la Dirección.
Capacidad de la Delegación Provincial para liderar el 
desarrollo de una supervisión y plan de evaluación para 
medir la eficacia de su trabajo.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad de realizar un 
análisis integral de la situación que involucra a todo el 
personal para promover la gestión del cambio y la rendición 
de cuentas institucional.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para llevar a 
cabo monitoreos regulares y evaluación de las actividades de 
la Dirección.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para hacer 
público el número de las quejas  y porcentaje de las quejas 
aceptadas.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para participar 
sin impedimentos externos con todos los interesados en el 
ejecutivo incluyendo las fuerzas armadas, las prisiones y la 
policía.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para participar y 
colaborar sin problemas con todas las organizaciones de la 
sociedad civil de los derechos humanos y las ONG.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para desarrollar 
mecanismos para el procesamiento de los tramites 
defensoriales.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para asegurar 
auditorías/veedurías ciudadanas  independientes regulares.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad para movilizar y 
garantizar recursos basados en las prioridades del Plan 
estratégico / otros planes de trabajo.
La Delegación Provincial tiene la capacidad financiera para 
adquirir equipos adecuados para llevar a cabo las 
investigaciones sobre violaciones de derechos humanos y 
para recibir y tramitar las quejas.
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Recomendaciones 
Las siguientes recomendaciones serán divididas siguiendo la misma categorización 
que caracteriza a la hoja de trabajo de la evaluación de la capacidad: Organización de 
Trabajo, Talentos Humanos, Liderazgo, Responsabilidades y Recursos Técnicos. Las 
recomendaciones vienen dadas no sólo por el análisis de las hojas de trabajo, sino 
también por discusiones individuales/grupales con el personal y evaluaciones 
personales. El Mecanismo Nacional para la Prevención de la Tortura se beneficiará 
de un análisis por separado, debido a su particular espacio institucional dentro de la 
Dirección. 
Organización de Trabajo 
 Existe una sobrecarga de trabajo para cada funcionario y una 
acumulación de casos antiguos sustancial que afecta claramente a la 
calidad de su trabajo. Existe una clara necesidad de un incremento del 
personal. 
 Dicha acumulación también viene dada por un retraso en la emisión de 
Resoluciones y Apelaciones. Esto es causado por un alto número de 
filtros previos a la publicación de una Resolución. Sería recomendable 
que dichos filtros sean reducidos a una cantidad mínima necesaria, 
de manera que se acelere el sistema Defensorial en su totalidad. 
 No existe una base de datos interna que contenga tanto instrumentos 
nacionales como internacionales de protección de los derechos 
humanos. Es recomendable que dicha base de datos sea constituida. 
 Existe una coordinación escasa entre la Dirección y las otras 
Unidades de la Defensoría lo cual afecta la efectividad y la calidad de 
trabajo. Por ejemplo, reuniones regulares entre las Unidades y la 
Dirección ayudarían a obtener un incremento de la eficiencia en 
conjunto. Una preocupación común entre los funcionarios es que la 
Dirección debería tener voz y voto en los asuntos de asignación 
presupuestaria con el fin de priorizar ciertos aspectos sobre otros. 
 Un incremento en el uso de trabajo en equipo sobre el trabajo 
individual  es recomendable para cada área de enfoque de la Dirección. 
Existe una tendencia del personal a “apropiarse” de los casos en lugar de 
compartir las resoluciones de los casos con el equipo. Compartir 
opiniones sobre cómo enfrentar cualquier contingencia está a la mano y 
no sólo amplía el alcance de la eficiencia, sino que también crea 
mecanismos de ayuda recíproca, la cual sólo puede ser positiva en la 
resolución de casos. 
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 No existe capacidad relacionada con la supervisión y el monitoreo 
del seguimiento de las recomendaciones. Sería recomendable que una 
unidad específica sea establecida con el fin de dar seguimiento a las 
recomendaciones dadas a la institución relevante. 
 Existe una colaboración demasiado débil con las ONGs. Es 
recomendable introducir nuevos foros de diálogos con dichas 
instituciones tan esenciales con el fin de incrementar de una manera 
coordinada la efectividad de la protección de los derechos humanos en el 
país. 
 Debido a una supuesta presencia de límites impuestos al trabajo de la 
Dirección por parte de cierto número de instituciones Estatales, es 
recomendable que se lleven a cabo reuniones frecuentes con dichas 
instituciones con el fin de construir mejores conexiones y relaciones.  
 Desde el punto de vista del actual establecimiento de las oficinas, existe 
la necesidad de tener habitación(es) separada(s) para las audiencias. 
El espacio abierto establecido que caracteriza a la Dirección podría 
afectar las audiencias debido a su carencia de privacidad. 
 
Talentos Humanos 
 La preocupación más común entre los funcionarios entrevistados fue la falta 
misma de personal. 
 Algunos funcionarios están preocupados por una cierta carencia de 
conocimiento general sobre la ley internacional de los derechos humanos 
por parte de algunos funcionarios. Es recomendable la capacitación y cursos 
de actualización en derechos humanos. 
 No existe una manera de evaluación del personal. Es recomendable un 
proceso estándar de evaluación (a parte de la autoevaluación en la hoja de 
trabajo que integra este informe). 
 A pesar de que el ambiente de trabajo es muy positivo, son recomendadas 
actividades que incluyan a todos los funcionarios, con el fin de incrementar 
el compañerismo dentro el equipo de trabajo. 
 
Liderazgo 
 El proceso de toma de decisiones no es participativo en su totalidad. Por 
otra parte, incluso los jefes de las unidades dentro de la Dirección denuncian la 
sobrecarga de trabajo. Sería de ayuda el tener un incremento en la delegación 
de la toma de decisiones a los funcionarios y no sólo a los jefes/Director de 
la unidad. 
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 Como fue mencionado anteriormente, los jefes de unidad deberían tomar la 
iniciativa de introducir procesos de cooperación entre los funcionarios con 
fines de formación de equipos de trabajo. 
 No existe un código oficial de conducta. La introducción de dicho código 
sería un paso adelante para la Dirección bienvenido. 
 Han habido solicitudes dentro de la hoja de trabajo que denuncian el hecho de 
que usualmente las opiniones de los funcionarios no son tomados en cuenta 
en su totalidad por los líderes de la Dirección. Serían recomendables 
reuniones generales más frecuentes con todo el miembro del personal (por 
ejemplo, reuniones generales mensuales). Esto ayudaría motivando al equipo 
en su totalidad (lamentablemente, la carencia de motivación del personal ha 
sido señalada como un defecto de la Dirección varias veces en la hoja de 
trabajo). 
 
Responsabilidades 
 No existe una herramienta estandarizada que permita a la población 
conocer la cantidad exacta de denuncias que llegan a la Dirección y 
tampoco existe una compilación estandarizada de los casos pendientes o 
resueltos. Sería recomendable que se establezca un sistema que recolecte y 
publique los datos de la Dirección, tanto para la población en general como 
para la claridad de los mismos funcionarios. 
 De alguna manera, se detectó una posición débil con respecto a asuntos 
sensibles particulares. La fuerza de la Defensoría viene dada exactamente de 
una independencia total y absoluta del Ejecutivo, la cual algunas veces se 
muestra carente. Sería recomendable que la distancia Defensoría-Ejecutivo 
sea revisada y fortalecida. 
 Podría decirse que existen demasiados pasos entre el momento en el que una 
demanda es entregada y su resolución. Se requieren demasiadas 
autorizaciones antes de que un caso pueda darse por terminado. Con el fin de 
acelerar los procesos, algunos de los pasos deberían ser eliminados, sobre 
todo aquellos que se tratan con organismos externos como otros 
Ministerios. Incluso en este punto, la petición de independencia es algo que 
debe ser seguido por la Defensoría para seguir siendo reconocida como la 
institución respetable que viene siendo considerada hasta hoy. 
 Consecuentemente, es recomendable que se sellen lazos interinstitucionales 
más fuertes. Si un oficial de un Ministerio determinado se encuentra a una 
simple llamada de distancia, se simplifica y acelera el proceso en su totalidad, 
lo cual es esencial en los casos de violación de derechos humanos. 
 Es recomendable un incremento de participación durante las reuniones con 
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otras instituciones del Estado por parte del personal que trató 
directamente el caso en discusión, por encima de los jefes de unidad o el 
Director. Esto incrementa la participación del personal y, por tanto, la 
motivación. 
 
Recursos  Técnicos 
 Una preocupación común entre el personal es que muchas autorizaciones y 
propuestas presupuestarias dependen de otras unidades dentro de la 
Defensoría. Es entonces recomendable que la Dirección esté más 
involucrada en asuntos relacionados con su propio presupuesto, ya sea por 
presidir las reuniones de asignación presupuestaria o por tener mayor voz y 
voto en sus peticiones. 
 La elaboración del Plan de Acción es realizada por una pequeña cantidad 
de personas que no representan la totalidad de los miembros de las distintas 
unidades de la Dirección. Un enfoque más amplio y participativo sería 
recomendable. 
 En términos de las faltas técnicas, no existe una versión estándar del mismo 
software en las computadoras de la Dirección. Unos utilizan Microsoft 
Office y otros usan software libre, causando problemas de incapacidad, los 
cuales dan lugar a un trabajo menos eficiente y menos veloz. Es recomendable 
que todo el software sea unificado en una única marca de fábrica. 
 
Mecanismo Nacional para la Prevención de la Tortura 
 Si bien se reconoce que la existencia del Mecanismo es ya un paso adelante 
en la lucha contra el uso de la tortura a manos del Estado y la Defensoría ha 
tenido un papel fundamental en su creación y funcionamiento, sería 
recomendable aumentar su independencia dentro de la propia 
Defensoría. Una Directiva independiente incrementaría la eficiencia 
tanto en términos de medios como en términos de calidad y rapidez de 
sus acciones (mecanismos en el extranjero, como los presentes en España y 
Argentina, se han beneficiado desde su establecimiento en un cuerpo propio 
e independiente).  
 La falta de una coerción que caracterice el poder del Mecanismo, como una 
Unidad dentro de la Defensoría del Pueblo, es una debilidad sustancial en 
un área que necesita fuertes e inmediatos medios de resolución. A largo 
plazo, sería recomendable que el Mecanismo sea una institución 
autónoma con su propio personal, presupuesto y poder de coerción. 
 La existencia legal del Mecanismo dentro de la Defensoría proviene de la 
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Ley Orgánica de la Defensoría del Pueblo, que es fácilmente variable. 
Como tal, su continua presencia dentro de la Defensoría es demasiado 
dependiente de los poderes decisivos del Defensor. Para evitar tal riesgo, 
deberían aclararse las garantías de su continua presencia y actividad, 
ya sea constitucionalmente o con cualquier otro medio de garantía. 
 Desde un punto de vista operativo, la colaboración con las Delegaciones 
Provinciales han demostrado haber causado algunas complicaciones antes 
que soporte a las visitas del Mecanismo (el “efecto sorpresa” que las visitas 
a los centros de detención necesitan a veces ha sido develado por el 
personal de la Delegación, lo que hace a las visitas menos eficaces y útiles). 
Es recomendable que dicha colaboración no sea necesaria en lo 
absoluto. 
 Por otra parte, sería recomendable una red regional de oficinas 
pertenecientes al Mecanismo con el fin de ser capaces de coordinar las 
distintas instituciones nacionales que están involucradas con la actividad del 
Mecanismo. 
 Parece ser que existen demasiados pasos que las resoluciones del 
Mecanismo tienen que tomar antes de llegar a quienes en efecto toman las 
decisiones de manera coerciva (los Ministerios). Cuando el Mecanismo 
completa sus visitas y recomendaciones, no resulta estar en sus manos el 
que la situación llegue a manos superiores. Sería mejor que las 
resoluciones del Mecanismo tuvieran un camino más directo, sin tantos 
pasos por tomar. 
 También dentro de esta unidad, no existe un número adecuado de 
personal. Por esta razón, a pesar de que el mandato permite al Mecanismo 
el hacerse cargo de todo tipo de centros de detención del país, actualmente 
sólo logra hacerse cargo de dos categorías (Centros de Rehabilitación Social 
y Centros de Adolescentes Infractores). Un incremento de funcionarios 
ayudaría a incluir las demás categorías a su alcance y así, finalmente, 
cumplir su mandato a cabalidad. 
  El Mecanismo es difícilmente conocido entre la población. Una mejor 
promoción de su función en los medios nacionales ayudaría a incrementar 
su reconocimiento y, por lo tanto, su eficiencia. 
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Sistema de calificación de capacidades  
1. Muy Baja Capacidad muy baja o no existente. 
2. Baja Capacidad baja o básica. 
3. Media Capacidad media o parcialmente 
desarrollada (ej. implementación 
irregular-básica). 
4. Alta 
 
Capacidad alta o bien desarrollada (ej. 
implementación parcial- completa). 
5. Muy Alta Capacidad muy alta o completamente 
desarrollada (ej. monitoreo activo y 
evaluación después de la 
implementación). 
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Hoja 1 
Organización del Trabajo 
 
 
Declaración guía 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad de 
desarrollar planes generales anuales, 
planes estratégicos y unidades 
estratégicas que coinciden 
exactamente con las funciones y 
actividades de las unidades de 
trabajo. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
poner en marcha los mecanismos de 
coordinación entre las unidades y 
dentro de la Defensoría en su 
conjunto. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
verificar que el enfoque de género 
está integrado en todas sus políticas. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
implementar sus planes de trabajo 
anuales, planes estratégicos para la 
Dirección y sus unidades. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
identificar las prioridades 
financiarías necesarias. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar y mantener una base de 
 
Clasificación 
  
 
Explicación 
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datos interna para el personal tanto 
en instrumentos de derechos 
humanos como en procesos de 
planificación interna. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
recibir y tramitar quejas de cualquier 
persona, grupo de personas u  
organizaciones no gubernamentales 
alegando violaciones de los derechos 
humanos. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar e implementar procesos 
estándar para llevar a cabo 
investigaciones independientes de 
violaciones de derechos humanos y 
prácticas discriminatorias. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar recomendaciones 
apropiadas para reparar las 
violaciones de los derechos 
humanos.  
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad de 
promover y supervisar la aplicación 
de las recomendaciones. 
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Fortalezas 
 
Oportunidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debilidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Amenazas 
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Hoja 2 
Talentos Humanos 
 
Declaración guía 
 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
desarrollar y poner en marcha el 
desarrollo de recursos humanos a 
largo plazo para garantizar la 
adecuada dotación de personal y 
las competencias  del personal. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
poner en marcha un adecuado 
número de mecanismos de 
medición de rendimiento. 
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene un número 
adecuado de personal calificado 
para cumplir su mandato.  
 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
acceder y adaptarse a las políticas 
internacionales y a las mejores 
prácticas para abordar y responder 
a violaciones de derechos 
humanos en el país.  
 El personal de la Dirección 
Nacional de Protección tiene la 
capacidad para distinguir entre las 
violaciones de derechos humanos 
y las violaciones de otros 
derechos y sugerir reparaciones.  
 
Clasificación 
  
 
Explicación 
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 La Dirección Nacional de 
Protección tiene la capacidad para 
investigar los centros de detención 
sin impedimentos externos.  
 El personal de la Dirección 
Nacional de Protección tiene la 
capacidad de participar con los 
actores adecuados para llevar a 
cabo una investigación.  
 El personal de la Dirección 
Nacional de Protección tiene acceso 
a bases de datos sobre los 
derechos humanos nacionales e 
internacionales. 
 El personal de la Dirección 
Nacional de Protección tiene la 
capacidad para articular sus ideas y 
opiniones abiertamente con los 
actores claves externos para llevar 
a cabo sus responsabilidades más 
efectivamente.  
 El personal de la Dirección 
Nacional de Protección tiene la 
capacidad para participar con las 
organizaciones no 
gubernamentales y trabajar 
activamente con ellos para la 
protección de los derechos 
humanos. 
 Capacidad de la Dirección 
Nacional de Protección de 
coordinación con las oficinas 
provinciales. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          El desafío 
de ser diferentes, es sentirnos semejantes 
 
 
 
 
Fortalezas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oportunidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debilidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amenazas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recomendaciones 
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Hoja 3 
Liderazgo 
 
 
Declaración guía 
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para decidir cómo 
dirigir, aceptar o rechazar quejas basadas 
en el mandato.  
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para garantizar la 
aplicación de mecanismos transparentes y 
procedimientos para recibir y actuar en 
quejas y medidas disciplinarias.  
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para asegurar que los 
derechos del personal estén protegidos y 
promocionados a través de un código de 
conducta.  
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para garantizar la 
aplicación de un seguimiento basado en el  
mérito y los resultados y un marco de 
evaluación para medir el impacto del 
trabajo de la Dirección. 
 Capacidad de la Dirección Nacional 
de Protección para liderar el desarrollo de 
una supervisión y plan de evaluación para 
medir la eficacia de su trabajo. 
 
 
 
 
Clasificación 
  
 
Explicación 
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Fortalezas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oportunidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debilidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amenazas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recomendaciones 
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Hoja 4 
Responsabilidades 
 
 
Declaración guía 
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad de realizar un análisis 
integral de la situación que involucra a 
todo el personal para promover la gestión 
del cambio y la rendición de cuentas 
institucional.  
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para llevar a cabo 
monitoreos regulares y evaluación de las 
actividades de la Dirección.   
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para hacer público el 
número de las quejas  y porcentaje de las 
quejas aceptadas. 
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para participar sin 
impedimentos externos con todos los 
interesados en el ejecutivo incluyendo las 
fuerzas armadas, las prisiones y la policía.  
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para participar y 
colaborar sin problemas con todas las 
organizaciones de la sociedad civil de los 
derechos humanos y las ONG.  
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para desarrollar 
mecanismos para el procesamiento de los 
tramites defensoriales. 
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 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para asegurar 
auditorías/veedurías ciudadanas  
independientes regulares. 
 
Fortalezas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oportunidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debilidades 
 
 
 
Amenazas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recomendaciones 
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Hoja 5 
Recursos Técnicos  
 
 
Declaración guía 
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad para movilizar y 
garantizar recursos basados en las 
prioridades del Plan estratégico / otros 
planes de trabajo. 
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad financiera para adquirir 
equipos adecuados para llevar a cabo las 
investigaciones sobre violaciones de 
derechos humanos y para recibir y 
tramitar las quejas.  
 La Dirección Nacional de Protección 
tiene la capacidad de administrar misiones 
de monitoreo y evaluación para evaluar el 
impacto del trabajo de la Dirección en 
todo el país. 
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Explicación 
 
Fortalezas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oportunidades 
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Debilidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amenazas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recomendaciones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Bibliography 
 
Literature 
 
Abdullahi An-Na’im, Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural 
Relativism, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Feb., 1987). 
Adamantia Pohjolainen, The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions – the Role of 
the United Nations, Danish Institute for Human Rights (2006). 
Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: a Western Construct with Limited 
Applicability, in Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, Preager - New York 
(1980). 
Albert H. Rosenthal, The Ombudsman-Swedish “Grievance Man”, Public Administrative 
Review, Vol. 24 (1964). 
Alfred Bexelius, The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs in Ronald C. Rowat, The Ombudsman, 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (1966). 
Alfred Bexelius, The Swedish Ombudsman, The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 17 
No. 1 (1967). 
Americo Castro, Caracter Argentino e Hispanoamericano in Archivo de Cultura, Ediciones 
Aga-Taura - Buenos Aires (1945). 
Americo Castro, La Peculiaridad Linguistica Rioplatense y su Sentido Historico - Buenos 
Aires (1941). 
Andrè Legrand, L’Ombudsman Scandinave, E. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias (1970). 
Anna Pohjolainen, The Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions – the Role of the 
United Nations, Danish Institute for Human Rights – Copenhagen (2006). 
Augustin Gordillo, La Administracion Paralela, Civitas – Madrid (1982). 
Bertrand Russel, Authority and the Individual, Routledge ed. – London (1949).  
Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, 
Cambridge University Press (2009). 
 
  
 
Birgit Lindsnaes and Lone Lindholt, National Human Rights Intitutions, Article and Working 
Papers, Danish Centre for Human Rights – Copenhagen (2001). 
Brian Burdekin and Jason Naum, National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia Pacific. 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute - Lund (2006). 
C. Flinterman and M. Zwamborn, From Development of Human Rights to Managing Human 
Rights Development, Netherland Institute of Human Rights – Utrecht (2003). 
Carlos Gueròn, Internvention in VVAA. El Proyecto de Ombudsman para America Latina, 
Cuadernos de Documentacion, Serie III, Cuestiones Iberoamericanas, No. 1 - Madrid (1986). 
Carlos R. Constenla, Teoria y Practica del Defensor del Pueblo, Editorial Reus - Madrid 
(2010). 
Cecilia Bizerra, Sumac Kawsay/Buen Vivir, Monthly Review, Vol 48 (December 2009) 
available at http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009/bizerra181209.html. 
Davidse Koen, The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights: Bridge to Nowhere or 
Bridge Over Troubled Waters?, Touro International Law Review (1995). 
Dodson Michael, Jackson Donald Wilson, Horizontal Accountability in Transitional 
Democracies: The Human Rights Ombudsman in El Salvador and Guatemala, Latin American 
Politics & Society, Volume 46, Number 4 (2005). 
Flor Francisco Hidalgo, Contrahegemonia y Buen Vivir, Francisco Hidalgo Flor y Alvaro 
Marquez Editores - Quito (2012). 
Ellen Messer, Pluralist Approaches to Human Rights, Journal of Anthropological Studies 
Research 53 (1997). 
Fariborz Nozari, The Swedish Institution of Justice Ombudsman, International Journal of 
Legal Information, Vol. 18 (1990). 
Goodman Ryan and Pegram Thomas, Human Rights, State Compliance and Social Change – 
Assessing National Human Rights Institutions, Cambridge (2012). 
Guillermo Escobar Roca, Actas del I Congreso Internacional del PRADPI - La Proteccion de 
los Derechos Humanos por las Defensorías del Pueblo, Dykinson S.L. (2012). 
Henkin Louis, The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights, Annals of the Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 506 (1989). 
 
  
 
Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders? Government Human Rights Commissions in 
Africa (2001) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/01/01/protectors-or-pretenders. 
International Council on Human Rights Policy, Performance and Legitimacy: National 
Human Rights Institutions, Second Ed. - Geneva (2004). 
International Council on Human Rights Policy, Assessing the Effectiveness of National 
Human Rights Institutions – Geneva  (2005). 
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in theory and practice, 2
nd
 ed. Cornell University 
Press (2003). 
Jeong-Woo Koo and Francisco Ramirez, National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: 
Worldwide expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966-2004, Social Forces, Vol. 
87, No.3 (2009). 
John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, 4
th
 Edition Oxford 
University Press (2008). 
Jorge Santisteven de Noriega, El Defensor del Pueblo en Iberoamerica in Comentarios a la 
Ley Organica del Defensor del Pueblo – Navarra (2002). 
Julie A. Mertus, Human Rights Matters – Local Politics and National Human Rights 
Institutions, Stanford University Press (2009). 
Lanza Leo Valladares, The Challanges Facing the Ombudsman in Latin America in The 
International Ombudsman Yearbook, Vol.2 (2004). 
Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: the Role of National Institutions in Good 
Governance and Human Rights Protection, Harvard Human Rights Journal 13 (2000). 
Linda C. Reif, Transplantation and Adaptation: The Evolution of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman,  Boston College Third World Law Journal, Volume 31, Issue 2 (2011). 
Manfred Nowak, Introduction to International Human Rights Regime, Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2003). 
Maria Iràizoz, La Eficacia del Defensor del Pueblo en Iberoamerica – Expansion y 
caracterizacion como Instituciones Nacionales de Derechos Humanos, Dykinson S.L – 
Madrid (2012). 
Osvaldo Hurtado, Dictaduras del Siglo XXI – El Caso Ecuadoriano, Paradiso Editores (2012). 
Pietro Catalano, Giovanni Lobrano and S. Schipani, Da Roma a Roma – Dallo Jus Gentium al 
Tribunale Penale Internazionale, Instituto Italo Latinoamericano (2002). 
 
  
 
Rhoda Howard, Occidentalism, Human Rights and the Obligations of Western Scholars, 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 29 (1995). 
Richard Carver, A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions and 
the Domestication of International Law, Human Rights Law Review, Volume 10 (2010). 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Cultural Diversity in the Development of the Americas – Indigenous 
Peoples and States in Spanish America, Cultural Studies Series N.11, Unite for the Social 
Development Education and Culture, Organization of American States (2004). 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Law, Duke Law Journal 54 (2004). 
Seminar on National and Local Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, ST/HR/SER.A/2 (1978). 
Sergio Camara Arroyo and Eduardo Luna Cervantes, Mejores Precticas del Ombudsman en 
Iberoamèrica, Dykinson S.L (2012). 
Sonia Cardenas, Emerging Global Actors: the UN and the National Human Rights 
Institutions, Global Governance 9 (2003). 
Uggla Frederik, The Ombudsman in Latin America, Journal of Latin American Studies 36 
(2004). 
Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering, Fragmented Universality and the Future of Human 
Rights, in The Future of International Human Rights, Pergamon Press (1999). 
 
UN Documents (General Comments, General Observations, General Recommendations, 
Resolutions, Reports) 
CESCR General Comment No.10: the Role of Independent National Human Rights 
Institutions in the Promotion and Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1998), 
E/C.12/1998/25; 
CHR Res. 9 (XXXVI) of March 1962, endorsed by ECOSOC Res. 888 F (XXXIV) of 24 July 
1962; 
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, London 
16
th
 November 1945, Art. VII (1-3); 
CRC General Comment No.2: the Role of Independent National Human Rights Institutions in 
the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child (2002), CRC/GC/2002/2; 
 
  
 
ECOSOC Res. 9 (II), 21 June 1946; 
ECOSOC Res. 2/9 of 21 June 1946 on Commission of Human Rights, section 5 “Information 
Groups”; 
ECOSOC Res. 772 B (XXX), 25 July 1960; 
ECOSOC Res. 888 F (XXXIV), 24 July 1962; 
GA Res. 1961 (XVIII) of 12
th
 December 1963; 
GA Res 48/134 of December 20, 1993; 
GA Res 48/134 of December 20, 1993; 
General Observation 1.5, ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation General Observations, 
Geneva (2009); 
General Recommendation XVII (1193), General Comment 10 (1998) and General Comment 
2 (2002); 
ICC Working Group on Accreditation, Decision Paper on the Review of ICC (2008); 
ICC, Rules of Procedure for the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation, adopted by ICC 
members during its 15
th
 session (September 14
th
 2004 – South Korea), amended by ICC 
members during its 20
th
 session (15
th
 April 2008; 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, Informative Bulletin No.19 – Geneva (2013); 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Survey on National Human Rights 
Institutions, Geneva (2009) available at http://www.nhri.net/2009/Questionnaire%20-
%20Complete%20Report%20FINAL-edited.pdf; 
Principles relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights (The Paris Principles), GA Res. 48/134 (1993); 
Report by the Secretary-General, Effective Functioning of Human Rights Mechanisms: 
National institutions and Regional Arrangements – National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights (2005), E/CN.4/2005/106; 
UN GA Res. 2200 C (XXI), 16 December 1966; 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Opening Ceremony of the Human Rights Council, 
Geneva (2006), available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/statements.htm; 
UNGA Res 41/129 (December1986); 
  
 
United Nations Centre for Human Rights, National Human Rights Institutions: a Handbook 
on the Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, Professional Training Series No.4, UN Doc. HR/P/PT/4 (1995); 
United Nations Development Programme, Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens' 
Democracy (2007) available at http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/democracy-undp-publication.htm. 
Oral Sources 
Brian Burdekin, former Special Advisor on National Institutions to the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights; Lund, Sweden, 10 December 2013; 
George Tugushi, Vice-Chair of the Committee Against Torture and former Ombudsman of 
Georgia; Geneva, Switzerland, 21 April 2014; 
Katharina Rose, ICC Geneva Representative ; Geneva, Switzerland, 24 April 2014 ; 
Ramiro Rivadeineira, Defensor del Pueblo de Ecuador; Quito, Ecuador, 23 June 2013; 
Sisi Shahidzadeh, Senior Human Rights Officer, National Institutions and Regional 
Mechanisms Section, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; Geneva, 
Switzerland, 25 April 2014; 
 
 
